69. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Herter to Foreign Secretary Lloyd1
Dear Mr. Secretary: Thank you for your letter of February 23 in which you commented on the five-step course of action on Hungary suggested in Secretary Dulles’ February 2 letter to you.2
I am glad to see that we agree on the necessity for not permitting the Hungarian issue to die through inaction. However, we have a somewhat different view of Sir Leslie’s mandate and the extent to which the Soviets and the Hungarians are interpreting our failure to take stronger action at the last General Assembly as an indication of weakness. Concerning the latter, it appears to me that Zorin’s statement hailing the reduced majority for the resolution on Hungary as a “victory”,3 the offensive Hungarian note of January 27 which the American Legation in Budapest was instructed to return,4 and the recent threatening complaints to the United Kingdom, French, and Italian Missions in Budapest regarding the policies of their respective Governments on Hungary,5 are all indicative of aggressive attitudes which should not be encouraged by seeking to restrict the scope of Sir Leslie Munro’s activities.
We consider Sir Leslie’s mandate sufficiently broad to enable him to do as much or as little as he sees fit. He is certainly more than a rapporteur, since this title was deliberately rejected in favor of that of “Agent” at the time the resolution on Hungary was drafted in New York. When other co-sponsors objected to the connotations surrounding the word “Agent”, the language finally decided upon was “Decides [Page 118] to appoint Sir Leslie Munro to represent the United Nations for the purpose of reporting to Member states or to the General Assembly on significant developments relating to the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly on Hungary.” Although the resolution does not require him to approach the Soviet and Hungarian authorities or call upon the Communist regimes concerned to cooperate with him, he is not limited to the narrow functions of a rapporteur. The reference to implementation of the Assembly’s resolutions makes this abundantly clear.
Sir Leslie himself suggested that he might begin his activities with informal behind-the-scences approaches to the Soviets and the Hungarians. I believe that, although the prospects of success are dim indeed, Sir Leslie should not be discouraged from his proposed private initiatives. Communist charges of provocation, if made, would probably only serve further to advertise Soviet and Hungarian intransigence, and would be unlikely to affect adversely our own objectives with respect to Hungary. Moreover, I am convinced that Sir Leslie Munro, in any case, should be encouraged to make eventual public approaches to the Soviets and the Hungarians before he prepares his report. I hope upon further consideration this course will commend itself to you.
We have told Sir Leslie Munro that we hope he will keep us informed during his public and private efforts, as well as during the preparation of his report. Such close coordination should be mutually valuable.
In the event Sir Leslie’s efforts fail, I continue to believe that we must then consider what further action should be sought on Hungary in the United Nations. In the light of your letter of February 23 and after further consideration here in the Department of State, I agree that we should postpone consideration of moves to expel Hungary through action in the Security Council or to press for rejection of Hungarian credentials at the next General Assembly. The situation mentioned in your letter, i.e., the possibility that the Hungarian regime might commit flagrant future outrages, had also occurred to me and is a strong argument for keeping in reserve drastic action in the Security Council and the General Assembly on Hungary. Meanwhile, I suggest we continue to maintain close consultation on the subject of Hungary and carefully watch developments in that country.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Drafted by Newlin on March 3.↩
- Lloyd’s letter is Document 66. Dulles’ letter is Document 61.↩
- Zorin’s statement has not been identified.↩
- Telegram 215 from Budapest, January 29, transmitted the text of a January 27 note from the Hungarian Government which termed relations between the United States and Hungary “abnormal and absurd” and accused the United States of pursuing a “consistently hostile policy” toward Hungary. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.64/1–2959) Telegram 175 to Budapest, January 30, instructed the Legation to return the note to the Hungarian Foreign Office and to state that its tone belied the Hungarian Government’s assertion that it wished to establish normal relations with the United States. (ibid., 611.64/2–2959) Telegram 217 from Budapest, January 31, informed the Department of State that the note had been returned. (ibid., 611.64/1–3159)↩
- Despatch 466 from Budapest, February 20, transmitted a copy of the Hungarian note to the British Legation. (ibid., 310.364/2–2059) Despatch 484 from Budapest, February 27, reported that the Legation had seen the Hungarian notes to the French and Italian Legations and compared their texts to the note the British Legation had received. (ibid., 310.364/2–2759)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.↩