Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

244. Memorandum of Discussion at a Special Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, February 18, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

Nuclear Elements of the United States Disarmament Policy

After Mr. Gray opened the meeting, Secretary Herter explained that the United States must now prepare its position on disarmament policy for negotiation with our allies, before UN Subcommittee negotiations.¹ The question today was in what category should we place the cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. The State Department recommends that the President approve the initiation of moves to negotiate on this subject at once, while other aspects of disarmament might be negotiated later.

Secretary Herter recalled that the President had recommended in 1953 his “open skies” proposal,² and in 1956 had offered to put open stocks of fissionable material under control of an international agency.³ Secretary Herter said that Allen Dulles was prepared to give an estimate of the reliability of our intelligence on Soviet stockpiles. Secretary Herter said that he understood that our stockpile was ten to one over the Soviets—five to one in uranium and two to one in plutonium. The United States therefore has a marked superiority in this respect. He therefore felt this was a good time to get started in this field. He said he was not optimistic, however, that the Soviets would agree. One other important factor to be considered is the danger of proliferation of nuclear materials in the custody of other nations, especially those in the Far East. As the Soviets continue production, that will put them in a better position to help the Communist Chinese, who have not been helped yet so far as we know. In summary, Secretary Herter said that he felt the cut-off of nuclear production would not hurt U.S. security, but that he believed on balance it would be favorable to us.

Secretary Gates said that the Defense Department agrees that a cut-off of nuclear production should be our ultimate objective. He also was concerned that, if we proceed to negotiate this subject now, the Soviets would separate this out of the disarmament negotiations at a time when they have not yet made any offer of effective inspection in the USSR. Secretary Gates pointed out that we are now in a difficult period of transition from bombers to missiles. This will require more nuclear weapons, although they will have less megatons. If the anti-missile system programs progress, a goodly amount of fissionable material must be used. Secretary Gates said that any change in the nuclear production program would drastically affect our future weapons plans. He therefore felt that the Defense Department and JCS should have time to review this probable effect. For example, we might have to reprogram some of our nuclear weapons into conventional weapons. He believed that it would be better to keep this subject in Category 3 of the disarmament negotiations⁴ and allow time for further study of future requirements. He is not sure now that Defense could live with a cut-off of production. He was also fearful that we might arrive at a moratorium in this field as we did in nuclear testing by the pressure of world opinion, even though nobody in the United States wished this result. In summary, Secretary Gates said that Defense would like to be prepared to show the effect on the stockpile of a cut-off in production, before a decision is made.

The President said he thought that the Defense presentation of possibility was very good, but that it did not mention what would happen to the Soviets if they stopped production. It also overlooked the possibility that an agreement might put us in the posture of mutual observations with the Soviets, which would be to our advantage. The President said that he did not know how close we have to search for an atomic plant. The President thought, however, that we should look very seriously at what we would be gaining if we could make a start on disarmament. He pointed out that since his atoms-for-peace talk in 1953, the United States had been standing by its proposals for progress on disarmament.

In answer to Secretary Gates’ observations that it would be different if we got inspection, the President said that he did not agree to a disarmament program if it did not involve effective inspection.

Mr. McCone said the studies indicate that the inspection problem will be very difficult. It will require a large number of men closely identified with each plant. If we got into technical negotiations on this subject, it would be more difficult, complicated and confusing in the eyes of the world than has been the nuclear testing negotiations. Mr. McCone agreed that Defense needs mean we must continue production, but he thought we could cut out some U–235 capacity. He thought that the fact that we have greater productive capacity than the USSR is a reflection of the fact that we have different needs for smaller weapons for air defense and anti-missile systems. He is concerned that we not get into the position of separating negotiations for nuclear and conventional disarmament. He said that is just what Khrushchev wants with his “ban the bomb” proposal.⁵ This would put the United States in the worst posture and expose Free World manpower to the superior numbers within the Soviet Bloc. Mr. McCone agreed that it would be an advantage to open up the Soviet Bloc, but indicated that they are not willing to agree to this.

The President said that you can’t put the cart before the horse. You must put out some bait to get them to agree.

