Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

232. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 6, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of Principals: Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• State
  • Under Secretary Dillon
  • Amb. Wadsworth
  • Mr. Popper, USDel
  • Mr. Farley, S/AE
  • Mr. Sullivan, S/AE
  • Mr. Spiers, S/AE
  • Mr. Baker, S/AE
  • Mr. Mark, USDel
  • Mr. Morris, S/AE
• Defense
  • Mr. Gates
  • Mr. Irwin
  • Gen. Loper
  • Gen. Fox
• AEC
  • Mr. McCone
  • Gen. Starbird
  • Dr. English
• White House
  • Mr. Gray
  • Dr. Kistiakowsky
  • Mr. Keeny
• CIA
  • Dr. Scoville
  • Col. Smith

Mr. Dillon said he had convened the group in order to discuss the course we would like to pursue upon resumption of negotiations on October 27. Of course, decisions would only be final after consultations with U.K. officials when their new government is formed. The Department of State has given a good deal of thought to this matter. The course of action we have developed is only slightly different than that outlined in the July 23 statement.¹ We have recently received a letter from the Department of Defense noting their continued interest in a phased agreement and their eagerness to proceed with the July 23 course of action.² We in the State Department feel that we would not want to allow the negotiations to proceed past December 31 without some decisive action lest we allow the Soviet Union to have a de facto uncontrolled cessation of nuclear tests. We feel that after resumption of negotiations on October 27, the delegation must, for the next two months, make a major effort to make clear in the minds of impartial observers that the Soviet Union is not prepared to accept what we consider to be adequate control over a cessation of underground tests. How to do this is a problem for the negotiators. Our thinking has been that it will be necessary to re-emphasize the need for a full discussion of the technical data pertinent to the underground problem. If the Soviets refuse to enter into such a discussion, the delegation itself should then proceed to present the technical information. We do not necessarily feel we must present our estimate of a specific number of on-site inspections, but rather, set the pattern as to how a level of inspection must be derived from consideration of the technical facts.

This procedure, coupled with a re-emphasis of our position on the other major issues such as staffing and veto, would, we believe, put us in a position so that after the end of the current United Nations General Assembly and a probable December summit meeting, we would be able by Christmas to move to presentation of a limited treaty on the basis of Soviet refusal to give attention to pertinent technical data or to agree to adequate inspection and control. When presenting the limited treaty we should point out that such an agreement would eliminate the fallout problem.

Mr. Dillon said that he was not clear from Mr. Gates’ letter of Sept. 29 exactly what Defense recommended. If it wished to move immediately on October 27 to table a limited treaty, he thought that this would cause considerable difficulty both in world public opinion and in the negotiations. The Soviets would probably be able to shift to the United States the blame for withdrawing from the stated conference objective of a complete cessation of nuclear tests.

Mr. McCone said that when he was in Vienna for the General Conference of the IAEA, the Soviet delegate, Mr. Novikov, had sought him out on several occasions to discuss the negotiations. Mr. McCone gathered that Novikov was deputy director of the international organization section of the Soviet Foreign Office and perhaps had over-all responsibility for the Geneva negotiations. During these discussions Novikov made the following statements:

1. The USSR desires to stop all nuclear testing and to ban the use of nuclear weapons.

2. The Soviet Union has concluded that the United States does not want to stop testing because the latter wishes to continue the development of tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets felt that they have no practical value, are very expensive and if used, would lead to full-scale nuclear war. Chairman Khrushchev himself had decided not to proceed with developing and manufacturing such weapons.

3. The United States had not presented all the information on the new seismic data in its presentation of January 5.³ Soviet scientists have not been able to check the validity of the new data, working only with the summary report that has been given.

4. The United States over-exaggerates the problem of controlling underground nuclear tests. He pointed to the Soviet detection of 32 U.S. tests during Operation Hardtack. When Mr. McCone pointed out that such detection was very possible from a submarine, Novikov had replied that all detection had been from the Soviet Union. Novikov seemed to think these explosions had included underground tests.

5. He questioned U.S. refusal to discuss the Soviet quota proposal and our insistence that a quota must be firmly related to the technical facts of the underground problem. This was hard to understand, since Gromyko, Lloyd and Herter had agreed in Geneva that the quota was indeed a matter for political decision.

