Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

282. Report by the Operations Coordinating Board¹

Washington, January 21, 1959.

OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD REPORT ON ANTARCTICA (NSC 5804/1)²

(Approved by President, March 8, 1958)

(Period Covered: From June 26, 1958 Through January 21, 1959)

A. Summary Evaluation

1. Political.

a. U.S.-Proposed International Conference. In pursuance of its policy objectives, i.e., use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only, freedom of access to and scientific research in Antarctica, and continued international scientific cooperation in Antarctic research, the U.S. initiated on June 13, 1958, informal confidential discussions in Washington with representatives of the eleven other countries active in the IGY program in Antarctica. The purpose of these discussions is to make arrangements for the convening of the international conference to negotiate a treaty on Antarctica, as proposed to these countries by the U.S. on May 2, 1958. All countries represented in these discussions, including the USSR, have repeatedly indicated their agreement to the basic objectives of peaceful use and international cooperation as expressed by the United States in its note of invitation. The participating governments have also indicated agreement to holding the conference in Washington. No agreement, however, has been reached on the date for the conference. The participants agree that at least two months should elapse between the preparatory talks and the conference. The USSR representative has resisted discussion in the preparatory talks of substantive matters pertaining to the treaty and has proposed that the conference be expanded to include other interested nations. Representatives of some of the Western nations, notably the UK and Australia, feel that there must be evidence of greater agreement among all the countries concerned with respect to substantive matters prior to negotiation of the treaty at a formal conference. These preliminary discussions are continuing although they have lasted longer than originally anticipated. It has been agreed that statements to the press by any representative will be limited to those statements agreed to by all. Up to now the group has agreed to say only that the preparatory talks are being held. While it is considered to be in the best interests of the U.S. to continue negotiations for a treaty, it should be recognized that these negotiations may continue for a prolonged period. Therefore, the planning of U.S. activities in Antarctica should not be based only on the expectation or assumption that a treaty will be obtained, but, rather, such planning should be accomplished in a manner appropriate to meet U.S. requirements irrespective of possible treaty arrangements. (See Annex C)

b. Documentation in Support of Possible U.S. Claims. The Department of Defense has turned over to the Department of State all information available to the Department of Defense in support of possible claims, and documentation has been assembled which can be used to support claims which may be made by the U.S. Although policy guidance provides that the U.S. be prepared to make claims, even in areas claimed by other nations, it is the considered view of interested agencies that, in the event the U.S. should decide to make a claim, its interests would be served best by claiming the Unclaimed Area and reserving U.S. rights in the areas already claimed by other nations rather than by making specific claims therein. Thereby the U.S. should be in a stronger and more flexible position vis-à-vis other claimant nations.

2. Level of U.S. Operations. Pursuant to the policy guidance, measures were taken by the U.S. to reduce activity to the minimum essential to support U.S. interests. A network of four Stations (McMurdo, Byrd, Hallett and South Pole) have been kept in operation [15 words not declassified]. The remaining Stations supported by the U.S. during the IGY period (Wilkes and Ellsworth) were made available to friendly nations for their logistic support under appropriate cooperative arrangements including participation of U.S. scientists. In addition, steps were taken to discontinue the use of Little America as a year-around operational Station. However, due to the fact that during the period under review the Soviets gave firm evidence (see Annex A) of an intention to expand their network of polar stations into the largest and most widespread in Antarctica, the question emerges as to whether the present level of U.S. effort is sufficient to protect U.S. interests in the face of this immediate and long-range challenge to U.S. political and scientific pre-eminence and position of leadership in Antarctica. From the standpoint of military interests, the Department of Defense considers that the present level of activity is adequate to meet its requirements.

3. Scientific and Logistic Support Activities. The National Science Foundation, as the agency responsible for the coordination of a continuing Antarctic scientific research program, and in conjunction with those Federal agencies that are conducting portions of the program, has met all commitments planned for the first post-IGY year of Antarctic activities. The Department of Defense fulfilled all logistical support requirements to which it was committed during the period. (In view of the present budgetary and manpower limitations imposed on the Department of Defense, the present program of four stations is the maximum that the Department of Defense can support.) (See Annex B)

4. Need for Policy Review. In view of developments since March 8, 1958, particularly the matters discussed in this report, it is recommended that U.S. policy towards Antarctica be reviewed.

