Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

61. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Secretary Lloyd¹

Washington, February 2, 1959.

Dear Selwyn: As I wrote you on December 8, 1958,² in the light of all the circumstances prevailing at that time, we reluctantly concluded that rejection of the credentials of the Hungarian representatives should not be sought at the thirteenth General Assembly. However, we question the desirability of letting the Hungarian issue wither away, particularly in view of certain evidence that the USSR and the Hungarian authorities are tending to interpret our failure to take stronger action as an indication of weakness on our part. While it may now be too late to secure effective punitive measures against Hungary, I believe we must at least give serious consideration to all the possibilities before deciding whether to press further for such action.

Our present efforts, I believe, should be directed toward helping Sir Leslie Munro secure the cooperation of the Hungarians. If he fails, it seems to me that action in the Security Council might be useful. We are presently considering the following five steps in the order indicated: (1) a behind-the-scenes approach by Sir Leslie Munro to the Hungarians and the USSR urging them to cooperate with him on the basis of their own self-interest; (2) public approaches by Sir Leslie to the USSR and, principally, Hungary; (3) assuming the failure of these approaches, consideration by the Security Council of a resolution noting the General Assembly’s findings on Hungary and urging the present regime to cooperate with Sir Leslie, which would probably be vetoed by the USSR; (4) a second resolution in the Council recommending to the General Assembly that Hungary be expelled, which would also be vetoed; (5) action at the fourteenth General Assembly to seek rejection of Hungarian credentials. I envisage that steps (1) through (4) would be completed well before September in order that we would have sufficient time to develop support for (5).

I should appreciate receiving your reactions to the plan outlined above. Of course, other considerations including the general state of our relations with the Communist bloc at the time, would have to be examined before actually proceeding in the Security Council. In the meantime, we plan to inform Sir Leslie in strict confidence that, should his efforts not bear fruit, we intend to consider Security Council action on Hungary.

Sincerely yours,

Foster³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/2–259. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Newlin. Transmitted to London in telegram 6999, February 2, which is the source text, for immediate delivery. Telegram 6999 was repeated by pouch to USUN.
2. Document 54.
3. Telegram 6999 bears this typed signature.