Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

286. National Security Council Report¹

Washington, April 7, 1959.

NSC 5905/1

STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY ON ANTARCTICA

General Considerations

1. The increasing scientific potential of Antarctica, and growing Soviet interest in this area, call for a reappraisal of U.S. policy. Antarctica is not readily accessible even during the brief Antarctic “summer”, and much of it has never been seen or explored. It has no present economic value. It has assumed some strategic importance, particularly in the light of recent technological advances and increased Soviet activity. It has considerable importance for scientific purposes; our understanding of the physical structure of the world and its atmosphere will be materially advanced by data obtainable only in Antarctica. Moreover, Antarctica may have other potential values not now determinable, so that its importance would conceivably increase greatly with additional knowledge and new technical developments.

2. The results of the IGY scientific activity in the Antarctic have emphasized the practical potential of and the need for continued research in the area. Among the research areas of particular importance are: the study of ionospheric phenomena and cosmic radiation, both important to communications and space science; the influence of the huge Antarctic ice cap and atmospheric circulation on worldwide weather; the vast food reservoir in the Antarctic oceans and the Antarctic mineral formation and continental structure as they relate to the geology and structure of the earth as a whole.

3. In the present state of knowledge of Antarctica, this scientific interest appears to be the pre-eminent one from the standpoint of U.S. interests. The strategic and economic potential of Antarctica cannot be stated in specific terms but has to be borne in mind in the light of present day advances in science and technology. While this is so, it is in the national interest of the United States to maintain a leading position in Antarctic activities and to maintain itself in a position to take advantage when new factors, as they emerge, permit an evaluation of strategic and economic potentials of the area.

4. In addition to extensive participation in the IGY, the Soviet program in Antarctica includes such activities as ground-controlled aerial photography, mapping, hydrographic charting and basic geology and biology, which have been only incidentally a part of U.S. activities. The USSR’s announcement of plans to expand the Soviet network of stations in Antarctica and to penetrate into the Unclaimed Sector, where U.S. rights are now stronger than those of other nations, the ambitiousness of the traverse plans of the Soviet Union, and its initiative in pressing for an international program for mapping the continent could represent a governmental decision to make the Soviet Union the leading scientific nation in the Antarctic. Whether or not all of these plans are actually carried out, the already impressive Soviet scientific results could eventually be increased to a point where they might overshadow the present pre-eminence of the United States in Antarctic affairs with serious implications to U.S. prestige in the Antarctic.

5. Previous policy on Antarctica (NSC 5804/1, approved March 8, 1958) included a provision for secret consultation with Free World claimant countries regarding the possibility of a treaty among countries having an active interest in Antarctica (including the USSR) providing for the objectives which are repeated in this paper; and depending on the outcome of these consultations, the invitation by the United States of the countries having such active interest to a conference to conclude such a treaty.

6. The contemplated consultations were undertaken and pursuant thereto the United States, in a Note dated May 2, 1958,² invited 11 countries (including the USSR) to attend a conference for the purpose of concluding a treaty which would provide that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only and for freedom of, and cooperation in, scientific research in Antarctica. In extending this invitation the United States refrained from making claims in the hope of reaching a constructive international solution, but stated that the United States was reserving its rights in Antarctica. All countries invited accepted; and preliminary informal discussions with representatives of the 11 countries concerned have been held regularly in Washington since June 13, 1958. There has been tentative agreement on a list of topics to be dealt with at the proposed conference. The 12-power discussions, which have not represented any official commitments on the part of any of the governments concerned, have reflected unanimous agreement that Antarctica should be used for peaceful purposes only and that there should be freedom of, and cooperation in, scientific research in Antarctica. However, in the past, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have favored some sort of internationalization; Australia, Argentina and Chile have been reluctant to renounce sovereignty. While it is considered to be in the best interests of the United States to continue negotiations for a treaty, it should be recognized that these negotiations may continue for a prolonged period.

7. The seven countries which thus far have made formal claims to territory in the Antarctic region are the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, France, Argentina, and Chile. There are two extensive unclaimed sectors: one extending between 90° and 150° West longitude, and the other poleward of the Norwegian claim between 45° East and 20° West longitude. The United States has important potential claims based on discovery, and exploration, scientific and other activity, both within the other national claims and in the unclaimed sectors. The Soviet Union has not yet announced a claim, which might rest on the tenuous historical basis of a naval expedition under von Bellingshausen in 1819–21. However, extensive and continuing Soviet activity in the area at the present time might give support to possible Soviet claims. In addition, the USSR has since World War II taken part in whaling in the area, and regards this activity as additional support for the Soviet position. Neither the United States nor the USSR has recognized the claims of other powers, or made claims of its own. However, the United States on numerous occasions in diplomatic notes and publicly has expressed its policy of reserving all its rights in the area, and the USSR has officially asserted the right to participate in any territorial settlement.³ Japan, the Union of South Africa, and Belgium have participated in the IGY program in Antarctica, but have made no claims. Declaration of a claim by the United States or the USSR or other powers might precipitate additional announcements of claims by countries, such as the Union of South Africa, which have begun to show an increasing interest in the area.

