Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

473. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, December 9, 1959—1:36 p.m.

Gadel 176. For Lodge. Re Outer Space Delga 658.² Evident that negotiations have reached crisis point. On assumption Austria is fourth neutral, as indicated Delga 658, agreement to Indonesia as fifth neutral would leave too narrow margin in Committee on questions relating to ChiComs. Such composition would put almost intolerable pressure on Austria. Moreover, we see no useful purpose to be served in seeking commitment from Sweden since in Department’s judgment commitment of type described in recommendation 3 Delga 658 would not be forthcoming, or if it was, it unlikely to be supported by Swedish public opinion, given fact Sweden recognizes Communist China.

It clear that Soviet objective is to create situation in Committee and/or Conference where some form of ChiCom participation can be achieved, or at least create situation where West German and ChiCom participation can be bargained.

In light these considerations and those outlined in detail in Gadel 174,³ Department cannot accept Indonesia as fifth neutral and we must continue insist upon UN member and Specialized Agency formula for Conference. Following, therefore, are further instructions for your next meeting with Kuznetsov.

1. You should inform Kuznetsov that negotiations have reached crisis stage and you want to be sure he fully realizes this. He should understand that we have not agreed to 12–7–5 and agreement is possible on this formula only if satisfactory agreement reached on neutrals and composition of Conference. US agreement to 12–7–5 formula would be major concession which we would be unwilling make unless Soviet reciprocate. US wants to reach agreement, but not at price of making further concessions Kuznetsov should at this point understand that if we cannot reach agreement, we consider all aspects of this question as open, and in particular question of Hungarian participation, which is another offer of major magnitude which we have expressed willingness to make. FYI You may read this paragraph to Kuznetsov if you believe it will have desired effect. End FYI.

2. You should inform him that you cannot accept Indonesia. If Soviets willing accept, however, either Jordan, Liberia, Lebanon or Tunisia as fifth neutral, we would be willing agree to paragraph in resolution minus our desired phraseology on understanding we would arrange for introduction appropriate amendment and campaign vigorously for its adoption. If USSR unwilling cosponsor or to agree to have others cosponsor on basis this understanding, you should indicate US sees no possibility agreement on resolution, since US unwilling abandon “UN member and Specialized Agency” formula which is firmly established in UN tradition, or abandon position on neutrals.

3. You also authorized make following alternative proposals: (a) US would agree to Indonesia on understanding Soviets would agree to have us add one Latin American to list of 12 free world members; or (b) US would agree to Indonesia provided USSR willing add sixth neutral (Jordan, Liberia, Lebanon, all of whom vote affirmatively on Chi Rep, but not Tunisia under this formulation since it abstains). Re (a) above, we do not believe Soviets will accept such proposal. As far as (b) concerned, vote on Chi Rep questions would normally be 14 in favor, 11 against which would provide acceptable margin and avoid putting Austria in position of being crucial balancing vote in any future situation. Of course, possibility of changes must be borne in mind.

Department assumes from Delga 658 that you are confident that amendment on UN Member and Specialized Agency formula as it relates to conference would have required votes in GA. If this not case in your judgment, Department could not agree to having you make proposal contained recommendation 2 of this telegram.

FYI Department undertaking contingency planning for possible break, and in particular development of best arguments as to reasons for break for use with our allies and in public GA forum. Would appreciate any advance thoughts GADel may have in this regard on contingent basis. End FYI.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320.5701/12–859. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by Sisco; cleared by Kohler, Wilcox, FE, and S/AE; and approved and signed by Herter.
2. Delga 658, December 8, reported in detail on a meeting between Lodge and Kuznetsov during the afternoon. Lodge started by agreeing on the 12–7–5 formula providing all other issues were settled first. A lengthy and unproductive discussion followed. At the end of the cable, Lodge recommended accepting Indonesia if Austria was the fourth neutral and suggested that this appeared to give the United States a safe margin on the Chinese representation question. (Ibid.)
3. Gadel 174, December 8, provided Lodge with instructions for his next meeting with Kuznetsov. (Ibid., 320.5701/12–759)