124. Memorandum for the Record0
SUBJECT
- Presentation of Limited War Study Before the AFPC
The AFPC met at 0930 on 27 September 1960 in the Secretary of Defense’s conference room. In addition to the normal members, the following also attended: Mr. Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Mr. Merchant, Mr. Hare, Mr. Gerry Smith and Mr. Furnas from the Department of State; Mr. Dulles from CIA; Mr. Williams, General Polk and Mr. Stanley in addition to Mr. Irwin from ISA; and Mr. Le Boutillier from S&L.
Mr. Irwin gave the prepared presentation in approximately 25 minutes, The discussion then followed for about one hour and ten minutes. The following comments, while not an exact statement of what was said, express the main ideas put forward by the conferees.
General Twining supported the study strongly and said that the four qualifications on our basic conclusion were not qualifications but “musts.”1 They were actions to be taken automatically and early in any limited war conflict. He stated that we cannot prejudge the use of atomic weapons but must have them ready; that these studies were illustrative and should not be taken as a basis for policy decisions.
Mr. Gates stated that the presentation did not give him a clear feeling of the adequacies or inadequacies of our capabilities. He had been saying before Congress that all of the Army, the Navy except Polaris, the Tactical Air Force and the Marine Corps were all applicable to limited war situations.
Mr. Irwin mentioned that we had considered all these forces; that if we engaged in one sizable limited war conflict such as Laos, we would concentrate a total of 6 divisions and 3 carriers in the Southwest Pacific area and seriously unbalance our world-wide deployments.
General Lemnitzer stated that it takes time to get production going, that a limited war arouses the country and starts mobilization, and that this study pointed up the necessity for well trained reserves; that it would be necessary to call up top priority National Guard and reserve units. He then went on to stress the greatly increased emphasis on anti-guerrilla warfare in the U.S. Army and how our main efforts should be in training other countries’ forces for this type of warfare.
[Page 480]Admiral Burke said that the study made two things evident to him: that early decisions were critical in order to make the task easier, and second, that we must have the will to see a limited warfare operation through, as we could lose the world piecemeal.
General White said the study was useful and pointed up problem areas. He agreed with Admiral Burke about the requirement for early decision and strong will and stated that we must use weapons as necessary to win.
General Shoup said he disliked being forced to plan on weapons of opportunity and that atomic weapons were now in this category. He believed that if we became deeply committed in one limited war, and a second is forced upon us, we must then use atomic weapons to solve one or both. He asked about the use of Allied airlift, saying that the Belgians were very proud of their lifting troops to and from the Congo. (Note: The study did not use Allied lift except for limited U.K. forces.)
Mr. Irwin stated that each problem placed heavy reliance on our Allies but was of the opinion that, if we are to move quickly and decisively in a limited war situation, we must place primary reliance on U.S. forces.
General Lemnitzer believed that we cannot determine the employment of atomic weapons ahead of time and stated that it was a tricky problem to maintain a proper balance between conventional forces and atomic weapons. He thinks we must fight limited wars conventionally and be prepared to use atomics if necessary.
Mr. Le Boutillier, S&L, mentioned that we are now short in some items of conventional ammunition and that it will take time to build up our inventory to agreed levels.
Mr. Brucker invited the group to visit the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg and explained special forces deployment world-wide. He then spoke about logistics and was of the opinion it would take at least 9 months to start production rolling off the lines of stand-by plants.
Mr. Merchant stated Mr. Herter regretted missing the meeting as the subject was close to his heart. He stated that foreign policy must be supported by an adequate limited war force, not only for these situations but for smaller conflicts in Latin America and Africa. He thought it was an excellent study, posed the problems properly and was illustrative rather than definitive. He believed that the relative calm for the past two years in the Middle East and the Formosa Straits was due to our fast reactions in those areas. He believes that Khrushchev is seeking to castrate the Secretary General of the U.N. and leave the U.N. incapable of acting positively in a future situation such as the Congo. If he succeeds, this will put a greater dependence on U.S. unilateral intervention in this type situation.
[Page 481]Mr. Merchant further stated that it was not State’s job to set forces or allocate money but he believed we must have the capability of dealing with at least two limited wars at one time. We must step up training of our Allies in anti-guerrilla operations. He agreed with Admiral Burke on the necessary will and ability in limited wars but must underline that there are situations where initial use of atomic weapons is politically unacceptable. He was delighted with the study and repeated that we require the ability to fight two limited wars concurrently and should start working toward this capacity.
Mr. Dulles, CIA, said the study was useful and that our chief objective must be to prevent limited wars from starting. Most limited wars will start with unclear situations and force probes in which Communist support is not clear. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] He thinks most local wars are successful because the particular country lacks control and ability to respond quickly.
Mr. Gates stated that we have not devoted much money to our production base in recent years. We now have a new logistic yardstick which includes procurement objectives to support a six months limited war of the Korea type. However, we have failed to finance the approved mobilization base because new weapons, in-being forces and reserves are so expensive. Unless we have a radical change in our financial policy, we will not have the stocks authorized in the logistics planning guidance. Further, Mr. Gates does not think we will fight a six months Korean type war again, so that the paper planned for the logistics base is good but it will not be financed.
Mr. Gordon Gray said he was not competent to comment on the study but was interested in a broader question, namely, “Are we carrying out policies in accordance with Basic National Security Policy?” There have been doubts expressed that basic policy is understood or is being carried out. The President will probably want an answer to this question.
Mr. Gates said that Basic National Security Policy was broad; Defense policy was under constant review within the framework of the broader policy, and he had no desire to rewrite Basic National Security Policy.
Mr. Gray said that this study indicated that nuclear weapons must inevitably be used if we are to hold Korea and the Offshore Islands.
[1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] However, he cautioned that this study was not a war game or a JCS presentation but was illustrative only and hence was not applicable to policy decisions.
Mr. Gray said that the President was never very eager to talk about limited war and disliked the subject. He mentioned that Mr. Kistiakowsky got into trouble recommending a reorganization of the Department of Defense and otherwise got outside his terms of reference in [Page 482] studying limited war. He believed that this study would not offend the President unduly.
The meeting closed with an observation from Mr. Douglas that, in meeting two limited war situations at one time, we may have to fight each of them in a different way. For instance, we might fight a conventional war in Korea and a limited nuclear war in Laos; that we must take all of these facts into account in determining our level of financing for procurement and provision of active forces.2
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170. Top Secret.↩
- See paragraphs 1–a through 1–d of Document 121.↩
- Smith commented on this meeting in a September 28 memorandum to Irwin. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Limited War) Additional comment on the study is in an October 5 memorandum to Kistiakowsky from George W. Rathjens of his staff. (ibid., Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology) Both are in the Supplement.↩
- Printed from a copy that indicates Polk signed the original.↩