Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

208. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Camp David, Maryland, March 21, 1959, 4:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Nuclear Testing

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The President
  • The Acting Secretary
  • Mr. Murphy
  • Ambassador Whitney
  • Mr. Merchant
  • General Goodpaster
  • Dr. Killian
  • Mr. McCone
  • Mr. Quarles
  • General Twining
  • Mr. Reinhardt
  • Major Eisenhower
  • Mr. Farley
• United Kingdom
  • The Prime Minister
  • Mr. Lloyd
  • Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar
  • Sir Patrick Dean
  • Sir Anthony Rumbold
  • Ambassador Caccia
  • Sir Norman Brook
  • Mr. O’Neill
  • Mr. Roper
  • Mr. Bishop

MVW USDel MC 19

Mr. Herter said that the negotiations in Geneva for a suspension of nuclear weapons tests had recessed until April 13.¹ The principal issues on which there was a sharp difference between the United States and the United Kingdom on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other were the veto, procedures for on-site inspection, and staffing of control posts. He briefly summarized the opposing positions.

The Prime Minister noted that at the last meeting the Soviet Union had accepted the draft duration article proposed by the United States.² During his recent trip to the Soviet Union Khrushchev had told him that it was clear the proposed U.S.–U.K. control system was designed for espionage purposes. There are some 2,000 earthquakes a year and the U.S. and U.K. propose a scheme which would enable anyone of them to be inspected plausibly. There would be plenty of occasions for obtaining military intelligence anywhere the U.S. and U.K. wanted. Mr. Macmillan had replied that the Soviets wanted a double veto on inspection, both over the sending of a team and the reaching of conclusions after its visit. He had protested that there was no intent to carry out 2,000 inspections a year. If this was what was troubling Mr. Khrushchev, the difficulty could be met by setting a ceiling on the number of inspections and allocating to each side a certain share of these. Khrushchev had said this was an interesting idea. Gromyko later asked what number of inspections we had in mind but Mr. Lloyd had left it indefinite.

The Prime Minister said that the real question now was what the technical situation is. Our experts last summer had agreed on a control system with a very high capability even for 5 KT underground shots. We went into the present talks with our eyes open on this basis. But now he understood there were new facts indicating that perhaps a 100 KT shot underground could go undetected. It was important to get clear whether this was indeed the situation before we tried to decide on negotiating tactics.

Dr. Killian said that there have been several developments. The first of these was the new data from the Rainier series. Instead of from 20 to 100 earthquakes needing checking annually there might be about 1,500. Second, a restudy of the possibilities of concealment of underground shots showed the possibility of reducing the signal from an underground shot to one-tenth or less of the actual yield. In theory the reduction in signal size might be even greater. Dr. Killian emphasized that this was only theory and that one could not be sure without experimenting and testing. Such concealment would be very costly and would require a considerable engineering effort. The third development related to testing in outer space. It is apparently technically feasible to test out to 300 million kilometers. It is also technically feasible to design detection systems, using in the first instance earth satellites, and later solar satellites. Here, however, account must be taken in turn of the possibility of shielding outer space tests from such satellite detection systems.

The President observed that he had had some experience with earthquakes in the Far East and that earthquakes were much more diffused events than nuclear explosions, which came from a single point. Dr. Killian said that this was true and that when the signal from an earthquake could be clearly distinguished from the background noise of the earth, it could in many cases be recognized and distinguished from a nuclear explosion.

Dr. Killian continued that the final development was the possibility that (leaving aside concealment) relatively simple ways had been found to restore now the capabilities of the Geneva experts system for 10 KT shots to what it had been thought to be for 5 KT shots. By three years of research, the capability could be fully restored down to 5 KT, and if some provision were made for additions to the system, the original estimated capability could be improved.

Mr. Quarles said that the developments summarized by Dr. Killian meant that the Geneva experts system might not distinguish events which could be tests approaching 50 to 100 KT. If events of this size could go undetected, then most of the additional nuclear weapons development work that the United States might want to do could fall within this range of undetectability. Mr. Herter and Dr. Killian pointed out that this limitation on the detection capability had a direct bearing on the possibility of setting an upper limit on the number of inspections, as suggested by Mr. Macmillan. With such a range of uncertainty it would be very difficult to fix a realistic ceiling.

The President asked whether the idea of a threshold had been suggested to the Soviet Union. Dr. Killian said that it had not.

The President inquired whether fallout appeared to be an increasing problem. Dr. Killian said that our appraisal of the fallout hazard has not changed significantly. However, scientists have always pointed out that this problem must be carefully watched and they are now concerned that new data now coming in may lead to a shift in the evaluation of the degree of hazard. Mr. Quarles observed that there appeared to be a higher rate of settling out of strontium–90 from the upper atmosphere so that more of this radioactive material comes to earth during its half-life.