Mr. McCone said that Novikov evinced considerable interest in the Berkner reports and asked what they contained. Mr. McCone had replied that they showed that the Geneva system did not have the capability for dealing with the underground problem the experts had originally estimated. This capability could be restored partially but not fully. Novikov had asked whether closer spacing of seismic stations would not increase this capability. Mr. McCone had replied that he thought it would. The possibilities of evasion of detection were referred to, but Mr. McCone did not discuss these in any detail. Novikov asked how many inspections would be required if it turned out that there were 1,000 unidentified events each year. Mr. McCone said that, proceeding from the formula in our tabled draft Annex I to the treaty, this would be about 20 percent of the stated figure, or 200 inspections. Novikov commented that even if the Soviet Union did allow that number of inspections, he thought it would be impossible to organize them.

Mr. McCone said that he had taken the position that the United States was pursuing these negotiations in accordance with the President’s May 5 letter to Mr. Khrushchev.⁴ He pointed out that it did not appear that Ambassador Tsarapkin was negotiating in the same spirit that characterized Mr. Khrushchev’s letters to the President, especially Khrushchev’s pledge of absolutely adequate controls. Novikov seemed disturbed by this. He also seemed impressed with Mr. McCone’s assessment that technical discussions of the underground detection problem were the only way to make progress in the negotiations.

When Novikov suggested that the United States really did not want an agreement on underground testing because it wished to be able to continue to develop nuclear weapons, Mr. McCone had replied that this was not the case and that the United States did not have to continue such development since we had enough nuclear weapons. It was rather a question of improving our existing weapons. Mr. McCone had further stated that it appeared that the Soviet Union was trying to establish a position where the United States, an open country, would be constrained from continuing such tests while the USSR could proceed with undetectable tests. Novikov had replied that the Soviet Union did not know as much about the United States as Mr. McCone might think, pointing out that the three Argus high altitude tests had been unknown to the Soviet Union until they were reported several months later in the New York Times.

After concluding the account of his talk with Novikov, Mr. McCone said that the AEC had been giving some thought to the course of action on resumption of the negotiations. The AEC has not changed in its appraisal of the extreme difficulty of monitoring an underground nuclear test cessation. It thought it important to remember that the United States has already been foreclosed from nuclear testing for a year by a device which is very much to the advantage of the Soviet Union. It believes that, as time goes on, there will be continued and increasing pressure on us to accept a treaty that does not provide safeguards. In this connection, General Gruenther had reported that at the recent International Red Cross Conference several delegates from other countries had strongly indicated their belief that nuclear testing would not be resumed. They, of course, had not differentiated between tests in the atmosphere and underground tests.

The AEC feels that the July 23 course of action is perfectly valid, although it agrees that interim events may require some modification in the tactics. It believes that a comprehensive treaty must be adequately safe-guarded. The decision that underground tests could not be adequately monitored had been arrived at on a sound basis and after the exposure of all pertinent technical data. We must continue to study ways to improve the detection system. Of course, it might be that we will find that a solution of the underground problem is impossible and that the art of deception may advance as rapidly as improvements in seismic detection. The AEC believes that we should avoid a break in the negotiations which, if necessary, should be carried to a point at which the President might address himself to Khrushchev either personally or by letter. Failing agreement with the Soviets on a limited atmospheric treaty, the AEC would propose that we announce a unilateral moratorium on atmospheric tests to continue as long as others do likewise. We should state, however, that due to the lack of adequate control means for monitoring underground tests, the United States reserves the right to take any action with regard to such tests it deems necessary. In view of a possible summit meeting and the President’s trip, however, the AEC does not believe that we should state in advance that we are free to resume testing on January 1. However, we should not impede the United States freedom of action to do so.

General Starbird commented that in earlier conversations Mr. McCone had felt that a letter from the President to Khrushchev should be sent before the end of December and that the U.S. Delegation should be instructed on resumption of negotiations that their objective is to point out that the United States cannot accept an agreement banning underground tests.

Mr. Dillon said that the only difference between the July 23 course of action and the one proposed by the State Department is that under the former, after the Soviets had refused to discuss the technical data, we would immediately introduce the limited treaty while, at the same time, proceeding to present the technical data. The course we now propose would have the U.S. Delegation present the technical data without telling the Soviet Delegation that we cannot accept a comprehensive treaty.