Mr. McCone suggested that we make it a condition that the Soviets go forward on the “open skies” plan before we agree to a nuclear production cut-off. He said he was afraid that we would get into a long protracted argument as we have done at Geneva and be forced into a moratorium in production. He thought that we should force the issue of “open skies” inspection. Then we could find out whether they have additional plants that we don’t know about.

Mr. Dulles thought that we have a good idea where Soviet plants are. There may be some plants we don’t know about, but we do know about the major plants. However, in judging the efficiency of these plants there is a great margin of error. Even with the highest figure estimated for their production, their stockpile is much lower than ours.

Secretary Gates said that we have a weapons superiority of about two to one. However, taking into account that they may initiate the attack, we may need as much as two and a half to one. We are now in a position where we are developing new systems but do not yet have them. If nuclear production is separated out from other disarmament measures, per se this will mean that we must change our weapons program.

The President said that we would be in danger anyway even if these new weapons systems come along. As we get into the point that we don’t think that we may be attacked by aircraft, we will not need all of our antiaircraft weapons.

Secretary Gates said that we would still need such systems as Nike–Zeus which will use great amounts of fissionable materials. General Twining said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are fearful of stopping nuclear production. He pointed out that we will have to rework our weapons [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. This requires added amounts of tritium.

Secretary Herter, Secretary Douglas and Mr. McCone all pointed out that tritium is not covered by the definition of fissionable material. General Twining and Secretary Gates both expressed the fear that we could not separate tritium out from the other materials as we wanted.

In answer to a question by the President, Mr. McCone said that we used a lot of tritium, but that it was not defined as fissionable material. However, it does come from reactors instead of producing plutonium.

The President did not think that the Joint Chiefs of Staff or others should fear that we were going to surrender our advantage. We should not say that we do not have the guts to keep making tritium. He believes that if we are way ahead in plutonium and uranium and if we can get a dependable inspection system, he did not see how we would not be better off than we are now. We cannot stay on a dime and be in exactly the same position as they are on Berlin. We should not be in a rigid position, but should find something that we can do in our own advantage. That was the point of the “open skies” proposal. We thought that they would probably not accept it because they have good maps of the United States and we have nothing comparable.

In response to a suggestion by Mr. McCone, the President said that he thought that the idea of stopping production in one plant for a one-plant cut-off on the other side was a good gimmick, but that we should not put it into the international disarmament negotiations. Secretary Herter concurred that such a proposal should be arranged bilaterally.

In answer to Admiral Burke’s fear that the rules would get changed on us, the President said that the rules would have to be that any agreement would have no effect and would not be signed unless an inspection system had been agreed upon, set up, and tested. In testing it we might try Mr. McCone’s suggestion of a one-plant-for-one-plant idea.

The President said we should not forget, when we talk about the Soviet’s conventional power of overrunning us, that we still have navies. We would then restore the ocean’s capacity to safeguard us. The President commented that in Congress smart demagogues are distorting Defense testimony because the United States is horrified that nuclear bombs will destroy millions of people. War used to result in the destruction of nations, but it now involves our very survival. The President thought that if we could eliminate nuclear bombs he would not fear that the United States could take care of the weapons that would be left. He thought that if we could get effective inspection we should be willing to pay a lot. That’s what we are struggling for. He thought that we should make no offers across the board until we can be sure that we can get into the Soviet Union. He felt that we should look at this problem as getting the better in a horse-trade.

Secretary Gates said that he did not disagree with what the President had said, but felt that before we get into such complicated negotiations, a complete review of our force structure should be required.

The President noted that Khrushchev had said that he thought they would be shutting down some nuclear plants. They did not believe in little weapons, but they will be building atomic submarines and missiles. Khrushchev indicated they might shut up at least two nuclear plants, and that they are getting out of the nuclear power business. The President thought that Khrushchev here and there was telling the truth, but the danger was that there might be one lie out of twelve truths. The President had said to Khrushchev that, if we stopped nuclear weapons production, let’s put so much bang under UN control. Khrushchev had just smiled. The President reiterated that we must insist upon an inspection system that the military would trust.

In response to Secretary Gate’s comment about the enormous transition that is going on in our weapons systems, the President pointed out that our program is based on our evaluation of what the Soviets will do. If they would stop nuclear weapons production, the situation would be different. The President said that even if we got agreement to inspection, he wouldn’t talk about putting it into effect before 1963.