8. At the 1956 and 1958 sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, the Indian Delegation sought to have the question of Antarctica placed on the agenda but later withdrew its proposal. It is possible that the Indians will again raise the issue at the next General Assembly. Apparently, the Indian Government believes that the Antarctic may become a ground of further international contention and thus contribute to a continuation of the cold war. If the issue is raised in the General Assembly, a trusteeship arrangement might be proposed as a means of resolving the claims problem. The United Nations, however, could not impose a trusteeship on a part or all of Antarctica in the absence of the agreement of the states directly concerned.

9. There are certain practical disadvantages to direct United Nations involvement in the administration of Antarctica, principal among which are:

a. Administration by a virtually universal organization such as the United Nations, most of whose members have no direct interest in Antarctica, would not be as efficient as administration by those countries having both experience and substantial interests in Antarctica.

b. Direct United Nations involvement might produce a kind of political maneuvering that could result in question related to Antarctica not being decided exclusively on their own merits, but in relation to other considerations and other matters pending before the United Nations. The votes of certain states might, for example, be motivated by considerations quite apart from those relating exclusively to the best policy for Antarctica.

c. The usual and normal conditions for a United Nations trusteeship are totally absent. There are no permanent inhabitants of Antarctica—only a few isolated posts where the personnel are rotated. Accordingly, there is no problem of dependent peoples, aspirations toward independence, or the need for tutelage which occasionally has arisen for some dependent peoples living in underdeveloped areas of the world. Furthermore, any consideration of a trusteeship for Antarctica would run into such difficult and controversial aspects in the United Nations, as, for example, the naming of one or more countries to act as trustee, the extent of control by the General Assembly, and possible efforts to supervise the administration of the area that would not accord with the realities of the situation.

d. If it were decided to place Antarctica under a strategic trusteeship, making the Security Council the key UN body, the USSR would have the right to veto, which could be utilized to frustrate the establishment or operation of an equitable international administration in the area.

e. An effort to place the territory under United Nations administration is likely to produce greater resistance among those states which have asserted claims of sovereignty in Antarctica than would be the case if the administration were restricted to the claimants and only a very few others.

10. The United States has a long history of discovery and exploration in Antarctica, commencing in the early part of the 19th century and continuing up to the present. On the basis of these activities, the United States has consistently reserved its rights in Antarctica, although it has refrained from making a formal claim to any specific territory. At the same time, the United States has never recognized the claims of other countries.

11. In the light of the foregoing, one possible course of action for the United States to pursue in protecting its rights and interests in Antarctica would be to assert specific territorial claims of sovereignty in Antarctica.⁴ Such a course of action might well serve as a catalyst for conclusion of an acceptable international agreement, particularly if the United States advised interested governments that it is prepared to defer action to implement claims and would agree to leave all other claims and rights unaffected if an acceptable international agreement were reached, such deferment to continue for so long as the agreement remained in force. The assertion of U.S. claims could also avoid a situation in which the United States might be forced to react swiftly to Soviet enunciation of a claim.

12. The course of action described in paragraph 11 has the following disadvantages:

a. If only the unclaimed areas were claimed by the United States, no difficulties would arise with other claimant countries, but presumably any such claim would not be recognized by the USSR. The unclaimed areas are a portion of Antarctica which is difficult of access by sea. Moreover, it is now reported that two-thirds of Marie Byrd Land may be below sea level.

b. If the United States were to make specific territorial claims in sectors already claimed by other countries, a number of practical difficulties might arise. The United States could logically support territorial claims in most if not all of the sectors now claimed by other countries. If this were done there might be a series of disagreeable controversies with a number of friendly countries. Furthermore, it would be difficult to define precisely the geographic limits of such claims by lines of latitude and longitude.

c. If the United States were to make specific claims throughout Antarctica, the result might be an apparent downgrading of U.S. rights in areas not claimed. The United States might be deemed to have less rights in other areas of Antarctica if it claimed superior rights in certain specific areas.

d. The problem of administering and defending U.S. sovereign soil in Antarctica might become complicated and expensive if the United States has a number of scattered claims over all the territory.

e. The assertion of U.S. claims might accentuate rivalries in Antarctica, and might provoke unwelcome initiatives by the USSR. Competition for the area would be intensified and costly.

f. In view of the general, tough, unofficial, understanding that political activities in Antarctica should be held in abeyance for the duration of the IGY, there might be much sentiment against positive action by the United States in Antarctica if such action were based on activities conducted during the IGY.

g. An attempt by the United States to extend its sovereignty over large portions or Antarctica might not be so well received in world opinion as a broader policy aimed at international cooperation.

h. The assertion of territorial claims does not appear to be necessary in order to achieve the basic objectives of U.S. policy, and might even be detrimental to these objectives.

13. For the time being, the objectives of the United States respecting Antarctica could be achieved by the conclusion of a multilateral agreement as proposed in the Note of May 2, 1958. Alternative courses of action, in the event of failure to conclude such an agreement, are provided for below.

