Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

102. Memorandum of Discussion at the 445th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, May 24, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Items 1. “Anniversary of the Death of John Foster Dulles,” 2. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security,” and 3. “Statements Regarding the U–2 Incident and the Recent Military Test Alert.”]

4. Policy Issues in the Post-Summit Environment¹

[Here follows discussion of East-West issues in the aftermath of the summit; see the Supplement.]

Mr. Staats asked how the Administration should react to moves in Congress designed to increase the defense budget. Secretary Gates said he understood Senator Symington had just attempted to add $4 billion to the defense budget. Any additions to the defense budget made in Congress would deal with the glamorous programs, the long-lead time items. The armed services, except for the Navy, had completed their testimony before Congress on the defense budget.

Secretary Herter said he hoped we would move ahead fast and not back down with respect to the reconnaissance satellite program. In Paris, Khrushchev’s reaction had been extraordinary when De Gaulle chided him about the Soviet “space ship” which was going over Paris sixteen to eighteen times a day. Khrushchev said he did not care how many satellites flew over his territory. Secretary Herter thought it would be very useful for our allies and other friendly nations of the Free World to be reassured that if one kind of reconnaissance against surprise attack had to be suspended, another kind would soon be available. The President agreed and added that in Paris Khrushchev had said that anyone might take all the pictures he wished from satellites over Soviet territory.

Mr. Gray asked what should be the public posture of this government with respect to reconnaissance satellites. Secretary Herter felt we should not adopt a public attitude which would be provocative with respect to our military preparations. Mr. Gray pointed out that his question referred to reconnaissance satellites only, not to military preparations. He added that he understood Senator Jackson had written a letter to the President suggesting that reconnaissance satellites should be turned over to the UN. The President wondered who would develop reconnaissance satellites if they were now to be turned over to the UN. With respect to our public posture on reconnaissance satellites, the President thought it might be useful to quote Khrushchev’s statement to the effect that he (Khrushchev) did not care how many pictures of Russian territory we made from satellites. Secretary Herter said one problem might arise in connection with quoting Khrushchev; namely, there were no official notes of the meeting in Paris. Each delegation took its own notes. The President said he thought the French preserved a rather complete record of the meeting. In any case, Khrushchev had made the statement in the presence of the President and a number of other people.

The President then said he would be glad to put reconnaissance satellites at the disposal of the UN if every nation would follow suit. Mr. Gray said he was not advocating this policy. With respect to questions that might be asked about reconnaissance satellites, the President thought that Administration officials need not attempt to reply to every question which some idiot was able to ask. He felt it would be enough to quote Khrushchev’s statement. If we went too far in describing our reconnaissance satellites, information concerning their infra-red and all their other capabilities would become public. Secretary Gates said it was not possible to lump all satellites together as Senator Jackson’s letter had apparently done. Midas, for example, was an early warning satellite for the Strategic Air Command. In reply to questions, General Twining said Midas would be fully operational in about a year. Secretary Gates added that Samos would not be fully operational as a system before three years had elapsed. In reply to a question from the President, Dr. Kistiakowsky said the “1 foot resolution” did not now appear hopeful in reconnaissance satellites; a “20 foot resolution” appeared more likely.

[Here follows discussion of the U–2 incident.]

Mr. Washburn asked whether the Secretary of State, in saying that it would be helpful to speed up the reconnaissance satellite, was referring to actions to be taken internally by this government or to our world-wide information posture. Secretary Herter said he was referring to internal actions by this government. The President believed it would be wrong to give the world the impression that we could get the same information from a reconnaissance satellite that we had been obtaining from the U–2 flights.

[Here follows discussion of world opinion.]

Mr. Gray, reverting to the reconnaissance satellite, noted that Senator Johnson had called for a crash program to develop these systems. He assumed everything was being done that could be done reasonably to attain an operational capability in the reconnaissance satellite systems. Mr. Douglas said there was some disagreement on this point. The military program adopted in April fully financed the Midas and Discoverer satellites but left Samos in a somewhat controversial position. Mr. Douglas thought the Department of Defense might have to ask for another $50 million in order to insure progress toward the operational capability of Samos in event rapid scientific progress should be made. The President suggested that Dr. Kistiakowsky should consult with Dr. York on the possibility of expediting a reconnaissance satellite program and should report the results to him.

[Here follows additional discussion of public opinion.]

General Persons said there were enough Presidential candidates in the Senate to add a great deal of money to the defense budget. We should take particular pains to support those Senators who wish to continue the President’s defense budget without a great change. Secretary Gates agreed with this view.

The National Security Council:²

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of an oral statement by the Secretary of State as to the position which the U.S. should take on various policy issues.

b. Noted the President’s approval of the following U.S. positions in the post-Summit environment:

[Here follow paragraphs 1–7 on policy implementation with regard to the Soviet Union and other Communist states, nuclear testing, and disarmament.]

(8) The military program as currently approved by the President continues to provide for an adequate defense posture in the post-Summit environment. However, certain operational steps to improve the state of readiness of U.S. forces should be considered in the ordinary course, but any changes deemed necessary should be undertaken quietly without unnecessary publicity.

(9) The reconnaissance satellite program should be reviewed in connection with expediting achievement of an operational capability as soon as feasible, but no programs are to be undertaken on a crash basis until scientific analysis demonstrates real promise of success. If an issue is raised as to whether development and use of reconnaissance satellites is a provocative act, Khrushchev’s statement might be quoted in which he said that he was aware of the U.S. satellite photographing the USSR, that he had not protested and that it could take as many pictures as we wanted.

c. Noted the President’s request that the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology consult with the Department of Defense with regard to the feasibility of expediting the reconnaissance satellite program, and report the results to the President.³

[Here follows Agenda Item 5. “U.S. Policy Toward Cuba.”]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on May 25. Another account of this meeting is in Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House, pp. 333–336.
1. For additional portions of this agenda item, see Document 255 and vol. IX, pp. 505–513.
2. The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2238, approved by the President on May 31. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
3. A note to the action reads in part: “The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Special Assistant for Science and Technology and the Secretary of Defense for appropriate implementation.”