Mr. Gates said that the important thing to the Defense Department is that the group determine U.S. policy on what we wish to be the outcome of the negotiations. Tactics are a State Department matter. Defense is anxious to be able to resume nuclear testing after December 31. If a policy decision is not made, it feels that we will continue to be faced with new reasons for delay, such as the President’s trip to the Soviet Union, a summit conference, etc. It will become more and more difficult to resume testing. Defense is anxious to determine a firm U.S. position so that policy will determine tactics, and not vice versa.

Mr. McCone asked whether Mr. Gates meant that Defense wished to abandon the goal of a comprehensive agreed ban even under circumstances where an adequate control system was possible. Mr. Gates said yes, because he has not yet seen a control system which would be adequate. He believed that we should settle the policy issue now rather than spend time on the discussion of tactics and technical data, so that we can avoid a situation where the tactics “tail” wags the policy “dog”. Mr. Gates said it seemed to him that a limited phased nuclear test agreement could be proposed as one immediately feasible move towards peace at a time when Chairman Khrushchev has so vocally stated his desire for such movement.

Mr. Irwin said that if agreement can be reached on a policy that the United States intends to resume underground testing because no system exists for the detection and identification of underground tests, and if this is the policy for which we can all work, then the tactics proposed by the State Department could be used, since our position will be clear. In this case, we will be faced with two possible situations: either the Soviets will agree with the technical assessment of the problem, but state that we should proceed with a comprehensive agreement regardless of the difficulties; or the Soviets will not agree with the validity of our technical assessment. In either case, the United States will have to be prepared for disagreement with the Soviet Union and to announce that we will continue to test underground.

Mr. Dillon said that we have not changed the conclusion that, without further seismic experimentation, we cannot be sure of a system which would give reasonable control, and thus we could not agree to a ban on underground tests. There was thus no real change in our view. However, we do not believe that we can separate tactics from our objective, since in the play of world events, especially looking toward a summit conference, tactics are a very real part of what we hope to attain. If we have a summit conference in December, the underground control issue should be sharpened at the negotiation to a point where a move to the limited approach could be made by the President at the summit meeting, should this seem desirable.

Mr. Gates said that what really worries Defense is that its planning, organization and budgeting in the nuclear field is all held in abeyance by the uncertainty of what our testing policy will be. He believed that we should decide now what we want to do and should work toward this. The tactical approach of playing by ear can only fuzz the matter. Mr. Dillon replied that, as he had said earlier, we do not wish to prolong the uncertain situation beyond December 31, thus giving the Soviets a de facto uncontrolled test ban. Mr. Gates commented that he thought the Soviets had done fairly well in getting by for the past year with an uncontrolled ban.

Mr. McCone commented that he did not think we could blame the Soviet Union for a de facto ban this past year, since we ourselves had volunteered a one-year moratorium. They had, of course, spun out the negotiations, although we had proposed several recesses. He said that he was not clear whether the Defense Department felt that it should be in a position to resume testing in the sensible [sic] atmosphere regardless of Soviet action. Mr. Irwin replied that Defense would be willing to accept an agreement banning atmospheric testing even if such an agreement relied only on national detection networks for control.

In response to a query by Mr. Gates as to what technical discussion at the negotiations would reveal, Mr. McCone said that he believed it would prove to any reasonable man the futility of safeguarding an underground cessation.

Mr. Dillon asked Ambassador Wadsworth how long he thought it would take at the negotiations to proceed with the proposed tactics in order to sharpen the issue of underground control to the point where we could propose a limited agreement. Ambassador Wadsworth replied that this would, of course, depend a bit on our objective. If the delegation returned to Geneva with all the material ready for presentation, we could present a rounded picture of why we need technical discussions in a relatively short time. However, it would be very difficult to know by what date we could demonstrate Soviet intransigence. His experience at the negotiations showed clearly that the Soviets might, on that day, make sufficient movement so that we would not be able to shift to a new approach. He would definitely not wish to face the issue until after the conclusion of the present UN General Assembly. He believed that a sufficient case could be built for a shift to a limited treaty by Christmas.