14. Mapping has taken on additional significance with the increasing scientific and political importance of Antarctica. It is essential to the accurate delineation of the physical character of the continent. The USSR began mapping and charting from the very outset of its IGY operations, and has been pressing for an international program, whereas the United States has refrained from any topographic mapping during the IGY and has no current program.

15. Current U.S. activities in the Antarctica are being carried on with the Department of Defense acting as Executive Agent through FY 1959 in supporting scientific and other expeditions. With the end of the IGY, the National Science Foundation is coordinating the scientific program of the interested government agencies, providing a single scientific budget and arranging with the Defense Department for support for the scientific program to be carried out.

16. Experience to date has created a need to re-examine the adequacy of organizational arrangements of the United States Government with respect to (a) coordinating the diverse United States Antarctic plans and projects; (b) facilitating balanced consideration of budgetary and financial requirements of the U.S. Antarctic programs which are in large measure in the nature of logistic support; and (c) serving as a focal point for information relating to Antarctica. Since the U.S. presence in Antarctica has been maintained on major scale through utilization of Defense logistic support, the Defense Department finds itself heavily committed in terms of available men, money and resources to programs which are not primarily of Defense Department interest.

Objectives

17. A leading U.S. position in Antarctica which would satisfy necessary U.S. political, scientific and potential economic, military and other interests.

18. Orderly progress toward a peaceful solution of the problem of Antarctica which would:

a. Prevent the use of Antarctica for military purposes.

b. Provide for freedom of scientific investigation throughout Antarctica by citizens and organizations of all countries under established uniform rules.

c. Guarantee freedom of access to Antarctica by citizens and organizations of all countries, under established uniform rules.

d. Establish uniform and non-preferential rules applicable to all countries and their nationals for any possible development of economic resources in the future.

e. In general, provide for an orderly joint administration of Antarctica by the countries directly concerned, on a non-preferential basis for all countries, and for peaceful purposes only.

f. Provide such relationship or association with the United Nations as would advance the preceding objectives.

Policy Guidance

19. Continue efforts to achieve an acceptable agreement on Antarctica which would have the objectives stated in paragraph 18 and would include the USSR.

20. As timely and appropriate, reiterate the U.S. position on Antarctica as reflected in the Statement by the President and the Note of May 2, 1958, contained in Annex A hereto.⁵

21. If required at any time for the protection of U.S. interests, claim the unclaimed area of Antarctica and reserve U.S. rights in the areas claimed by other powers or make claims in such areas as deemed appropriate.⁶

22. Take all feasible steps now to be prepared, in the event of failure to achieve the agreement referred to in paragraph 19, to achieve other cooperative Antarctica arrangements (e.g., condominium, joint administration).

23. In view of the scientific nature of IGY cooperation and the strength of Free World claims based on the pre-IGY period, support the principle that activities engaged in under the IGY Antarctic program and other similar programs do not constitute a legal basis for the assertion of Antarctic claims.

24. a. Provide for a continuing U.S. presence in Antarctica, with a scale of activities, including mapping, adequate to realize U.S. objectives.

b. In connection with such cooperative arrangements with other countries as may be worked out in Antarctica, explore the possibility of effecting economies through joint operation.

25. Initiate a review of current arrangements within the Executive Branch for conducting, coordinating and funding Antarctic activities in order to assure the most effective arrangements for determining the scope of and carrying out such activities. In connection therewith, consideration will be given to the desirability of an Antarctic Commission.

26. Pending the adoption of definitive arrangements for the conduct, coordination and funding of Antarctic activities following the completion of the review called for in paragraph 25 above, the present arrangements with respect to the Department of Defense as Executive Agent will continue.⁷

1. Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica Subject Files. Secret. NSC 5905/1 consisted of a cover sheet; memorandum of transmittal; the statement of policy; financial appendix; and two annexes: A, giving the text of the invitation to the conference, and B, the Soviet note of June 10, 1950. Only the statement of policy is printed here. The few differences between NSC 5905 and 5905/1 are indicated in subsequent footnotes.
2. Annex A. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. By a Soviet Memorandum of 1950 to the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and France. See Annex B. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Claims could be based on first sighting, explorations, mapping occupation, and use, of those areas in which U.S. explorers have been active, from Palmer, in 1920, through the latest Deep Freeze Operation. Among the explorers who have advanced U.S. rights are the following: Palmer, Wilkes, Byrd, and Ellsworth, as well as recent explorers such as Dufek, Ketchum, and Ronne, and members of their parties. These areas include, in addition to Marie Byrd Land and the area south of the Norwegian claim, the Palmer Peninsula, Ross Ice Shelf, Wilkes Land, the American Highland, the South Pole, and various areas, interior and coastal, which have been flown over and mapped by U.S.-owned aircraft. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. For the unagreed text of paragraph 20 in NSC 5905, see the memorandum of discussion, supra.
6. Paragraph 21 was not present in NSC 5905. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica Subject File) Paragraphs 22–25 were numbered 21–24 in NSC 5905.
7. For text of the final paragraph (numbered 25) in NSC 5905, see the memorandum of discussion, supra.