Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

66. Letter From Howard Furnas of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith)⁰

Washington, July 15, 1959.

Dear Gerry : The Planning Board did take up the military paragraphs yesterday, but the discussion was confusing and in many ways discouraging.

Gray introduced the subject by saying that the President does not believe the change in language represents any change in policy, and that it will not allow additional strength for the Army nor a “doubling or tripling” of the Defense budget for additions to the limited war capability. If the Secretary of State believes that a change in policy is involved, or that an increase in our limited war capability will result, says Gray, he is wrong. Gray said there still may be a difference of opinion which is not clearly brought out, namely, on whether the US now has an adequate limited war capability.

I said I didn’t think the Secretary of State cares whether the change is regarded as a change in policy or as a clarification of language to make it possible to implement present policy, so long as what comes out of the pipeline is an adequate limited war capability made up of balanced nuclear and non-nuclear forces. In response to Gray’s direct question, I said we believe the US does not now have an adequate non-nuclear limited war capability and that we feel we are in good company with the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps who would actually have to fight such actions.

When asked to give examples of where the US might have to respond to local aggression with forces which are not now adequate, I said that we might be called upon to fight in non-nuclear actions, at least initially, in the Off-Shore Islands, Lebanon, Iraq, Berlin, and Yugoslavia. Other Planning Board members added Korea, South Vietnam, and Iran.

Defense proposed to add the word “militarily” before “appropriate” in the second sentence of Gray’s redraft paragraph 12–a (attached). I said State could not accept this, and Gray said this was not what the President had in mind in agreeing to the language. Lay suggested the second sentence read simply: “Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where nuclear weapons would not be used, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear.” Gray did not seem enthusiastic about this (although I think we can accept it). Triebel did not like it, and Williams said Defense would be glad to study it. In the next sentence Triebel wanted to change “deployed organized units” to “designated commanders.” Gray objected to this.

My guess is that para 12–a represents the President’s thinking and was perhaps drafted by Gray under instructions; thus he is very reluctant to see changes in it and thus he can be so positive about what it means to the President. It seems clear that Defense now realizes the implications of the new language and McElroy wants to back away from his tentative agreement to it. Williams’ tactics yesterday were deliberately stalling.

Later, yesterday afternoon, during the briefing of Dillon for the NSC meeting, he received a call from Goodpaster. Goodpaster told him that Admiral Radford had seen the President and had discussed with him paragraph 12.¹ Radford apparently told the President that even though the latter might have understood from Secretary Herter and Mr. Dillon that the new language generally met the view of State and that they did not envisage any major change of policy this is not true with respect to some subordinates in State including Policy Planning people. The President asked Goodpaster to call Dillon to say that there had been long talks on paragraph 12, that it was essentially what the President intended, and that he would not want a big campaign of opposition built up against it. Dillon said he had understood and was satisfied that the paragraph was accepted as the basis for change in the language, and that while the Pentagon may be going back on its agreement to the paragraph, there is no question of a change of mind so far as State is concerned. Goodpaster told Dillon that Radford said there is a view within the Planning Staff of State that we should have a force of major size and be able to fight sizable operations. Goodpaster said this is what the President is addressing himself to. Dillon said that unless some change takes place we will wind up three or four years from now with no limited war capability at all. There was some exchange about the memorandum on the talk with Ambassador Caccia.² Goodpaster said Gray feels that the point of difference between State and Defense is on whether the proposed change concerns the need to maintain our present capability through future years or whether there is a need for additional forces at present. He said the President would like to know that the view he understood the Secretary and Dillon to hold would be generally held in State. Dillon promised to check this out and let the President know before the Council meeting on Thursday.

This conversation reveals what must have been in Gray’s mind before the Planning Board yesterday. He feels that even though the language may be agreed to, it represents different things to the two opposing sides. Williams has told me that his principals feel that the view of State and the majority of the Chiefs was never clearly put forward and that the President doesn’t understand that a change in policy is being proposed. The problem is fuzzed further by the apparent agreement between the two sides on the President’s language. In searching for the issue here Gray has come up with his idea that the real difference is on the question of whether (a) our present capability is adequate and we are merely seeking to ensure that it doesn’t deteriorate, or (b) we need an additional capability at present and for the future.

In any case, this will go back to the President now. After Dillon sees him tomorrow the President may want a further session.³ I think Dillon understands our view, which I put forward as clearly as I could last evening, assisted by Graham Martin,⁴ but I can’t be sure what position he will take. He seems inclined to feel that State can’t judge as to the adequacy of our present capability and must accept the assurance of the people responsible for these matters. Without going into the question of what the responsibility of the Secretary of State is in this matter, both Martin and I pointed out that the views of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps are on record, and that those officers in the Department who were intimately involved in the Off-Shore and Lebanon operations had been able to arrive at some judgments.

I’ll let you know of any further developments.⁵

Sincerely,

Howard

Attachment

⁶

Washington, July 9, 1959.

REDRAFT OF PARAGRAPH 12–a

It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation’s war objectives. Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. All deployed organized units will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.

0. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy 1958–1959. Top Secret. Smith was in Geneva, where he was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Conference.
1. See Document 65.
2. Not further identified.
3. Furnas’ handwritten postscript states that Dillon and Eisenhower did not discuss this subject at their meeting on July 16. According to the President’s Appointment Book, the meeting lasted only 9 minutes. (Eisenhower Library, President’s Daily Appointments)
4. Dillon’s Special Assistant.

5. In a conversation with Eisenhower on July 15, Gray stated that the Department of State view was that conventional war capability was inadequate and should be enlarged. Eisenhower was displeased that “clear and decisive” language could not be found to “communicate to everyone concerned his clear intention.” Gray replied that it was unlikely the language would be revised again so it should be clear and commonly understood. (Memorandum of conversation, July 17; Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up) See the Supplement.

   In Tocah 162 to Herter at Geneva, June 21, Dillon reported that he had agreed to a Defense proposal to accept “Gray’s paragraph 12–a” if there was a proviso stating that it was a clarification, not a change, in basic policy. Calling it a clarification was satisfactory if there was an understanding that the new language would be controlling. In Cahto 159 from Geneva, July 21, Herter approved, but asked Dillon at his discretion to state to the NSC an assumption that the new language would permit an ability to engage “to some significant extent in limited hostilities” without use of nuclear weapons. (Both in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy 1958–1959) Both are in the Supplement.

6. Top Secret.