257. Editorial Note
On Friday, December 9, President Eisenhower received a letter from British Prime Minister Macmillan, who wrote he was “shocked” the United States intended to vote in the U.N. General Assembly for the Afro-Asian resolution on colonialism. “Do let us stand together,” Macmillan urged, “at least on a decision to abstain, and thus dissociate ourselves from a resolution which has no connection with reality.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204)
Eisenhower telephoned Secretary Herter at 10:50 that morning, suggesting that, in view of his and Herter’s ambivalence about the resolution and Macmillan’s strong feelings, the United States abstain during the vote on it. The President noted he had just met with Senegalese Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, who shared the U.S. interpretation of the resolution. Eisenhower believed Dia would abstain if he knew the United States intended to do so. In reply to Herter’s comment that the resolution would pass regardless of the U.S. vote, the President stated, “a question arises when our strongest ally feels this way.” He said he would telephone Herter later that afternoon, and proposed the U.S. Delegation try to convince certain African delegations to abstain also. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations) A memorandum of Eisenhower’s 9 a.m. conversation with Dia is in Department of State, Central Files, 770T.00/12–960.
At 5:25 p.m., Herter received a telephone call from General Goodpaster, who stated the President was rethinking his decision to allow the United States to vote for the resolution and was now leaning toward abstaining. Eisenhower would call Herter later that evening. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)
The President telephoned Herter from Augusta, Georgia, at 6:15 p.m. After a brief discussion, he instructed the Secretary to “say that much as we would like to vote for the resolution we were going to abstain.” (Ibid.) Herter then telephoned Charles Bohlen and informed him of the President’s decision. Bohlen noted the resolution would probably come to a vote the following Monday or Tuesday, and agreed with Herter that the Mission at the United Nations would dislike the President’s instructions. (Ibid.)
[Page 458]The following afternoon, Herter called Ambassador Wadsworth at the United Nations. Wadsworth stated he had already learned of the President’s decision. “He did not like it,” but “if they wanted to take that kind of a chance, all right.” (Ibid.) Later that afternoon, Herter initialed telegram 1116 to USUN instructing the U.S. Delegation to abstain in the vote on the colonialism resolution and to make a “clear and accurate explanation” of the reasons for the U.S. vote. (Department of State, Central Files, 321.4/12–1060)