B. Major Operating Problems or Difficulties Facing the United States

5. Agreement on Date of the Conference. The United States along with Chile, Argentina, and others have urged agreement on an early date for the proposed conference. This group considered that the disadvantages of postponing the conference were greater than the advantages to be gained from prolonged discussion in the hope that greater understanding could be reached beforehand on basic issues. At one point the date October 23, 1958, was proposed as a basis for consultation with governments. The USSR and others indicated willingness to accept that date. Australia and the United Kingdom insisted, however, that the basic issues be explored further and that a greater extent of agreement first be reached on these issues. At that time it appeared that United Nations consideration of Antarctica during the 13th General Assembly was inevitable if an early date for the conference were not announced. Shortly after the United Nations General Assembly convened, however, India withdrew its earlier proposal to include the subject of Antarctica in this year’s Assembly Agenda. Another disadvantage seen in delaying the conference was that the chances were greater that other countries would voice an interest in Antarctica and in the conference, or even organize expeditions to Antarctica thus weakening the basis for the United States invitation list to the conference. These fears have been given some reality by the recently announced intention of Poland to send an expedition to Antarctica and by the articulately expressed interest of Brazil, Italy, and India in Antarctica. (See Annex C)

6. Implications of Soviet Expansion. The expansion of the Soviet network of polar stations into the largest and most widespread in Antarctic—notably penetration into the Unclaimed Sector where U.S. rights are now stronger than those of other nations—combined with the introduction of another Bloc nation (Poland), the ambitiousness of the traverse plans of the Soviet Union, and its initiative in pressing for an international program for mapping the continent appear to represent a governmental decision to make the Soviet Union the leading scientific nation in the Antarctic. If and when augmented by the future use of scientific submarines and atomic icebreakers the already impressive Soviet scientific results could eventually be increased to a point where they might overshadow the present pre-eminence of the U.S. in Antarctic affairs, with serious implications to U.S. prestige in the Antarctic. Since implementation of the present and proposed expanded Soviet program presents an immediate and long-range challenge to the U.S. scientific and political position, the scientific program as outlined in the current U.S. Operations Plan for Antarctica may be inadequate to support U.S. interests.

7. Possible Augmented Activities After FY 1959.

a. General. Contingent upon a policy determination at a higher level that U.S. activity in Antarctica should be increased to a scale commensurate with the projected operations of the USSR, and expanded U.S. program might include the following: (1) initiation of additional activities including geology, traverses, and the establishment of additional bases in western Antarctica; (2) an improved systematic oceanographic program; and (3) a comprehensive coordinated program of Antarctic mapping and resource evaluation. The fact that negotiations on an Antarctic treaty are now being pursued should not affect a decision with respect to the level of U.S. activities in Antarctica. (See Annex A, Sec. E)

b. Mapping. Mapping and surveying are a prerequisite of the planning and implementation of scientific programs, the support operations therefor, and the ascertainment of any eventual economic interests of the United States in the area. The political importance of mapping activity lies in its value as evidence to support rights and claims related to territorial sovereignty. This is especially significant in the unclaimed area where there is a need to delineate the rock basement above sea level. The United States should, moreover, be in a position to play a leading role in any international cooperative mapping program such as has been recommended by SCAR in which the USSR has declared it would participate very extensively. To meet this challenge the U.S. should be prepared to implement a systematic U.S. program of topographic mapping at an early date. Under the current level of operations, projected from existing policy, the U.S. representative at the scheduled SCAR meeting in March, 1959, will be unable to indicate any U.S. contribution to the Soviet-proposed international mapping of Antarctica. (See Annex D)

8. U.S. Organization for Coordination, Funding, Administration and Support of Antarctic Activities. During the period covered by this report several major factors have evolved to further identify the projection of U.S. interests in Antarctica beyond the IGY period. These factors are mainly in the political, psychological and scientific fields. They are, broadly stated, the challenge of U.S. prestige and leadership revealed in the ambitious Soviet programs for post-IGY activities in Antarctica, and the initiative assumed by the U.S. in proposing an International Conference on Antarctica. The many and varied implications of these factors in the immediate post-IGY period and in the long-term period have created a need to re-examine the adequacy of organizational arrangements of the United States Government with respect to (1) coordinating the diverse United States Antarctic plans and projects; (2) facilitating balanced consideration of budgetary and financial requirements of the United States Antarctic programs which are in large measure in the nature of logistic support; and (3) serving as a focal point for information relating to Antarctica. Since the U.S. presence in Antarctica has been maintained on a major scale through utilization of Defense logistic support, the Defense Department finds itself heavily committed in terms of available men, money and resources to programs which are not primarily of Defense Department interest. Therefore, specific means for financing logistic support of Antarctic programs other than by the regular Navy supply appropriations which have heretofore been used should be provided especially if the programs are augmented or expanded.