Secretary Herter said that the immediate problem is that Mr. Eaton must meet with our allies tomorrow. So far this one subject of nuclear production has been held out and not discussed even with our allies. The question is whether the State Department proposal on this subject can be put on the table in the first category of negotiations.

The President thought that our allies assumed that we had already offered to negotiate on this subject. Secretary Gates pointed out that our previous offer had made this objective along with other things. It had not been separated out before.

Secretary Herter said that the British had put forth a package proposal which they want to lay out. Our allies are objecting to our statement of an objective because they want to proceed to complete disarmament.

The President said that he did not quite agree that this subject had to be part of the package. We have previously said that there was no sense in agreeing to destroy bombs because they could not be discovered. However, it might be possible to stop nuclear weapons production under proper safeguards. The President therefore thought that this subject could be taken up separately.

Secretary Gates said there was one other point. He thought an agreement on production would tend to leave big bombs in the central storage; [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. The President said he sometimes wondered whether one-megaton weapons were better than 20-megaton. Secretary Gates agreed, but General White observed that we have to have both.

General Twining repeated his fear that public opinion would force us into a moratorium. He thought it would be different if we could be sure to get inspection.

The President said that as long as he is here there will be no moratorium until we have an inspection system which we know will work. The only reason we agreed to a moratorium on testing was that we had found out the Soviets had stopped testing in the atmosphere.

The President said that he thought Mr. Eaton should say that our purpose is to do anything that will give a good inspection system. We are prepared to go into cessation of production, but we have got to know that we have an inspection system first. Secretary Herter agreed, and noted that all negotiations so far have broken down on the problem of inspection.

The President agreed with the Joint Chiefs that we should not accept any proposal if there is a way to circumvent it before we get inspection. The President said that no one should think that he doesn’t share the Joint Chiefs’ apprehension. However, the President felt that we have got to make a proposal that would be so fair that any man of good sense would accept it.

When Secretary Herter read A-(l) of the State proposal,⁶ the President said that we must be clear what fissionable material means. He suggested that we say we are talking about the production of uranium and plutonium.

Mr. McCone pointed out that there are two different problems—one is refabricating weapons and the other is replacing the tritium in existing weapons.

Mr. Irwin pointed out that tritium is fusionable material. If we cease production of fissionable material, we could maintain the stockpile with the existing fissionable materials plus new supplies of tritium. He was afraid, however, that it would be hard to distinguish these materials in world opinion. The fusion bomb is considered worse than the fission bomb. What the world would understand is that we were stopping production of fusionable materials. It was this type of concern that caused the Defense staff not to accept the proposed cessation of production but to request that a study be made before the proposition is put forward.

The President felt that Defense still did not see that we were making a horse-trade. We should see what an agreement will do to the other fellow as well as to ourselves. We should look to means for starting to thaw out the rigidity between the two sides or there would be a disaster in the world. The President thought that State should study its proposal again to see whether it was possible to write language which would better meet the anxieties expressed. He thought that we should see that any inspection system must be mutually agreed and tested. He didn’t think this subject would involve the same problems of world opinion as the testing negotiations. Pauling and others had raised the specter of deformed children and other horrors resulting from the tests. The President thought world opinion would understand our insistence that we not stop production until we know we have a safeguarded plan.

Secretary Herter pointed out that the United Nations agreements on disarmament had never omitted provisions for a safeguarded inspection system. He thought we were in a good position in world opinion on that aspect.

The President said that the State proposal should be written so that there is no possibility of misinterpreting what we mean.

Secretary Gates noted that fissionable materials for weapons use might be construed to cover aircraft or missile propulsion. Secretary Herter agreed that the definition should not include such matters.

The President said that State should rewrite their proposal to make clear what we mean as indicated at this meeting. Secretary Herter should then look it over and take it back to Secretary Gates for his agreement.

The National Security Council:⁷

1. Discussed Paragraph A(1) of the attached draft proposal on the subject (Annex A) presented by the Secretary of State; in the light of comments thereon by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman and other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Noted the President’s directive that the Secretary of State prepare a revised draft of Paragraph A(1) of Annex A in the light of the discussion at this meeting, which would:

a. Make very clear that the installation and effective operation of an agreed inspection and control system would have to be a prerequisite to cessation by the United States of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

b. Ensure that the meaning of the term “fissionable materials” excludes tritium and other fusionable materials.

c. Make clear that the term “weapons” as used in this proposal excludes nuclear power reactors and propulsion.

