235. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Nuclear Test Negotiations: Meeting of the Principals, Room 5100 New State, 2:30 PM
PARTICIPANTS
- State
- The Secretary
- Mr. Farley—S/AE
- Mr. Blanchet—S/AE
- A.E.C.
- Mr. McCone
- D.O.D.
- Mr. Gates
- Mr. Irwin
- Gen. Fox
- White House
- Dr. Kistiakowsky
- Mr. Keeny
- Dr. Fisk—President, Bell Telephone Laboratories
Mr. Herter said the first matter to be discussed was the disagreement with the USSR over terms of reference for the forthcoming technical talks. He expressed his great appreciation to Dr. Fisk for his willingness to lead our group at these talks. Mr. Farley explained the main difference between the Soviet and the U.S. terms of reference. The issue was whether to state explicitly in the terms of reference that the working group should assess the capabilities and limitations of the control system. It was a major U.S. objective to arrive at such an assessment if possible. Ambassador Wadsworth’s explanation of the Soviet rigidity on this question was that they believed that such an explicit statement would prejudge whether or not the Experts Report of 1958 had in fact been overtaken by subsequent scientific research. The Soviets appeared to consider our concern with capabilities and limitations as unacceptable, just as we view the requirement, in the original Soviet terms of reference, that the group define criteria for on-site inspection “within an agreed quota” as unacceptable. Tsarapkin did, however, claim in informal talks that the Soviets were willing to discuss any data which was [Page 798] relevant and had stated that the Soviet scientists had masses of material which they wanted to bring to the discussions. They would be willing to record, Tsarapkin claimed, any new conclusions. They would not, however, commit themselves in advance to a revision of the conclusions of 1958. The Soviets looked upon our insistence upon an explicit statement that capabilities and limitations should be treated as an effort to prepare the way for disengaging from the conference. Mr. Farley stated that if this was in fact the Soviet position the practical question was whether, in the absence of an explicit call in the terms of reference for review of capabilities and limitations, Dr. Fisk would have a sufficient mandate to draw the Soviet scientists into a discussion of appropriate scope. In viewing this question we had to bear in mind the personality of Federov, who could eventually be brought to yield ground but would in the first instance be rigid and unyielding.
The Secretary said that to him the central question was how fundamental a difference did in fact exist between the Soviet proposal on the one hand and the Department staff proposal, both of which were reproduced in a paper before the meeting (Tab A). Mr. Gates said that it appeared to him that even under the Soviet terms of reference, if the Soviets were to try to dispute the relevance of information which we put forward, we would still be able to table the information and it would become a part of the conference record. Dr. Fisk agreed. The Secretary said he thought that, since it was stated in all current versions of the terms of reference that the group “shall consider all data and studies relevant to the detection and identification of seismic events” (as the Soviets had already agreed to do in the terms of reference), the other side would not be in a position to resist the submission of any relevant data. If they were to attempt to do this we should be in a much stronger position to break off the conference than we were in our present disagreement as to whether the terms of reference should refer to an assessment of capabilities and limitations.
Mr. McCone said that he thought the Department staff proposal did not show our real purpose in going to these discussions, a purpose to which the President had agreed in the conversation of November 11th1 and which was reflected in the policy statement discussed by the group last Saturday.2 He doubted whether, if he were the negotiator, he could meet the requirements of the policy statement within the limits of the terms of reference proposed by the Department.
Dr. Fisk stated that, although the Soviet and State Department staff terms of reference differed from the policy statement, he believed that they established the important point that all data should be discussed [Page 799] and could become a part of the permanent record. He did not attach the same importance to the part of the terms of reference concerning capabilities and limitations. The Secretary observed that it was an important point if Dr. Fisk felt the terms of reference would in fact permit a discussion of capabilities and limitations. Mr. McCone said it is also necessary to report upon the capabilities and limitations.
Mr. McCone said that he felt strongly that the proposed terms of reference might carry the negotiations down the road toward a comprehensive test suspension without securing a discussion of capabilities and limitations. He did not feel we should join in technical discussions at all on these terms. The Soviets had been pushing us around on a matter of great importance. The Soviets were conducting worldwide propaganda on the question of suspension of tests. The U.K. was wobbling. Our own position had been continuously eroded over the last year. It would be a mistake and a submerging of principle to go along with these terms of reference.
The Secretary stated that it was his understanding that the Soviet Union objected to the insertion of the words “capabilities and limitations” since this would constitute an admission that the Experts Report of 1958 had in fact been overtaken. He said that he had read the alternative proposed terms of reference carefully and had not reached the conclusion that there would be an essential difference in the group’s mandate if all reference to capabilities and limitations were left out. Dr. Kistiakowsky stated that it might well prove necessary to have separate conclusions; it might be impossible to get agreement upon a joint report. This was not, however, the same as having an inadequate discussion on record. He did not, however, share Mr. McCone’s concern about the proposed terms of reference. Dr. Fisk pointed out that it would permit the group to put all relevant information on the table and that this in itself might be sufficient. If the terms of reference were to preclude putting forth all relevant data, then he would have reservations. Mr. Farley pointed out that the word study had been used so that the Latter hole theory (which was not, strictly speaking, data) could be discussed.
