Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

198. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Greene) to the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy (Farley)⁰

Washington, February 12, 1959.

I have told the Secretary on the telephone that you and Mr. Dillon are considering the next moves in the nuclear suspension test talks in Geneva.¹ The Secretary considers that the question of composition of the control organization is irrelevant as long as the Soviets would have the veto power. The Secretary said he was not sure but what we should call Wadsworth home advertising that he is coming home to consider the grave situation created by Soviet demands for a veto, and indicating it may not be worthwhile to carry on the talks any longer.

The Secretary said if we call the talks off, we would probably have to make a counterproposal—one less far reaching in scope, and along the lines that were discussed with Mr. Macmillan in London (Secto 7),² and that have also been Mr. McCone’s idea and also more or less Senator Gore’s idea.³

This might be done by a letter to Khrushchev from the President; it should also be considered whether we want to act unilaterally, or together with the British. Macmillan might not want to write Khrushchev in view of his forthcoming trip to Moscow. We should also consider whether parallel letters from the President and Macmillan would tend to put Macmillan in the position of an intermediary or negotiator in our behalf.

The Secretary suggested a formulation along the following lines for a communication to the Soviets:

“Your position on the veto power and all other substantive aspects of control destroys any real control. There is, therefore, no alternative but to devise a course of action which on the one hand will not require controls but which, on the other hand, will spare mankind the growing danger of nuclear contamination. Therefore, we propose for the time being, and until further notice, not to have any more atmospheric explosions and to confine any explosions to underground. We hope you will do the same. If you will do the same, then at least the main concern of mankind will be satisfied. If you don’t do it, then we will have to reconsider.”

The Secretary thought that in view of Governor Herter’s active concern with these matters in the past, he should be consulted about the next moves. If it could not wait until his return, then a telephone call might suffice.

The Secretary also asked that there be appropriate consultation with Congressional leaders on the matter.

Joseph N. Greene, Jr.⁴

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Confidential; Personal and Private.
1. The transcript of the February 11 telephone conversation between Greene and Dulles is ibid. See the Supplement.
2. Document 197.
3. On November 17, 1958, Senator Albert Gore orally proposed to Eisenhower that the United States try a new approach at the Geneva Conference to consist of a Presidential announcement of unconditional and unilateral cessation of all atmospheric tests for 3 years, a call for similar action by other nuclear powers, and concentration by the negotiators on a limited treaty for permanent stoppage of atmospheric tests. Gore followed up this suggestion with a memorandum to the President on November 19, 1958. The Gore memorandum is attached to a memorandum from Gray to Eisenhower, January 8, 1959, which also contains the views of the Department of State and the AEC on the Gore proposal. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Disarmament) See the Supplement.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.