C. Additional Major Developments

9. Cooperative Maintenance of Wilkes and Ellsworth Stations. The United States reached understanding with Argentina and Australia on cooperative arrangements for the continued operation of the U.S. Ellsworth Station and Wilkes Station, respectively. The United States is contributing the facilities of these two stations, concerning which custody receipts will be signed by appropriate authorities at the Stations at the time the seasonal exchange of personnel takes place in January 1959. Argentina and Australia are assuming administrative and logistical support responsibility. In accordance with the terms of the understandings the United States is sending scientists to each of the stations to participate jointly in the scientific program there.

10. Scientific and Observer Personnel Programs.

a. Scientific Personnel at Stations Maintained by the U.S. The following table of U.S. scientists is given with respect to the first post-IGY calendar year 1959 winter science team and the IGY 1958–1959 summer team. The 1959 winter team list indicates activities at the four U.S. stations only, whereas the 1958–1959 IGY summer team list indicates terminal scientific activities at the six IGY scientific stations and NAF McMurdo.

[Here follows a table listing the number of American scientists at each station.]

b. U.S. Scientific Personnel at Stations Maintained Jointly or Under Cooperative Arrangements with Other Nations.

[Here follows a table listing the number of American scientists at Hallett, Ellsworth, and Wilkes stations.]

c. U.S. Scientific Personnel at Stations Maintained by Other Nations.

1959 Winter

(1) Scott (Main New Zealand Base)—4

(2) Efforts to find a United States scientist to participate again the coming year at the Soviet Mirny Station have been unsuccessful, and no approach has been made to the Soviets about continuing the current program. The United States has discussed the possibility with Australia, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand of one of them furnishing a scientist to continue this program [19 words not declassfied].

(3) A special program of participation, for the most part by the U.S. Navy, in the Argentine program is being continued in the coming year.

d. Official Observer Program. A program for exchange of official observers on resupply missions is being carried out during the Antarctic summer season now starting. Eight countries, including the USSR, accepted in principle the U.S. proposal that official observers be exchanged and accompany the relief and resupply missions to the various Antarctic scientific stations. The United States has named an oceanographer to accompany the Soviet expedition and has suggested that the Soviets also name an oceanographer to accompany the U.S expedition. The Soviets have responded on November 21 that their plans for oceanographic research have changed and an exchange of observers on the Antarctic expeditions does not appear possible this year. To obtain qualified persons to send on foreign Antarctic expeditions is a difficult problem. There has existed a shortage of travel funds throughout the Government and it is understood the various agencies desire to reserve what little they have for projects more closely related to their primary mission, as well as the objection to having staff members away from desks for as great a period of time. One suggestion for improvement has been made—that of speeding up the initial date of a placement for each year’s program and the second and most important one is to obtain a small allocation of funds to pay the cost of observer travel. The experience of the past several years has clearly demonstrated the value of the exchange of foreign observers. Reports prepared by observers upon return from their assignments with the expeditions of other nations have been a source of much accurate information. In the main, such knowledge might not otherwise have been obtainable. It is, of course, difficult to ascertain what the Foreign Nationals who accompany U.S. expeditions gain from their experiences. However, their active compilation of notes, requests for publications and intelligent queries reveal that they have been obtaining information which they consider of value. The State Department suggested that for the sake of uniformity, it would be advantageous for the exchange of observers program to include all eleven countries, of which the United States sent the note of May 2, proposing an Antarctic Conference. This, of course, included the USSR and New Zealand, in addition to the nine countries on the active list. Action was taken to conform with the suggestion. The Department of State, this season, issued invitations to eleven foreign nations for this observer exchange. About the first of September, five nations had replied, requesting U.S. observers. Whenever possible, it is desirous that the nominating agency, which will benefit directly, pay for the cost of travel for observers. Some foreign countries furnish and accept observers, others accept and do not furnish, while still others do not accept but do furnish them. The following chart demonstrates this point.

[Here follows a chart listing the nations which would send and/or take foreign observers.]

Annex A

January 2, 1959.

IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET EXPANSION IN ANTARCTICA TO THE U.S. POSITION

A. Background

Pursuant to the request of the Working Group on Antarctica expressed at its 113th meeting on 26 August 1958, the representatives of CIA and Department of State are submitting herewith (1) an estimate of the implications of reported Soviet plans for expanded activities in the Antarctic, (2) an evaluation of the adequacy of the U.S. program, and (3) suggested ways in which U.S. activities might be augmented to offset the challenge posed by the contemplated Soviet expansion.

