Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

70. Airgram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

CA–8216

Washington, March 26, 1959.

SUBJECT

• The Future of the Trusteeship Council

REFERENCES

• USUN’s 483 of December 19, 1958 and Delga 762 of March 5, 1959; Deptel 621 of January 19, 1959²

The Department refers to Delga 762 regarding the informal meeting, which was attended by Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, held on March 4 to consider the future of the Trusteeship Council.

The Department recently received, under cover of an informal note from an official of the British Embassy, a summary of the tentative views of the United Kingdom on the future of the Trusteeship Council.³ These views were advanced during recent Anglo-French discussions held in February 1959 but do not constitute a firm United Kingdom position. Rather, the United Kingdom stated that it was advancing its views preliminary to holding exploratory talks in New York in order to determine what the other administering powers think the best course would be before the United Kingdom considers further steps. The informal views transmitted by the United Kingdom on this question are summarized as follows:

A problem will be posed when France ceases to be an administering member, probably in 1960, when French Togoland and French Cameroun are expected to become independent, and Italy, not being a permanent member of the Security Council, loses its membership altogether on the attainment of independence by Somaliland in 1960. Thus the Charter would appear to require that Italy leave the Council and France become a non-administering member but that the elected non-administering members would have to complete their three-year terms. The administering members would thus be placed in a minority until the end of 1961, when the terms of three elected non-administering members (Burma, Paraguay and the UAR) expire. Assuming the letter of the Charter were followed, upon the expiration of the terms of the three non-administering members the Council would be reduced to ten members—Australia, Belgium, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States as administering members and China, France, the Soviet Union and the remaining two elected non-administering members on the non-administering side. Moreover, the presence of a former administering member (France) on the non-administering side might be resented by the anti-colonial powers who could argue that parity did not exist in reality. This in turn would tend to weaken the authority of the Trusteeship Council in the eyes of the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee of the General Assembly which might accentuate its current tendency to override or bypass the Trusteeship Council. The United Kingdom would consider this as regrettable since it regards the Trusteeship Council as a valuable body in view of its continuing responsibilities as Administering Authority for Tanganyika and its consequent desire to see the Council retain its effectiveness. The United Kingdom, however, suggests two possible approaches to this problem which had already been mentioned tentatively in earlier discussions:

(1) That means be found to allow France and Italy to retain their status as administering powers notwithstanding the grant of independence to their Trust Territories;

(2) That the permanent members of the Security Council renounce their right to belong automatically to the Council so that non-administering members could be elected.

A third course of action had been proposed by Iran to the United Kingdom, namely, to have an equal number of administering and non-administering members plus the non-administering members of the Security Council “sitting on the cross benches.”

The United Kingdom points out that the second and third proposals would certainly require an amendment of the United Nations Charter, as would probably the first proposal as well. The United Kingdom does not consider that the second proposal would be acceptable to the permanent members of the Security Council (including itself) and could be regarded as ruled out. Furthermore, it believes that the third, i.e., (the Iranian) proposal would disturb the principle of parity and not necessarily to the United Kingdom’s advantage; it would therefore not be acceptable to the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom believes that the most satisfactory solution, politically, and the one least in conflict, legally with Article 86 of the Charter,⁴ would be to allow France and Italy to retain their status as administering members. The United Kingdom points out that for the short term no course of action could be entirely reconciled with the terms of Article 86 which recognizes at the same time parity between administering and non-administering powers and three-year terms for those elected in the latter capacity. This was perhaps due to the fact that the drafters of the Charter had not foreseen that the administering members might lose their character as administering members in the intervals between elections of non-administering powers.

The French stated that it could be argued that parity had priority over the three-year term stipulation, but the United Kingdom legal advisers felt that both principles were absolute. The latter also felt that it might be just legally tenable to maintain that “administering” in Article 86 should be interpreted to mean not exclusively “currently administering” but “founder administering powers and currently administering powers.” This would exclude Italy but keep the Council at a membership of 12 with France on the administering side (Italy not having been a founder administering power).

The United Kingdom memorandum stated that after the Anglo-French talks, the following points were tentatively agreed:

(1) That further discussion should be held in New York initially among administering powers on policy;

(2) That it might be worthwhile to consider during these talks the proposal that the Council be temporarily “frozen” at its present size with France and Italy being classed as administering powers so long as five non-administering elected members remained on the Council; it being borne in mind that this temporary measure might or might not pave the way for a solution of the longer term problem on the same lines; and

(3) That the question of tactics be taken up when policy views are clearer.

In its reply to the United Kingdom memorandum, the Department repeated the views contained in its instruction of January 19, 1959 to USUN.⁵

With regard to the possible approaches to the problem contained in the United Kingdom memorandum the Department also set forth the following tentative views in its reply:

1. Any solution involving amendment of the Charter should be based on the desirability of having the Council continue as a useful body. This springs from the fact that the United States (as in the case of the United Kingdom with respect to Tanganyika) is administering the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and will probably continue to do so for some time. In view of the legal requirements for Charter review, any such solution would, of course, have to be acceptable to the great majority of United Nations members, as well as to all of the permanent members of the Security Council. It is in this light that it is necessary to examine not only the alternatives set forth in the Annex to the United Kingdom memorandum but also to anticipate other proposals designed to have the membership of the Council represent more accurately the climate of the Fourth Committee.

