104. Memorandum of Discussion at the 446th Meeting of the National Security Council0
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1. “U.S. Policy Toward Japan,” 2. “Consultations With Foreign Governments Concerning U.S. Grant Military Assistance,” 3. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security,” 4. “Certain Aspects of U.S. Politico-Military Relationships with Canada,” and 5. “U.S. Policy on Antarctica.”]
6. Review of Outer Space Programs Under the Auspices of the Department of Defense
The President said he had one more matter to bring up. He felt that at an early date it would be necessary to have a national security examination of our outer space programs, especially those being conducted by the Military Services. Under Secretary McElroy, the particular functions to be performed in outer space by the Military Services were laid out. However, the President had received some indirect indications recently that some of the Services were thinking along extremely advanced lines. The result might be not only inadvertent duplication of outer space programs, but possibly also the initiation of some programs so advanced scientifically as to make a re-appraisal advisable. Such a re-appraisal should take place not only during the period of the formulation of the budget, but also at an earlier date, when a more thorough study could be made. Accordingly, the President suggested that the Council at an early meeting examine outer space programs being carried on under the auspices of the Department of Defense.
[Page 415]The President then added, by way of example, that he had heard of one outer space program which involved sending a trillion photographs a year to an IBM machine for processing. He felt some competent scientists should take a look at advance programs of this kind.
Secretary Douglas believed that certain fantastic statements had been made regarding the operational requirements of reconnaissance satellites, but in his opinion such statements had not affected defense expenditures or financial commitments. He said the Department of Defense would be ready at any time to make a presentation to the Council on its outer space programs. He believed such a presentation would show that military efforts in outer space were sensibly integrated with the total military program.
The President said it would not be necessary for the Department of Defense to make its presentation until after completion of a related study which the scientists were undertaking under Dr. Kistiakowsky. The Department of Defense report and Dr. Kistiakowsky’s report could come before the Council at the same time.
The National Security Council: 1
Noted the President’s request that the Department of Defense present to the National Security Council a full report on all of the outer space programs being planned or conducted under the auspices of the Department of Defense. Noted further that this presentation was not to be given until after completion of a related study to be undertaken for the President by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.
Note: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Special Assistant for Science and Technology for appropriate implementation.2
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on June 1. Another account of this meeting is in Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House, pp. 338–339.↩
- The following paragraph and note constitute NSC Action No. 2245, approved by the President on June 11. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)↩
- Kistiakowsky noted that on June 1, he saw Gordon Gray about “NSC actions regarding intelligence satellites, since I was unsure about what I was supposed to do. It finally came out that I am to consult with York about the desirability of putting additional money into Samos to accelerate it and to report on this to the President. Separately I will probably be asked by the President to undertake a broad study of intelligence satellites.” (A Scientist at the White House, p. 339) For the recommendations of what became the Special Panel on Satellite Reconnaissance, see Documents 115–117.↩