B. Soviet Plans

1. Soviet Announcements Since August 1958. Soviet announcements concerning 1958–59 Antarctic activities as well as post-IGY plans, which were made in August, 1958, at the Second SCAR Conference in Moscow and subsequently modified and elaborated, disclose a major program of expansion in future operations, as follows:

a. The Soviet network of Antarctic stations is to be expanded to nine stations through the establishment of three new stations, two of them in the 1958–59 season. One of the two is already established at the “Pole of Relative Inaccessibility”, with indications that Sovetskaya will probably be disestablished as a year-around observation station; a second, to be called Lazaryev, will be located on Princess Astrid Coast in Queen Maud Land at approximately 10° East longitude; the third, to be called Bellingshausen, is to be set up in the Unclaimed Sector in the vicinity of Thurston Peninsula, possibly in 1959–60. The use of Pionerskaya as an active observation station is being discontinued.

b. The Oazis Station with all of its equipment is being turned over to Poland. It will be manned by six Polish scientists arriving in January, 1959.

c. Overland geographic and geologic studies are to be undertaken in the coastal zone of Queen Maud Land (10° W–45° E) and, possibly in 1959–1960, in the coastal zones along the Amundsen and Bellingshausen Seas (85° W–130° W).

d. Oceanographic surveys, including hydrographic charting and mapping, are to be undertaken in the waters adjacent to these coastal zones—in the Atlantic in 1958–59 and possibly in the Pacific during the following year.

e. A major tractor traverse approximately 3,750 miles long—connecting Mirny with Vostok, the South Geographic Pole, the Pole of Inaccessibility, and Lazaryev Station—is scheduled for completion by 1960; and a second—from Mirny to Bellingshausen—is proposed for a later date.

f. Soviets have proposed that an international mapping project for Antarctica at 1:3,000,000 (coastal areas at 1:500,000–1:1,000,000 and special areas at 1:250,000–1:1,000,000) be set up under SCAR. The Soviets have offered to map one-third of the area and any part which other nations are not able to undertake, and have proposed that two Soviet jet-aircraft and equipment be used.

2. Related Developments and Other Announcements. Other developments or announcements pointing to new or expanded activities that are relevant to this review of the future Soviet buildup in Antarctica include

a. Organizational changes recently instituted reflect a shift from temporary to permanent arrangements in the planning, coordination, and direction of Soviet Antarctic operations and research. An Interdepartmental Antarctic Commission was established under the Presidium of Academy of Sciences, USSR, and the long-standing Arctic Scientific Research Institute of the Chief Directorate of the Northern Sea Route was expanded to include the Antarctic—changing its official name to Arctic and Antarctic Scientific Research Institute. The reporting of Soviet activities and findings is being stepped up with the issuance of two serial publications. Current activities and preliminary results are being issued in an elaborate Information Bulletin, and more definitive studies and findings are to be published in Proceedings of the Complex Antarctic Expedition.

b. Progress announcements indicate that the second Soviet whaling fleet is in the latter phases of construction. One report indicates that a third may be built.

c. In connection with a description of the Soviet “scientific submarine” scheduled for operations in 1958, a Soviet source states that the possibility of the adoption of atomic energy “opens broad prospects for the future utilization of submarines for scientific purposes in the Arctic and Antarctic for the economic needs of the country”.

d. A responsible Soviet scientist has disclosed that atomic energy (form unspecified, presumably for power at the stations) will be used in the Arctic and the Antarctic.

e. On 30 May 1958, Nesmeyanov, President of the Academy of Sciences, USSR, reportedly stated to an American in a conference that the Soviet Union is contemplating launching earth satellites from the Antarctic as well as from Franz Josef Land in the Arctic.

C. Implications of Soviet Expansion

3. Progressive Increase in Station Network. The expansion of the Soviet network of polar stations to 9 stations is a far cry from the modest original Soviet announcement in July, 1955, stating a desire to establish “one and possibly two stations”. Moreover, it belies the expressions of uncertainty and doubt concerning the Soviet post-IGY network advanced by Somov at the First SCAR Conference at the Hague in February, 1958. At that time, he seemed to indicate that the six-station net lying entirely within the Australian-claimed sector, which had been announced at the Stockholm IGSU meetings in September, 1957, might not be continued after the end of the IGY. As Soviet transcontinental operations develop, we anticipate that additional supply bases will be required in the interior, some of which may become summer-season stations. This would further broaden Soviet presence in Antarctica through an even greater network of interior stations.

4. Implications of Increase. If established, the network of 9 stations will be the largest single network both in number of stations and extent of territory covered. The U.S., by contrast, operates 3 major stations—South Pole, McMurdo (167° E) and Byrd (120° W)—and participates with New Zealand in the joint operation of Hallett Station (arrangements have also been made with Australia and Argentina for the continued operation of Wilkes and Ellsworth Stations, with the U.S. contributing personnel to the scientific program). We can expect Soviet propaganda to stress (a) the superiority of their larger effort as evidenced by number and distribution of stations, and (b) their major scientific contribution in order to impress both the scientific and lay international opinion with their vigor and capabilities in the Antarctic. We must anticipate that this large-scale effort is likely to increase an already-existing apprehensiveness among the countries of the Southern Hemisphere.

