182. Memorandum by the President’s Staff Secretary (Goodpaster)0

The following questions would seem to be of basic importance to the next phase of U.S. efforts to arrange a suspension of nuclear weapons testing:

Should the suspension be limited strictly to that which can be verified, with high degree of reliability, by detection, reporting and inspection?
Should nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes be explicitly reserved from the provisions for suspension?
Should provision be included with respect to acceptable “progress on other aspects” of disarmament, and, if so, should it be explicit and detailed?
Should the suspension expire in the absence of positive action, or should positive action be required to terminate it?
On the assumption that no control system will be meaningful without the use of Chinese Communist territory, how should the United States be prepared to proceed if Red China refuses to participate in the system in this way or, if it agrees to participate, sets as the price of its participation worldwide diplomatic recognition and/or admission to the United Nations.
Is the participation of France in the agreement deemed to be essential and if so how is this to be achieved?

A.J. Goodpaster1 Brigadier General, General, USA
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary’s Records, Nuclear Testing. Secret. Gordon Gray and Goodpaster took part in a visit by NSCOCB staff to the Nevada test site October 3–5. Goodpaster prepared an October 10 memorandum for the record concerning the trip and an October 9 memorandum of his discussions during the visit with Dr. Edward Teller. (Both ibid.) See the Supplement.
  2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.