The Prime Minister said he thought it was important for us to rethink our position in the light of these facts. Our purposes in the testing negotiations were the following: (1) to get rid of fallout; (2) to limit the number of countries learning how to make nuclear weapons; and (3) to make some forward movement in applying the principle of international control. He asked whether an agreement limited at least initially to cessation of atmospheric tests would achieve these purposes. This would appear still to be a deterrent to fourth country nuclear weapons programs. Presumably the control system would be much simpler. Mr. Herter and Mr. McCone said that mobile inspection teams would not be required for such a ban, but only a relatively few control posts and aircraft flights. The Prime Minister said that the other possibility apparently was to suspend the present negotiations, continue suspension of tests unilaterally, and continue efforts to solve the technical problems which have appeared. The President said that the United States would be prepared in such a situation to say that we would refrain from atmospheric tests if the Russians did. We would want to do some tests underground, particularly some for peaceful purposes.

Mr. Herter said that it must be understood that the new developments on the detection problem raised very grave difficulties for the United States in seeking Senatorial approval of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests. Mr. McCone said that he was convinced that there would have to be a very persuasive case for our ability to detect tests, if a treaty was to be ratified. He remarked also that we would have to realize that there was a school of thought in the Senate which was skeptical of the kind of concealment or decoupling theories described by Dr. Killian and that we would be criticized for letting this possibility stand in the way of agreement. He agreed that it was possible to stop atmospheric tests either unilaterally or by agreement. In the case of such an agreement, it appeared that seven or eight fixed control posts in the Soviet Union and about four in the United States would be adequate. It would be harder to accept a halt in underground tests since there was much useful work to be done in this field.

The Prime Minister referred to the recently accepted duration article and pointed out that it gave a unilateral right to withdraw if we were not satisfied with the installation or operation of the control system. He suggested that with this much of a free hand we might be safe to go into a comprehensive agreement and rely on this right of escape if we felt we were not sure the Soviets were living up to it. The President said he thought this would not be prudent since it would be very difficult in the face of world opinion to exercise such a unilateral right of withdrawal.

The Prime Minister said that he thought the issues relating to the control system which Mr. Herter had summarized at the outset of the session might conceivably be negotiated out and agreed on. Was it wise to press ahead in our efforts to gain a treaty of the kind we were now seeking in Geneva? Mr. Quarles said that he did not think we ought to agree to anything we did not feel confident could be controlled by the proposed detection system. An inadequate control system favored the dishonest. He thought the conference should be steered toward an agreement for cessation of atmospheric tests but not outer space or underground tests. This would take care of the concern with fallout and the health hazard. The President said that while this would take care of the health hazard it would not take care of the fourth country problem. Mr. Lloyd said that he thought the Soviet answer to a proposal for a limited agreement would be to say they would agree to stop all tests or none. Mr. Herter agreed that that had been the Soviet line and on this basis they had raised strong objections to our article permitting explosions for peaceful purposes. However, if they turned down an agreement for cessation of atmospheric tests, after having been the obstacle to an agreement on a comprehensive test ban, they would take a licking in the propaganda forum.

Dr. Killian said that he thought it was important to try to make some start on application of international controls by agreement. Mr. Herter said that he thought any proposal for a limited atmospheric test ban should include provision for continued study of control of underground and outer space tests.

Dr. Killian pointed out that there were troublesome problems in defining the atmosphere, and that these problems of definition had real implications for both fallout and detection.

The Prime Minister asked whether we could just decide not to shoot off nuclear weapons in outer space. Mr. Quarles said that we have some things we want to do in outer space, though he then commented that perhaps we did not want to do them badly enough to actually shoot.

The Prime Minister said he considered a decision on this matter of a nuclear testing agreement to be an epochal one. It was of great importance to the survival of humanity to keep nuclear weapons from spreading. Mr. Herter pointed out that an agreement for cessation of nuclear weapons production was even more important in this regard. The President said that he too thought this was a very grave decision but unfortunately we just cannot be sure we could detect clandestine underground explosions.

Mr. Lloyd said he thought we would be on a very bad wicket if we changed our position. We proposed the experts’ talks and the present negotiations. If, after starting on October 31 on the basis of the experts’ report, and reaching agreement on most points, we now bring up basic new technical conclusions we will be in a very unfavorable position. Mr. Herter pointed out that we had not reached agreement on the veto. The Prime Minister said that clearly our line should be to have any break come on the veto, not on the technical issues. Mr. Herter and Mr. Quarles expressed agreement with this point.

Mr. Macmillan said that the possibility which appeared to be emerging was that we might say that, in the face of the Soviet insistence on the veto, we would go to an atmospheric test ban in order to simplify the control system in a way which would remove the need for mobile inspection. This would avoid having to try to agree on a specific number of inspections and yet remove the point which was of greatest concern to Khrushchev. The President said that, if the Soviets wouldn’t buy such a proposal, it would still be possible for us to go to a unilateral suspension of atmospheric tests.

The Prime Minister said that this matter would require more thought. We had a few weeks during the recess to get our position agreed. Mr. Lloyd said that he would be in touch with Mr. Herter regarding the next steps.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel on Disarmament Policy. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Farley and cleared by Herter.
1. The recess began on March 20.
2. For text of the agreed duration article, which bound the signatories “indefinitely” subject to the “inherent right” to withdraw if the provisions were not fulfilled, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, p. 380.