5. Penetration of Unclaimed Sector. The possible accomplishment of the difficult feat of establishing the first encampment on the coastal area of the Unclaimed Sector would afford the Soviets a basis for relating this Soviet achievement to the early Tsarist discoveries of Peter I and Alexander I Islands. If successful in the establishment of the Bellingshausen station, the Soviets will become the first nation to attain a position that could challenge the primacy of U.S. rights in the Unclaimed Sector. If the Soviets prove able to repeat from the Bellingshausen station their past achievements in exploration, geophysical observation, geographic studies, surveys, and mapping, the resultant record as evidenced by scientific reports and by maps and charts will comprise an impressive argument with which to challenge the record of U.S. activities in the Unclaimed Sector. Should Soviet activities in the Unclaimed Sector continue in the magnitude contemplated, they would tend to reduce the relative strength of the U.S. position in the area, which has been built up through the years by discovery, exploration, and other activities. This would become a serious consideration in the event that the U.S. should decide to make a claim to the area. In the event of a failure of the proposed Antarctic treaty, the Soviets’ presence and activities in that area could cause the U.S. difficulty in arriving at any limited arrangements under the provisions of which the U.S. might be expected to pool its claims (or its rights) to the so-called Unclaimed Sector with those of certain other nations.

6. Effect on U.S.-Latin American Defense Relations. The presence of the proposed Bellingshausen Station overlooking the approaches to Drake Passage and within 10° of the Antarctic area of the Security Zone of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance is likely to arouse substantial anxiety not only in Argentina and Chile but also among other Latin American countries. In the present missile-jittery environment, the Soviet presence less than 1500 miles from the South American continent may well stimulate additional anxieties and complexities as far as U.S.-Latin American defense relations are concerned.

7. Prospects for Permanent Settlement. The expanding Soviet station network and the prospects of further supply bases that may be set up in connection with the traverse programs add possible substance to long-term Soviet settlement and development envisaged in 1956 by Dr. D.I. Shcherbakov, now chairman of the Interdepartmental Antarctic Commission. At that time, he expressed his conviction that the Soviets would continue activities in Antarctica because of their importance to a number of applied sciences and that, after the IGY, the Soviet stations would gradually be improved and ultimately become continuously operating bases. He further speculated that settlements surrounding meteorological and radio stations might be established and continue to develop, as has been the case in the Soviet Far North.

8. Significance of Proposed Lazaryev Station. The Lazaryev Station in Queen Maud Land represents another area of major historical interest to the USSR. At approximately 10° E, the station would lie between the point where Bellingshausen made his discovery of the “icy continent of Antarctica” (69° 25’S–2° 10’W) and the site of his second penetration (69° 7’S–16° 15’E). The political significance of the region to the Soviet Union is evidenced by the March 1948 visit of the Slava whaling fleet explicitly to verify the fact that the icefield seen by Lazaryev (commander of Bellingshausen’s second ship) was a part of the continental ice shield of Antarctica. As early as 1955 the Soviet Antarctic planning chart has assigned Bellinghausen’s name to the two ice shelves and the barrier ice in this area. The new Soviet station would lie within the Norwegian-claimed area, which is a coastal zone that extends poleward for an undefined distance. The Soviets, in their forthcoming traverse to Lazaryev Station, will have the opportunity to cross extensive interior areas never seen by man—many of which lie within the hinterland of the Norwegian claim. If their plans are accomplished the Soviets will here also acquire the political advantages based on discovery, original scientific observations, and mapping.

9. Objectives of Planned Traverses. The recent shift in plans from a traverse across Antarctica to one across Queen Maud Land to Lazaryev actually represents an expansion, since the trans-Antarctic crossing from Mirny to Bellingshausen Station has not been abandoned but merely deferred. While motivations for these ambitious efforts may initially have been primarily scientific, there are strong indications that government approval was given for political reasons and for the propaganda value of scoring an achievement in Antarctic exploration that would surpass that of Fuchs and Hillary. If successful with both crossings the Soviets, indeed, will have added a spectacular imagination-capturing contribution to the buildup of the Soviet Union as a leading Antarctic power.

10. Entry of Poland into the Antarctic. The sudden possible entry of Poland into Antarctica appears to be a Soviet maneuver to gain another voice for the Soviet Bloc in whatever possible future administrative machinery may be created under the proposed Antarctic treaty as well as in the Special Committee on Antarctic Research.

