285. Memorandum of Discussion at the 401st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 2, 19591
[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]
1. U.S. Policy on Antarctica (NSC 5804/1; OCB Report on NSC 5804/1, dated January 21, 1959; NSC Action No. 2050; NSC 5905; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated April 1, 19592)
Mr. Gray briefed the Council on the proposed revision of U.S. Policy on Antarctica. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.3)
When in the course of his briefing Mr. Gray reached Paragraph 20, he pointed out the split of views between the Majority of the Planning Board and the JCS-Budget members. He then read Paragraph 20 as follows:
| “Majority” | “JCS–Budget” |
| “20. If required at any time for the protection of U.S. interests, claim the unclaimed area of Antarctica and reserve U.S. rights in the areas claimed by other powers or make claims in such areas as deemed appropriate.” | “20. As a means of expediting the achievement of an acceptable agreement on Antarctica, announce a U.S. claim to the unclaimed area of the Antarctic and reserve U.S. rights in the areas claimed by other powers or make claims in such areas as deemed appropriate; but advise the interested governments that the United States is prepared to defer action to implement claims and would agree to leave all other claims and rights unaffected if an international agreement is reached, such deferment to continue for so long as the agreement remains in force.” |
After briefly explaining the basis of this different point of view, Mr. Gray called on Secretary Dillon who was sitting at the Council table for the Acting Secretary of State.
Secretary Dillon commented that it is the view of the State Department that our objectives in Antarctica, on which all of the departments and agencies were in agreement, were actually in the course of being reasonably well achieved through negotiations looking to the establishment of an acceptable international agreement on Antarctica. Therefore, if we were suddenly to inject into the situation at this time a U.S. claim to portions of Antarctica, the result would almost certainly be a statement of claims in Antarctica by the Soviet Union. Such a course of action would therefore not serve the purpose which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Budget people, in their version of Paragraph 20, think it would serve; namely to act as a catalyst to produce an acceptable international agreement. Thus while the State Department cannot agree with the proposal by the JCS and the Bureau of the Budget, Secretary Dillon did point out that the State Department already has available the text of a U.S. claim to Antarctica. Accordingly, we would be prepared to make such a claim at any moment that it is decided to be in the U.S. advantage to do so.
When Secretary Dillon had completed his statement, Mr. Gray called next on General Twining. General Twining replied that the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that the U.S. is bound to encounter difficulties with the Soviet Union in Antarctica no matter what approach we took. This being the case the Chiefs felt that failure to announce a U.S. claim at the present time would merely cost us the loss of our initiative with respect to Antarctica without actually advancing the prospects of achieving an acceptable international agreement on Antarctica.
The President inquired of General Twining about the views of the Chiefs of Staff as to the defense or military value of the Antarctic area. General Twining answered that the Chiefs did not as of now see much military value to Antarctica and believed that its chief value was in the [Page 549] scientific field. The President then said that as he understood our policy, we are urging upon the other nations a peaceful solution of possible conflicts of interest in Antarctica. If, while we are urging such a solution the U.S. suddenly injects a territorial claim in Antarctica, the result would certainly be to increase the confusion. Moreover, in order to support such a U.S. claim, we might actually be called on to defend areas of the Antarctic, perhaps to send the Marines there. General Twining replied that he thought it was mostly U.S. prestige which was at stake here rather than the military value of the area to the U.S.
Asked for his opinion by Mr. Gray, the Director of the Budget commented that the hard facts of the current political situation made him wonder where the U.S. would find itself if the Soviet Union was the first of the two to make a claim in Antarctica. Accordingly, even if the argument in the JCS-Budget version of Paragraph 20, that a U.S. claim now might act as a catalyst to achieve a peaceful solution, was not a valid argument, he felt that the facts of the situation, as just described, motivated the Bureau of the Budget in supporting the JCS-Budget text.
Mr. John Patterson, Acting Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, desired to change the position taken by its representative at the Planning Board and switch its support to the JCS-Budget position on Paragraph 20. Mr. Patterson explained this change as resulting from anxiety lest the U.S. lose initiative and prestige to the Russians in Antarctica.