Mr. Gray noted that while it would be relatively easy to arrive at a policy decision on this matter for the U.S. Government, he wondered about UK willingness to support such a position. Mr. Dillon commented that this would, of course, be a problem and that we would not be able to develop a program with the UK until after their elections on Thursday. Mr. Gates said he was completely convinced that the UK has no intention of changing its national position, which was for a complete test cessation. Mr. Irwin said he believed this is a question of judgment of the importance to the United States of its nuclear capability over the next ten to fifteen years. If this capability is essential to U.S. national security, as he believed, then we shall have to weigh this against the problem of facing up to a difference with the UK.

Mr. McCone said he found it difficult not to be impatient with Macmillan’s attitude toward the negotiations since, after all, one of the reasons the UK is in a position to agree to cease British nuclear weapons development activities is that the United Kingdom is now getting weapons information and submarines from the United States under our bilateral agreement with them. He recalled that Macmillan had assured U.S. officials, and him personally—when urging the United States to drop the link to disarmament—that under no circumstances would he go along with an inadequately controlled agreement.

Mr. Dillon said it appeared that Defense wished a basic decision at this time that a comprehensive test cessation agreement is impossible, that the United States proceed with an atmospheric agreement, and plan to continue weapons testing underground for the next ten to fifteen years. The State Department, rather, would say that a controlled and complete cessation does not seem possible now but that we are not willing publicly to abandon this goal at this time. Mr. Gates said he thought we should eliminate underground cessation as a practical possibility at the present time and consider it as the next step in a phased approach. Mr. Irwin added that when we learn how to control underground tests in two or five years, we should then reconsider an extension of the agreement to include an underground ban, provided there is progress in other disarmament issues.

Dr. Kistiakowsky recalled that the original Geneva Experts’ control system had not guaranteed certain detection; rather the President had decided to accept a certain probability for such detection. Since that time we have learned of a quantitative change in the capability of the Geneva system. However, this was certainly not a black-and-white shift from capability to no capability. He also recalled that the McRae Report⁵ had indicated no strong technical requirement for a resumption of tests in January. To him the worst thing that could happen would be for the United States to be caught in a no-testing situation without any control system. Thus, he could not subscribe to a unilateral moratorium. He reiterated that no detection system could be perfect. Mr. Irwin commented that he realized that perfect control was impossible but that he believed we must have a “reasonably adequate” control system. He understood that such a system does not exist. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that possibilities for such a system had not been fully explored as, for instance, the possibility of using unmanned seismic stations—as discussed in the Berkner report and the London Killian–Penney meeting—capable of detecting and identifying underground events down to 50-ton size, not just 50 kilotons. This is a perfectly straightforward proposition which has not been considered.

Mr. McCone said that we had, of course, recognized that the original Geneva system was not perfect and for that reason he had thought that a threshold should be proposed for underground explosions. Thus we would ban nuclear tests of 5 kilotons and larger which could be controlled but would exempt from the ban tests smaller than 5 kilotons, which would not be adequately controlled. He noted that in the negotiations we had never had a real opportunity to introduce this concept and, indeed, we seemed to have forgotten it. A technical conference could re-establish the need for a threshold. Of course, this would not dispose of the decoupling problem.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said he had concluded that technical discussions would be advantageous but that he believed we should be very careful in any discussion of the Latter hole decoupling scheme unless we have good and hard facts to support what is now only a theory. To his mind, the Latter hole was a little like seriously proposing nuclear tests on the other side of the sun.

Mr. Dillon said that the group seemed agreed that we should not tie our hands, and pointed out that it would be difficult to reach a final decision at this point in view of differing scientific judgments on the underground problem. However, we could come close to agreement to use every effort to put the facts on the conference record, to clarify the underground detection problem with the Soviet Delegation and to make clear that they are unwilling to accept adequate inspection. He said he felt that if we follow this procedure, we will then be in a position to put forward the limited treaty. He believed the UK would go along with such a course of action as far as the moment when we would shift from a comprehensive approach to a limited phased approach. At that point we may well be faced with a parting of the ways.

Mr. Gray said he thought that sooner or later the United States would have to face up to a difference in approach to these negotiations. He believed that we were moving from a position relying on adequate control to a system described as deterrence.