11. Possible Soviet Leadership in Mapping. The lack of reconnaissance-type map coverage of Antarctica represents a basic deficiency, in the topographic delineation of the area. Aware of this deficiency, the Soviets began mapping and charting at the very outset of their operations, and they have repeatedly stressed their progress in new mapping as well as in the correcting of foreign maps, including those of the U.S. This boasting is not without considerable justification. Soviet coastal mapping and charting—including ground-controlled aerial photography, radarscope photography, and echo-soundings—now covers coastal areas extending over 126 degrees of longitude, with 100 degrees more scheduled for the 1958–59 season. In contrast the U.S. has abstained almost completely from any systematic mapping during the past three seasons, and the charting that has been undertaken was on a non-interference basis, principally in the Ross Sea. As a consequence, a basis has been laid for Soviet leadership in the mapping of the entire continent of Antarctica.

12. Introduction of “Scientific Submarine”. The eventual introduction of a “scientific submarine” (and probably of an atomic icebreaker) into Soviet Antarctic research will not only increase Soviet scientific results but also carry significant propaganda impact in these two fields that rank high in world-wide public interest. The great anxiety manifested in Australia over unfounded reports some 18 months ago that a submarine base had been established by the Soviets provides ample indication of the stronger reactions that are likely to result if a Soviet submarine should actually appear in Antarctic waters.

13. Contemplated Launching of Earth Satellite. Although the Soviet contemplation of the launching of an earth satellite from an Antarctic site has not as yet been confirmed by other evidence and although no launching is likely for several years, it is not premature to take cognizance of the problem at this time. The chief significance of the report may be as an indication that the Soviets intend to exploit further the psychological impact of the sputniks. At present, there appears to be no technological or scientific advantage in the launching of satellites from the polar areas themselves. Some scientific support is beginning to emerge in favor of the concept that in polar areas the belt of radiation in the higher altitudes is thinner than elsewhere and hence more favorable for the future launching of manned satellites. This concept, however, is still too speculative to provide a basis for the reported Soviet plans. If evidence of the Soviet intentions should persist, it might seem to indicate the extension of “sputnik diplomacy” specifically to impress the Southern Hemisphere peoples with Soviet missile-launching capabilities.

14. Soviet Economy in Commitment of Men and Transport. Soviet Antarctic operations have been accomplished with an unusually small commitment of men, ships and aircraft. The establishment of a 6-station net (including 2 nearly 900 miles from the coast), the extensive coastal mapping and charting and geologic oceanographic surveys have been achieved with no more than 3 ships (none of which is a true ice-breaker), personnel of about 400, and 15 to 20 aircraft. For the 1958–59 expansion into the interior and into Queen Maud Land, in addition to the re-supplying of their 6 other stations, the Soviets are using only 2 ships and about 300 personnel, including the crews of ships. Some of the factors that account for the successes that have accompanied this small logistic effort include (1) multiple use of ships—for logistic and scientific purposes, freight hauling on return trips, and continued operation in the arctic summers; (2) intensive air operations the year round (in January–November 1957, a dozen aircraft on scientific and logistic missions logged more than 3,000 hours and flew 420,000 miles); (3) increased mobility of extensive air operations from unprepared surfaces in the implementation of widespread scientific activities; and (4) use of a highly experienced corps of Arctic professionals. The economy of Soviet operations is particularly significant because (1) minimum resources were diverted from Soviet Arctic operations, and (2) the strain on the Soviet budget was relatively small. The budgetary strain was reduced still further by the profits of Soviet whaling operations, which in the 1957–58 season were reported to amount to nearly $6,000,000.

15. Significance of Whaling-Fleet Operations. The expansion in Soviet whaling-fleet operations poses some long-range implications. Benefits from these operations have not been limited to economic profits. Since 1947 the whaling flotilla has also collected scientific data (relative to weather, physical geography, and climatology as well as to whaling resources). In 1957–58, an added scientific team for special studies raised the number of scientists in the whole fleet to 10, including 1 glaciologist and 2 geologists. For the 1958–59 season 2 scientific ships have been added to the fleet. The whaling fleet has also been used to serve political ends. Activities during 1957–58 season included landings on 2 islands of the South Sandwich group (56° 18’ to 59°27’S–26° 30’W), and on most of the5 uninhabited Balleny Islands (66° 15’ to 67° 40’S–162° 15’ to 164° 45’E). Metal stakes or signs were erected noting the landings. In the 1947–48 season the Slava approached the coast of Antarctica, at the two points where the Soviets claim that the Bellingshausen expedition discovered the continent, in order to verify the physical-geographic plausibility of that discovery. With the construction of a second and possibly a third fleet, Soviet capabilities in Antarctic operations will be increased, whaling as well as scientific. As a result of mounting Soviet whaling production, the Norwegians have recently expressed alarm concerning the prospect of Soviet domination of the industry in the Antarctic. If this were to happen, Soviet prominence would be extended into another field of activity. Furthermore, if one were to postulate the possibility of Soviet use of the factory ships for hauling artificial earth satellites and even missiles, the fleet could eventually emerge as another significant tool in extension of Soviet power in the Southern Hemisphere. Since the International Whaling Commission has not as yet established an independent observer program to monitor whale-catching regulations, no method of surveillance could be set up that would provide information on the use of Soviet factory ships. [A program proposed by Norway in 1955 as a protocol to the International Whaling Convention lacked ratification by Mexico, Brazil and Panama as of 1958; unanimous ratification is required before entry into force.]³

