Office of the Historian

475. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1

New York, December 9, 1959—9 p.m.

Delga 666. Re: Outer Space.

1.
Pursuant Gadel 176.2Lodge saw Kuznetsov late this afternoon. He emphasized negotiations had reached crisis point and as authorized read pertinent language from instructions and made proposals para 2, reftel. Kuznetsov immediately characterized US position as “big step backward”.
2.
Lodge went on to make alternative proposals described para 3 reftel. These were also received dejectedly, Kuznetsov remarking “whole structure is going to fail”. He said he could only draw one conclusion: that US did not want agreement. He asked about Finland which had been previously mentioned. Lodge said he was not authorized to accept Finland. Lodge also rejected Iraq and Afghanistan again. Turning to alternative proposals in para 3 reftel, Kuznetsov commented that meant we would have 13, in which case 8 socialist countries should be included.
3.
Kuznetsov referred again to issue of participation in conference and urged res not pre-judge matter but leave it to decision in comite. Lodge repeated this was not acceptable. Kuznetsov tried unsuccessfully to argue that Soviet agreement on Austria was on understanding we would agree to such language on conference. Referring to Lodge’s comments on representation questions affecting selection of neutrals, Kuznetsov asserted repeatedly comite was not body that would be confronted with ChiRep question. He asked us to consider Afghanistan or Finland instead of Indonesia.
4.
In response to alternative proposal whereby we would add last state to present 12, Kuznetsov said he would then have to insist on 8 socialist countries and 5 neutrals with Indonesia, Finland or Afghanistan included.
5.
Kuznetsov seemed definitely upset and commented sadly that everything was going to fail at last moment because of US position. Actually there would be 13 states on our side at all times, in his view, if not more. He referred to problem of participation in conference and made completely clear that if amendment with standard language were proposed, which he knew would carry easily, USSR would acquiesce and vote for res as amended. However, 5th neutral must be Finland or Afghanistan. He referred again to COSPAR formula and to 5–5 composition of disarmament comite, arguing that these precedents made it difficult to explain Soviet agreement to 12–7–5 in Outer Space Comite.
6.
Lodge reviewed in detail various concessions we had made. Kuznetsov enumerated Soviet concessions and contended Soviet agreement to 12–7–5 after initially proposing 6–6–2 was “biggest concession” of all; US had started with 12–3–3.
7.
Barco inquired whether, if we were able to accept Finland or Afghanistan as 5th neutral, USSR would agree to standard language in res on participation in conference. Soviet Reps rejected this suggestion, repeating they could not cosponsor res with this language but could acquiesce in amendment procedure. They argued again that it was better to leave this matter to comite. Kuznetsov said if we failed to reach agreement, USSR would submit res on conference separately but recognized even then USSR could not prevent amendment on participation.
8.
We agreed to give Washington all Soviet comments and particularly its proposal have Finland or Afghanistan as 5th neutral, together with Soviet acquiescence in amendment procedure on conference participation issue.
9.
Conversation was concluded by Kuznetsov saying that if US felt it could not now “go to comite with more or less properly adjusted composition including Finland or Afghanistan or Indonesia,” USSR would be obliged to conclude we were not yet ready to have comite. He added that after Soviet Union had agreed with US Reps on 3–3–1 in COSPAR and 5–5 in disarmament group, it was very difficult to understand why US was “so stubborn on this very minor matter.”
10.
Russians appeared genuinely distressed at prospects our talks were going to collapse and there would be no agreement. They were incredulous when we gave representation issue as basis our position on composition.
Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/12–959. Confidential; Priority. Received at 10:01 p.m.↩
  2. Document 473.↩