2. Barring Charter review as a practical solution, the range of possibilities appears to be limited. Thus, with reference to the suggestion in the Annex to the United Kingdom memorandum regarding renunciation by permanent members of the Security Council of their right to belong automatically to the Trusteeship Council so that all non-administering members could be elected, in our view Article 86 does not leave to the members of the Security Council the discretion to renounce membership in the Trusteeship Council. Similarly the Iranian proposal mentioned in the Annex to the United Kingdom memorandum, although possibly quite interesting politically, clearly excluded by the language of Article 86.

3. The Annex to the United Kingdom memorandum describes the suggestion that the outgoing Administering Authorities remain on the Council notwithstanding the cessation of their duties, as being least in conflict legally with Article 86. If this suggestion means that France would stay on the Council indefinitely as a “founder administering power” (Italy having joined the United Nations only in 1955), it would obviously be contrary to the precise terms of Articles 86 and 81.⁶ If, however, France and Italy were to stay on the Council as Administering Authorities only until the expiration of the terms of three non-administering members, this would appear to be a possibility not inconsistent with Article 86. Although Article 86 admittedly does not explicitly provide for the case in which Administering Authorities cease administering Trust Territories in the interval between elections for non-administering members, its language does give some indication about the intent of the drafters. Thus, Article 86, 1., c, states “as many other members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer Trust Territories and those which do not” (underlining supplied). In the view of the Department, this indicates that the number of non-administering members having membership on the Council is to be governed by the principle of parity. The stipulation for a three-year term should, therefore, be read so as to satisfy this requirement of parity. If, consequently, and Administering Authority ceased to exercise the administration of a Trust Territory, thereby reducing the number of Administering Authorities on the Council by one, there would be need for one less “other Member” as specified in Article 86, 1., c. The Department, therefore, agrees with the French view that the three-year term requirement is subject to the overriding principle of parity. If, however, both the parity principle and the three-year term requirement are to be observed, it might be suggested that a retiring Administering Authority serve as such on the Council until the end of a term of a non-administering member.

4. The foregoing views of the Department are tentative and exploratory in nature. Since diverse interpretations are possible, even within the terms of Article 86, and since eventually agreement must be reached on a broad basis, the Department agrees with the United Kingdom view that it will be highly useful to obtain the views of other Governments on as wide a basis as possible. With this in mind, therefore, the Department favors extending informal consultations beyond the limited group of Administering Authorities at an appropriate stage in the consideration of this question.

The Department agrees moreover, with the suggestions tentatively agreed to during the United Kingdom’s discussions of this question with the French, namely, 1) that further discussions be held in New York, initially among Administering Authorities, on this question, and 2) that it would be worthwhile to consider carefully and possibly request the ICJ to render an advisory opinion regarding the proposal that the Council should be temporarily “frozen” at its present size, with France and Italy being classed as Administering Authorities, so long as five non-administering elected members remain on the Council; it being borne in mind that this temporary measure might or might not pave the way for a solution of the longer term problems on the same lines.

Action Requested

USUN is requested to take the above views into consideration in any further discussion of this question held in New York, and to report the results of such discussions to the Department.

FYI. The Department hopes that it will be possible for France and Italy to remain on the Council on the administering side until the end of 1961 when the terms of Burma, Paraguay and the United Arab Republics expire. This will permit the Council to remain at fourteen members for nearly three years, thus providing at least a short-term solution of the problem of the Council’s future. This is perhaps the most that can be achieved at this time in view of the limited chances for Charter revision. End FYI.

Herter⁷

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 350/3–2859. Confidential. Drafted by Feld; cleared by Green, Cargo, Nunley, McNutt, van Heuven, and Walmsley; initialed by Sisco; and approved by Gerig. Repeated to Brussels, Canberra, London, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Taipei, and Wellington.
2. Telegram 483 reported on a meeting of administering authority representatives regarding the Trusteeship Council’s future and requested instructions on the issues raised at that meeting. (ibid., 350/12–1958) Delga 762 is ibid., 350/3–559. Telegram 621 to USUN outlined the Department’s views on the Council’s future. (Ibid., 350/12–1958)
3. A copy of the February 26 memorandum is ibid., 350/2–2659.
4. Article 86 of the U.N. Charter concerns membership in the Trusteeship Council.
5. The instruction is presumably telegram 621 to USUN, cited in footnote 2 above. On March 30, Dorman sent the First Secretary of the British Embassy, Charles Wiggin, a memorandum outlining the tentative U.S. views on the future of the Trusteeship Council. (Department of State, Central Files, 350/2–2659)
6. Article 81 of the U.N. Charter concerns the administration of trust territories.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. The annex enclosed with the airgram is not printed.