16. Withholding of Information by Soviets. To date, the Soviets have withheld certain results of their Antarctic activities—chiefly new sailing pilots, hydrographic charts, echo soundings, radarscope photography, large-scale maps, gravity data, and improvements in aids to polar navigation—thus creating an imbalance that could have undesirable long-range military implications.

D. Conclusions

The expansion of the Soviet station net into the largest one on the Antarctic Continent, the introduction of another Bloc nation (Poland), the ambitiousness of Soviet traverse plans, and their initiative in pressing for an international program for mapping the continent appear to represent a Soviet governmental decision to make the Soviet Union the scientific leader on the continent, thereby strengthening its political position in the Antarctic. If and when augmented by the future use of scientific submarines and atomic icebreakers the already impressive Soviet scientific results could eventually be increased to a point where they might overshadow the present pre-eminence of the U.S. in Antarctic affairs, with serious implications to U.S. prestige in the Antarctic.

Since the expanded Soviet program presents a long-range challenge to the U.S. scientific and political position, the scientific program as outlined in the current U.S. Operations Plan for Antarctica cannot be considered adequate to support U.S. interests. The current U.S. program was developed as a minimum program at a time when Soviet post-IGY plans indicated that a six-nation network would be maintained and that it would be located entirely within their current area of operations. The U.S. program for the first post-IGY season is inadequate particularly because (1) it fails to provide sufficient activities in the interior regions, particularly in Western Antarctica; (2) there is no assurance that an adequate systematic oceanographic program will be implemented; and (3) an adequate program in aerial mapping is lacking. These deficiencies if not corrected would (1) weaken the U.S. political position, particularly in Western Antarctica; (2) lead to the eventual erosion of the position of pre-eminence and leadership in Antarctica now held by the U.S.; (3) provide the Russians a field of scientific endeavor with an opportunity to outpace and outperform the U.S.; and (4) reduce the coverage of basic scientific data to a point of deficiency that would be disadvantageous to the U.S.

E. Suggested Augmentation of U.S. Activities

The following are suggested as ways in which U.S. activities in Antarctica might be augmented to meet the challenge of the expanding Soviet program and its adverse political, scientific, and defense implications for the United States:

a. Increase U.S. interior operations by (1) establishing several small, seasonal stations, and (2) expanding traverse operations. The former would be most advantageous in the area between the base of Palmer Peninsula and the Pensacola and Sentinel Mountains. Such stations would (1) permit unique, fruitful geologic investigations, (2) serve geodetic requirements by establishing ground-control positions for aerial mapping, (3) provide additional year-round meteorological coverage through the use of automatic weather stations during the winter months, (4) provide imagination-capturing material to publicize U.S. activities and dilute Soviet propaganda, (5) help to maintain U.S. rights beyond the Unclaimed Sector, and (6) provide stations that would be useful as air-rescue facilities for the future, when expanded air operations will be required for mapping [9 words not declassified] and the delivery of Free World scientist-observers.

b. Outfit either a special ice-breaker or a specially reinforced vessel for a systematic oceanographic and hydrographic survey program, including echo-soundings and radarscope photography. Such a program would not only be valuable to basic science but would also provide significant military as well as psychological advantages. By the collection of its own hydrographic data, the U.S. would not lag behind the Russians in the charting of the oceans. Hydrographic charting and bathymetric data are essential not only to naval preparedness but also for the world gravity survey now underway by the USAF and USNHO for the development of a world geodetic datum to meet U.S. guided-missile requirements. A systematic oceanographic program would also serve to strengthen the U.S. exchange position in obtaining the Soviet oceanographic and charting data that have been collected over the past three seasons but have not yet been released.

c. Begin a systematic 1:1,000,000 aerial-mapping program as soon as practicable to ensure U.S. priority in mapping, particularly in western Antarctica. Such mapping is to conform to the master plan and specifications developed for the Working Group by its Technical Advisory Committee on Antarctic Mapping. The prior Soviet mapping of any substantial part of the continent, particularly western Antarctica, would be disadvantageous to the U.S. political position in that area as well as to its prestige in general. The adverse consequences of U.S. inaction would be further compounded by the opportunity that would be afforded to the Soviets to produce the weightiest possible record of their capabilities and territorial activities.