Mr. Gates said he could not understand what was so difficult in arriving today at a decision among the principals. Mr. Dillon said he could not see any difficulty in arriving at a decision but could not say when such a decision could be made, since it would be necessary to take into account subsequent events.

Ambassador Wadsworth said that the words they use in Geneva to describe the kind of control the United States desires are “effective international control”. Control is effective if it acts as a deterrent. Thus, in the delegation lexicon, they arrive at the term “adequate deterrent”. Effective control means enough deterrent. Mr. Irwin said that in order to have a deterrent one would need a reasonable chance of catching a potential violator. He did not know, but perhaps 200 inspections might be able to do this even if we know that such a number of inspections could not positively identify an underground violation.

Mr. Dillon said that after listening to the discussion, it appeared to him that the basic decisions on this matter had already been taken, and that he could not see what further decision was required. Mr. Irwin replied that Defense would like to see instructions to Ambassador Wadsworth stating that the U.S. Delegation should not agree to a cessation of underground testing at this time, and that the cessation of underground tests should be a goal for a phased agreement to be entered into at the time when underground detection becomes feasible and after progress in other areas of disarmament. The instructions should include a statement that the United States reserves the right to continue nuclear testing underground after January 1. The delegation’s tactics should be aimed toward the implementation of this policy.

Mr. McCone said he did not believe such a course of action was different from the May 5 decisions of the President.⁶ The AEC believes that whether or not the Soviets agree to technical talks on underground detection, the President should write Soviet Premier Khrushchev prior to January 1:

(1) making clear that the United States can accept at this time only the limited treaty embracing atmospheric tests and those to altitudes which can be adequately monitored by the system to be agreed;

(2) pointing out that if the Soviets want a first step, the limited treaty can be negotiated immediately;

(3) emphasizing that the United States cannot accept now a treaty prohibiting underground tests in view of the lack of adequate capability for monitoring;

(4) reiterating that the United States is pursuing urgently the problem of improving techniques for detection and identification of underground tests so that agreement on this matter can be attempted subsequently when a technically sound solution is possible;

(5) If the Soviets refuse the limited treaty, the United States will announce that it will withhold unilaterally atmospheric tests while other nations do likewise in view of the possibility of monitoring these relatively effectively with national systems in existence. However, in view of the lack of any system capable of monitoring effectively underground tests, the United States will consider itself free to take any action with regard to such tests it deems necessary.

Mr. Dillon said that the State Department sees our objectives in the negotiations somewhat differently from the Defense Department, which wishes to clear up the underground control problem so that we may be free to resume underground testing on January 1. The State Department does not disagree with the necessity for resolving the underground detection difficulty, but we feel that tactics are an integral part of our objective. We must consider not only our testing positions but also our position vis-à-vis world public opinion. Thus, for us, tactics meld with our objective. Mr. Irwin said he believes that the importance to our national interest of continued underground nuclear testing during the next ten years is such that it should override the imponderable public opinion problem.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said it was his impression that the State Department thought of a nuclear test agreement as a part of an over-all arms limitation program. A nuclear test ban makes no sense to him if it is not a step in the broader area of disarmament. He was afraid that a hard and fast decision to resume nuclear testing would be bad if it disregarded public opinion.

Mr. Gray said he very strongly felt that the principals were not fundamentally in agreement on the course of action to be pursued. The Defense Department clearly desired to instruct the U.S. Delegation to avoid a comprehensive agreement. He did not believe this to be the State Department position. He asked whether the Delegation had been informed of the July 23 decision. Ambassador Wadsworth explained that the July 23 decision had not yet been translated into concrete instructions to the Delegation because of the practical difficulties of implementing it. He was, of course, aware of the proposed plan for proceeding immediately to table a limited treaty. He stated that he was personally definitely opposed to such a course of action. He did not wish to discuss this matter in detail, however, since his responsibility was that of negotiation rather than of policy formulation. Mr. Dillon said he believed the principals were agreed that the underground detection facts do not indicate at this time that an underground nuclear test ban could be fully monitored. Mr. McCone said it was perhaps rather that we now know that we cannot enforce an underground cessation and that we must strive to develop additional technology in this field. Dr. Kistiakowsky said he did not believe he could judge the ability to control underground tests until he had studied the recent work with long-period seismograms being done by Columbia University seismologists in cooperation with the Bell Telephone Laboratory. Some of those working on this possibility believe they can re-attain the detection and identification capability originally estimated for the Geneva system.