The President emphasized the importance of a thorough and effective inspection and control system. The President further directed that the Secretary of State coordinate this revised draft proposal with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, prior to making this proposal in current negotiations with Western disarmament representatives.

Note: The following redraft of Paragraph A(l) was prepared by the Departments of State and Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission pursuant to 2 above:

“Agreement on the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons immediately after the installation and effective operation of an agreed control system to verify this measure. (The obligations under this provision will not affect the use after the cut-off date of fissionable materials produced prior to and on hand at that date (a) to complete the fabrication of weapons in course of manufacture and (b) to fabricate and maintain weapons on hand or completed under (a). ‘Fissionable materials for use in weapons’* is defined as not including materials for nuclear power or propulsion.)

“* ‘Fissionable materials for use in weapons’ does not include tritium or other fusionable materials (Noforn).”

JSL

Annex A

⁸

NUCLEAR ELEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES DISARMAMENT POLICY

A. The United States would be prepared to reach agreement on the following measures subject only to negotiation of appropriate inspection and control and not dependent on specific political settlements or other disarmament measures:

(1) Cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons immediately after the installation of an agreed control system to verify this measure. (The obligations under this provision will not affect the use, after the cut-off date, of fissionable materials on hand at that date—(a) to complete the fabrication of weapons in course of manufacture, and (b) to refabricate and maintain weapons then on hand or completed under (a).)

(2) Conditional on (1), agreement to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons into the national control of other nations except in defense against armed attack.

(3) Agreed quantities of fissionable material from past production would be transferred in successive increments under international supervision to non-weapons uses including stockpiling. (Amounts transferred under this provision after institution of the cut-off and separately from significant progress in other disarmament areas would not be so great as drastically to reduce U.S. nuclear weapons capability.)

(4) Agreement to place non-military atomic energy installations under IAEA safeguards.

B. Without commitments as to a subsequent course of action the United States would agree to:

(1) A technical conference on the possibility of accounting for past production of nuclear weapons.

(2) A joint study to design an inspection system to police a cut-off of fissionable materials production for weapons purposes.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Lay on February 19. For Kistiakowsky’s account of the meeting, see A Scientist at the White House, pp. 257–258.
1. The forthcoming Ten-Nation Disarmament Meeting under U.N. auspices was scheduled to start on March 15.
2. Reference is apparently to Eisenhower’s July 21, 1955, proposal at the Geneva Summit Conference, the text of which is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, pp. 486–488.
3. On December 8, 1953, President Eisenhower addressed the U.N. General Assembly and made his “Atoms for Peace” proposal, which called for the existing nuclear powers to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an International Atomic Energy Agency. For text, see ibid., pp. 393–400. In a letter to Soviet Chairman Bulganin, March 1, 1956, Eisenhower stated that the United States was prepared to work out suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that further production of fissionable materials would no longer be used to increase weapons stockpiles. The President suggested that this approach might be combined with the “Atoms for Peace” proposal. For text, see ibid., pp. 593–594.
4. A February 4 Department of State paper, submitted to the Department of Defense for its comment, proposed a three-stage plan of action for the consideration of the Ten-Nation Meeting on Disarmament at Geneva. The text of the paper is attached as Appendix “B” to a memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, February 12, which took strong objection to the State proposal. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, NSC Special Meetings) See the Supplement. The plan was subsequently discussed with and revised by the Delegations of Canada, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom and submitted on March 16 at Geneva as a Western paper. Phase III measures were described in the Western plan as “additional measures which are regarded as necessary for achieving the ultimate goal.” For full text of the March 16 proposal, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 68–71.
5. On May 24, 1958, Soviet Chairman Khrushchev addressed the Warsaw Pact and called for a ban of atomic and hydrogen weapons. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, pp. 1043–1044.
6. See Annex A below.
7. The following paragraphs and Note were not given an NSC action number since this was a special and not a numbered NSC meeting.
8. Secret. The source text, which is dated February 17, is labeled “Draft.”