Mr. Irwin asked whether the new data had not invalidated the Experts Report of 1958. Dr. Fisk replied this question had to be answered in two parts. Setting aside for the moment the question of concealment, the Hardtack II data had shown that the conclusions of Experts had been optimistic relative to the capabilities of the instrumentation described. At the same time, however, it was possible to envisage improvements in instrumentation which would restore something like the original capabilities. This judgment did not take into account the effect on the system of the possibility of concealment. If it were in fact possible, taking into account such factors as the expense of constructing large holes, to decouple so that the yield of an explosion would be reduced by a factor of 10 or [Page 800] as much as 100, then the capabilities and the system would be much less. Its effectiveness would then have to be assessed differently. Mr. Irwin said it was his understanding that, irrespective of the possibility of decoupling, there was a threshold below which small tests could be conducted without risk of detection and with the promise of significant military results. Dr. Kistiakowsky stated that it had been obvious before the Experts Report in 1958 that there was a threshold below which the detection of small tests was uncertain but that nevertheless the President had authorized the negotiations. Mr. McCone said that our basic position provides specifically that the question of threshold would be brought up in the negotiations.
Mr. Dulles said that he did not know what likelihood there was that the Conference might break on the terms of reference. He believed, however, that we would be in a better position if we were to break over a failure to reach conclusions on data which had been put before the conference than if we were to break on the terms of reference. He did not see a clear-cut issue between the two drafts. The Secretary said that there had been a clear-cut issue so long as the Soviets had refused to accept the principle that all relevant data should be discussed. If they were to refuse to consider relevant data on the course of the conference there would again be a clear-cut issue. Dr. Kistiakowsky said he thought a significant issue had been the use of the phrase “suspicious events” in the original Soviet terms of reference. This had suggested a Soviet intention to insist upon positive evidence of a nuclear explosion as part of the criteria for on-site inspection. This phrase had however been abandoned and he did not believe the Soviets could press this approach in the discussion. Dr. Fisk said he wouldn’t be surprised if there were trouble with the Soviets at the Conference. It had been possible in 1958 to get Soviet agreement to an identification of the holes in the capability of the system. He was doubtful if it would be possible to get agreement in this same respect this time. Nevertheless he believed it reasonable to expect that it would be possible to consider all relevant data. The Secretary said that there was a practical problem in keeping the scientific group which had been gathered for the discussion together. He was grateful for Dr. Fisk, who had made it possible to assemble these people. In his own opinion he felt the language proposed by the Department was preferable. It was necessary to keep things moving. It was essential to have a scientific appraisal of the feasibility of the detection and identification of underground events.
Mr. McCone said that he felt it was important to continue to follow the policy we have consistently stated in the past. We must only agree to a discontinuance of testing if the agreement is effective and adequately safeguarded. It was essential that we have a clear estimate of the capabilities and limitations of any control system which might be under negotiation. If these principles could be observed and if it was considered that it [Page 801] would in fact be possible to bring into the technical discussion all relevant information, he was agreeable to accept the terms of reference proposed.
Dr. Fisk stated that he thought that he would prefer the original U.S. terms of reference but that he thought that the versions calling specifically for consideration of all relevant data and studies would permit an adequate frame of reference. He said that he hoped that he would have an opportunity to have a private conversation with Federov comparable to Mr. McCone’s conversation with Emelyanov, which had apparently contributed a great deal to the Soviet agreement finally to discuss the new data. He would make clear to Federov as had Mr. McCone that it was essential that these technical matters be fully discussed.
It was agreed that the delegation would be authorized to seek Soviet agreement to the terms of reference proposed by the Department staff with the words “as part of their work” substituted for the words “in the course of their work” at the beginning of the first sentence of the second paragraph. Dr. Fisk then left the meeting.
The Secretary then raised the question of safety tests. Mr. McCone said that he had received a report on recalculation of the chances of one-point detonation. It appears that the original calculations of Los Alamos had been in some respects in error and had exaggerated the probability of a dangerous incident. There is a problem, however, and safety experiments would have to be conducted some time even though less urgent. The AEC was accordingly prepared to do without these tests before January 1 and could face further deferral till about February. It could forego these without failure to meet any DOD weapons production requirements, except in the case of the depth charge. Mr. Gates asked whether this was the only nuclear depth charge. Mr. McCone said he thought so.
Mr. McCone passed out a preliminary draft of a public announcement concerning the tests.3 Dr. Kistiakowsky agreed to attempt revision to place these experiments in the context of normal laboratory activities. It was generally agreed that this was a good approach.
The Secretary said that when the original draft had been refined to the satisfaction of all concerned it would be desirable to give the British and Canadians advance notice.
Mr. McCone said that if our voluntary moratorium were to extend beyond another three months it would probably be essential to do something about one-point safety. The Secretary observed that it was helpful to know that the matter was not as urgent as originally suggested. If there were an extended moratorium we would of course have to go ahead with [Page 802] these tests in any case, as the State Department has been consistently willing to do.
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Blanchet and approved by S on November 30. For Kistiakowsky’s account of this meeting, see A Scientist at the White House, pp. 163–164.↩
- See footnote 1, Document 234.↩
- November 14; see Document 234.↩
- Not found.↩
- Confidential.↩