Dr. Scoville said that there was a real difference between what was necessary to deter and what is necessary to control. He did not believe that many of those present were sympathetic with the deterrent approach. However, if a control system does deter a potential violator, it is therefore an effective control system. He recalled that the most recent NIE on Soviet testing motivations had concluded that the Soviet Union would not seek to cheat if there was an appreciable chance that they would be caught.

Mr. Gates stated that he did not wish to take the position that the Defense Department is opposed to a comprehensive test agreement. However, it does not see how such an agreement can be controlled now. In the face of this, it wishes to avoid continued delays and to move toward continued underground testing. He could not understand why we could not now proceed with a limited phased agreement. Mr. Dillon said that when we move away from a comprehensive approach, he did not believe we should immediately resume weapons tests underground after January 1. It would be more prudent to conduct seismic improvement and decoupling investigation of nuclear shots first. These would get people accustomed to underground nuclear explosions and help pave the way for resumption of underground development tests later on.

Mr. Dillon said he believed that, on the basis of the discussion, we were in a position now to work out a definite course of action for the delegation which, after coordination with the other agencies, could be presented to the U.K. next week.

Mr. Dillon reminded the group that technical discussion or extensive technical presentation will require a very strong technical contingent on the U.S. Delegation, and he hoped that the other agencies would make such people available as Ambassador Wadsworth may need them.

Mr. Dillon asked for a summary of progress on the various technical investigations under way in Defense and AEC. Mr. McCone explained that the high explosive investigation of the Latter decoupling scheme being done in Operation Cowboy was about two months behind schedule. We could not expect results until sometime in January or March. Several contracts had been let for the engineering studies of the feasibility of constructing, and the costs of, the “Latter” holes required to decouple underground tests, which had been recommended by the Killian/Penney group in London. Early reports seemed encouraging for holes of limited size. For instance, a hole of 110–ft. radius designed to accommodate a 2 KT nuclear explosion could be constructed with reasonable assurance in twelve months at a cost of $5 million.

Mr. Keeny asked whether anything could be done with the larger holes. General Starbird replied that AEC had been hampered in these studies because they have had to ask for judgments on this complicated question without being able to explain fully the use to which such holes would be put. There have been some judgments that holes as large as 200 ft., or even greater, could be reliably constructed. However, they have not been able to approach the investigation broadly on an unclassified basis. Mr. McCone said that in planning for nuclear shots for the testing of the decoupling theory, and for seismic improvement shots, surveys and negotiations are required. These are not proceeding because the Defense Department had requested that a public announcement of this program be withheld for the present. Mr. Irwin said that the Defense Department had recommended withholding a public announcement because it was concerned lest publicity have an untoward effect on the negotiations. Mr. Dillon said the Department had approved the text of the announcement some time ago and did not see any problem with going ahead with such a public announcement at a suitable time.

General Loper reported that the Berkner and Panofsky panel recommendations for long-range research and development on seismic and outer space detection had been reviewed by two panels under Dr. York’s direction and that while proposals were under consideration, no contracts had been let. $20 million had been allocated by the Secretary of Defense for this work, but the two panels had indicated a total of $28 million would be needed for the first year. Defense was somewhat worried about the propriety of allocating funds initially appropriated for other purposes.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology; Disarmament, Nuclear Testing Policy, ‘59. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Morris and approved in U on October 13. For Kistiakowsky’s account of this meeting, see A Scientist at the White House, pp. 108–109.
1. See the attachment to Document 225.
2. The letter, dated September 29, has not been found.
3. Reference is to Geneva Conference doc. GEN/DNT/25, January 5, 1959, a report given to the Soviet and British Delegations at Geneva. The report is briefly summarized in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, pp. 1335–1336.
4. For text, see ibid., pp. 1403–1405.
5. Dr. James W. McRae was the chairman of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Requirements. The report of the panel was presented at the August 26 meeting of the principals charged with policy for the Geneva nuclear test negotiations. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Suspension of Nuclear Testing) See the Supplement.
6. See Document 216.