Mr. George Allen said, on the other hand, that he wished strongly to support the Majority text of Paragraph 20, particularly from the point of view of pubic relations. If either the U.S. or the Soviet Union were now to stake out a claim in Antarctica, such an action would have the automatic effect of recognition of the legitimacy of the claims made by all the claimant powers. Mr. Allen felt that the prestige of the U.S. over the years in Antarctica as a whole was so very much greater than that of any other power that we would be unwise to claim only some portion of the Sub-Continent.
Secretary Dillon said he felt strongly indeed that we ought to increase the prestige of the U.S. in the Antarctic area but he felt that this objective was effectively accomplished by other paragraphs in NSC 5905 and indeed that these paragraphs promised a much greater contribution to U.S. prestige than would be achieved by a U.S. claim to specific areas in Antarctica at the present time.
The President explained that the reason he had asked General Twining about the defense or military interest in Antarctica was his belief that if Antarctica does not have a military-defense aspect, then primary responsibility for determining our courses of action with respect to Antarctica should be lodged with the State Department. The President stressed that he did not want the U.S. simply to have pieces [Page 550] of the Antarctic pie. If we were ever to make claims in the area, we had better claim it all. We should continue to base our position with respect to Antarctica on our long record of exploration and expeditions. On the other hand, the President did believe that this government should state something at the appropriate time, as we had in the past, that we have as much right to any area of Antarctica as has any other nation.
Mr. Allen Dulles warned that if the Soviets continue on with their extensive Antarctic program, they will in due course have a better claim to the interior portions of the Sub-Continent than the U.S. had. In answer to a question from the President, Mr. Dulles went on to point out that most of the exploration of Antarctica up to the present time had been confined to the coastal areas leaving the interior of the Sub-Continent open to future exploration and possible claims.
Dr. Killian stated that it was virtually the unanimous view of the scientific community in the U.S. that this country should not make any claims in Antarctica at this time. International cooperation, including the cooperation of the U.S.S.R., in Antarctica had been altogether remarkable and our scientists did not wish our government to take any action which might impair this promising development.
The President repeated his view that the U.S. ought to assert a right to go anywhere it damned pleased in Antarctica and that the U.S. should at the same time refuse to recognize the claims of any other nation to any part of Antarctica. Secretary Dillon commented that the only real problem areas in the Sub-Continent at the present time were the areas claimed by the Latin American countries, particularly Chile and Argentina. To this the President replied that the proximity of the areas of Antarctica claimed by Chile and Argentina to the Straits of Magellan gave to these Latin American countries a clear defense interest. He said that he would be inclined to recognize their claims to this relatively small portion of Antarctica.
Mr. Dillon then repeated his conviction that essentially the prestige of the U.S. with respect to Antarctica derived from activities conducted by the U.S. in the area. The President in turn repeated his view that we ought to, at an appropriate time, make a statement which would uphold our rights to go anywhere we wished to go in Antarctica under an international aegis. Secretary Dillon told the President that this was of course our present policy but that he could certainly reiterate it. The President said the essence of such a statement would be that we gave up nothing of our rights in Antarctica but that we made no specific claims to portions of the Sub-Continent.
Apropros of the earlier discussion of the military or defense aspects of our interest in Antarctica, Dr. Killian pointed out that there could arise a U.S. defense or space interest in the area because it might be the scene of the launching of satellites with polar orbits.
[Page 551]Mr. Patterson inquired whether it would not be useful to strengthen Paragraph 23–a regarding the U.S. presence in Antarctica by spelling out in greater detail the specific activities which the U.S. would undertake in order to provide for a continuing U.S. presence in Antarctica. The present statement seemed to Mr. Patterson to be too general in character. The President turned to Dr. Killian and asked what possible reason there was to launch rockets from Antarctica. Dr. Killian replied that the purpose served would be the observation of the upper air. The President then repeated his view that it was the right of the U.S. and of every other nation to use the whole area of Antarctica for peaceful purposes. Thereafter, the President inquired if it was the U.S. Navy alone which provided logistic support to U.S. activities in Antarctica. General Twining and others pointed out that in addition to the Navy the Air Force provided substantial logistical support for such activities. In turn the President inquired of Dr. Waterman information as to the scope of the scientific effort of the U.S. in Antarctica in terms of the money and resources being devoted to this effort. Dr. Waterman supplied the figures requested by the President.