d. Attempt to secure adequate arrangements in any future political agreement on Antarctica as well as within SCAR for complete exchange of all scientific results, data, and related materials produced since the beginning of the IGY as well as in subsequent programs. This is aimed especially at securing (1) maps and charts compiled by the Soviets and (2) earth satellite tracking data from future observations.

e. Increase U.S. participation at the Wilkes and Ellsworth Stations, which should step up publicity designed to emphasize the joint character of operations at those stations.

f. As a minimum, seek continuation of the Norwegian station at 70° 30’S–02° 32’W (whose abandonment during 1960–61 season is indicated) and give consideration to its development as a joint U.S. Norwegian activity.

g. Develop cooperative arrangements for participation in the operations of other friendly countries, such as Belgian traverse operations, to improve the position of Free World countries in Antarctica, and thereby reduce the impact of Soviet achievements and increase U.S. prestige in Antarctica.

h. Stimulate through Free World members of the International Whaling Commission the establishment of an independent observer program for the surveillance of Soviet whaling operations.

[Here follows the remainder of Annex A.]

Annex C

PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH THE ANTARCTIC CONFERENCE

a. Soviet Attitudes. Soviet attitudes in the United States proposed Antarctic conference will be motivated in part by balancing the prospective substantive and psychological advantages of participating in such a conference against the disadvantages of entering into an agreement which might restrict Soviet freedom of political action in Antarctica. The Soviets are likely to criticize the United States at the conference for restricting the invitations solely to those countries active in Antarctica during the International Geophysical Year, and use the announced Polish Expedition to its advantage. They will also likely use the conference as a propaganda forum and will avail themselves of the opportunity to tell the world about the extent and importance of Soviet Antarctic activities.

b. Substantive Difficulties in Negotiating a Treaty. Though there has been minimum discussion in the informal twelve power meetings on substantive matters pertaining to the treaty, the United States representative has explored informally with other representatives the various questions which should be dealt with in the treaty. Based on these discussions and on study of United States policy considerations, the United States representative drew up, and on November 18 distributed in the twelve power informal meeting, a series of informal working papers containing the text of possible treaty articles.⁴ It is hoped these papers will generate discussion on these substantive matters to the point that unanimous agreement can be reached soon to set the date for the conference. In the course of the discussions, however, certain areas of possible difficulty and of disagreement to be resolved have become evident. The principal difficulty at the moment appears to be concerned with the question of rights and claims (”freezing the legal status quo”). Nine of the countries agree with the United States that a provision is needed ensuring that political considerations pertaining to rights and claims in Antarctica not be a source of difficulty or conflict in the future. The USSR has expressed opposition to the inclusion of this provision in the treaty. This may constitute a serious obstacle. There is also a minor difference with France regarding the formulation of this provision. There is a difference of opinion as to whether the high seas should be included or not in the area of application of the treaty. The Australian representative in the discussions has also indicated his Government preferred that there be no provision in the treaty that would recognize the participation of military forces in the support of scientific programs in Antarctica. In bilateral discussions it became evident that Australia would prefer the United States and other countries conduct their activities in Antarctica by other than military agencies. Their reasoning appears motivated by the fear this might provide the Soviets with a justification for placing military forces in Antarctica. The United States representative has made it clear that the use of military logistical support in the United States Antarctic program is necessary and that a qualification to the peaceful uses provision is therefore needed in the treaty. The Australian representative has stated in bilateral discussions that Australia desired that the provision for peaceful uses of Antarctica explicitly apply in war as well as in peace. In talks with the various individual representatives it has also become clear that the question of accession, or of the position in regard to non-signatory states, will provide material for considerable contentious debate. In addition it is anticipated that other problems might arise during the further course of negotiations. These problems would be associated with the questions of free access to Antarctica for the peoples and organizations of all countries of the world; of the exploitation of the potential resources of the area; of inspection and control of guarantee that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only; of nature of administrative measures which might be needed to ensure the accomplishment of the objectives of the treaty; of the nature and extent of any relationship to the United Nations and its specialized organizations; of jurisdiction in regard to civil disputes and criminal matters; and of other matters such as the duration of the treaty, ratification, revisions, and review.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Antarctica Subject File. Secret. The report consisted of a cover sheet; memorandum of transmittal, which noted that it had been concurred in by the OCB on January 21; the report; a Financial Annex; and Annexes A–D. Only the report, which covered the period June 26, 1958–January 21, 1959, and Annexes A and C are printed here.
2. Document 269.
3. Brackets in the source text.
4. A copy of this working paper, which contained drafts of 12 articles, is attached to the memorandum of the 26th meeting in Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/11–1858.