Secretary Dillon expressed the opinion that the kind of statement which the President had in mind about U.S. rights in Antarctica seemed to be almost identical with the statement contained in the note sent on May 2, 1958 by the U.S. to the governments of the eleven nations participating in the International Geophysical Year activities in Antarctica which note was set forth in Annex A to NSC 5905. The President expressed his agreement with Secretary Dillon’s suggestion but argued that one would have to keep repeating the U.S. view in order to convince people that we were being good boys.
At this point Mr. Gray returned to his briefing note and discussed in general terms the organizational arrangements within the U.S. Government for Antarctic activities. He pointed out that the responsibility was now divided among several agencies and also pointed out that the discussion in the Planning Board and in the OCB had indicated that the existing arrangements of divided responsibility left much to be desired, particularly when it came to determining the scope of the program and the means of funding its various aspects. This situation induced the Planning Board to make a specific recommendation for the re-examination of the management aspects of our Antarctic program. He read Paragraph 24 which called for such a review and expressed the hope that the Bureau of the Budget would undertake the review and complete it within a period of sixty days.
With respect to the Financial Appendix, Mr. Gray pointed out that no increase in funds for the Fiscal Year 1960 would be required even if the new policy were adopted. On the other hand, the figures for FY 1961 and FY 1962 were by no means so firm and could conceivably be larger than those indicated in the Financial Appendix.
[Page 552]Lastly in his briefing Mr. Gray reached Paragraph 25 which contained the only other split view and which Mr. Gray read as follows:
“25. Until a different organizational arrangement for the handling of Antarctic activities is adopted,
| “Majority | “Defense–JCS |
| “the current arrangements should be continued under which the Department of Defense is the Executive Agent of the U.S. Government in supporting scientific and other expeditions to Antarctica.” | “the Department of Defense will be the Executive Agent of the U.S. Government for operations in Antarctica, coordinating related activities therein and providing logistic support for U.S. Antarctic programs at approximately the FY 1959 level. Any logistic support in excess of this level will be funded by the agency or agencies sponsoring an expanded program.” |
He then indicated that he had, as a result of discussions with officials of the Defense Department and the National Science Foundation, formulated a new version of Paragraph 25 which he thought acceptable to the National Science Foundation, to the Department of Defense, and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He distributed this new version of Paragraph 25 and pointed out that the views of State with respect to the new version had not yet been ascertained. It was generally agreed that the new proposal for Paragraph 25 was acceptable.
The discussion closed with questions by the President as to how and why so many Government Departments seemed to be involved in our Antarctic programs. This suggested to the President that there might be unnecessary duplication. Secretary Seaton of the Department of the Interior pointed out that Interior’s interest lay only in the mapping activity inasmuch as Interior was the primary government mapping agency. Mr. Mueller, the Acting Secretary of Commerce, pointed out that his Department’s interest in Antarctica was through the agency of the Weather Bureau, the Bureau of Standards, and the Geological Survey. However, Commerce he said had only about thirty people in Antarctica. Even after these explanations the President expressed himself as puzzled as to why so many different agencies seemed to be concerned with the weather in Antarctica and said he presumed this was why we needed to review the organization of our programs in Antarctica.
The National Security Council:
a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5905; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of April 1, 1959.
[Page 553]b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5905, subject to the following amendments:
(1) Page 15: Insert the following new paragraph 20, renumbering subsequent paragraphs accordingly:
“20. As timely and appropriate, reiterate the U.S. position on Antarctica as reflected in the Statement by the President and the Note of May 2, 1958, contained in Annex A hereto.”
(2) Page 15, old paragraph 20 (new paragraph 21): Retain the majority proposal, and delete the JCS-Budget proposal.
(3) Pages 16–17, old paragraph 25 (new paragraph 26): Substitute the following:
“26. Pending the adoption of definitive arrangements for the conduct, coordination and funding of Antarctic activities following the completion of the review called for in Paragraph 25 above, the present arrangements with respect to the Department of Defense as Executive Agent will continue.”
c. Requested the Bureau of the Budget to undertake the review called for in Paragraph 24 of NSC 5905, and to complete this review within the next 60 days.
Note:NSC 5905, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 5905/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.
The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, for appropriate implementation.
[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on April 2.↩
- For NSC 5804/1 and the OCB Report, see Documents 269 and 282. A copy of NSC Action No. 2050 is in Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95; regarding NSC 5905, March 25, 1959, see footnote 1, infra. A copy of the memorandum from the Executive Secretary is in Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica Subject File.↩
- Not printed.↩