256. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, December 8, 1960, 4:10 p.m.1
The President telephoned with regard to our vote in the UN on the Afro-Asian resolution on colonialism.2 The President raised the question of the possible effect on Okinawa, the Ryukyus and the Virgin Islands, and Panama and the Secretary explained our thinking with regard to these areas. The President mentioned the Philippines which had not wanted us to leave before they were adequately prepared, and Guinea which has always claimed that France pulled out on them too fast as examples of the fallacy of some of this resolution. [Page 456] The Secretary said it was an exceedingly badly worded resolution and that he has spent an hour and a half wrestling with this, but everybody feels on balance we have to vote for it rather than abstain. The Secretary said as a practical matter the Charter of the UN is the binding thing and the UN Charter makes it clear that you provide for Trust Territories, etc. The Secretary said this is a bad resolution, but we are afraid of an alternative Soviet resolution. The Secretary said even Cambodia agreed that it is badly drafted but they don’t dare change it because of possible Soviet amendments, but they have said if this resolution goes through there would be a more mature discussion of colonialism later. The President said he thought we almost have to take it paragraph by paragraph and give the American interpretation and point out the Charter of the UN with respect to treaties which says there must be a reasonable period and, therefore, we take this to mean the initiation of the process. The President said you have to explain in either case: if we vote no we have to say that the US has stood for this principle for decades and we have never tried to sustain a relationship by force, with a similar explanation if we abstain; if we vote for it we have to make even more explanations. The Secretary said there is a period of explanation of vote and whatever we vote we would explain our reasons. The Secretary said this is a really tough one but on balance we felt we should go along since the resolution would pass anyway. The President said he thinks he would abstain and explain it but with people like Mr. Bohlen and others who work closely feeling differently it makes it difficult. The Secretary said none of us like the wording but felt on balance we would be better off to go along. The President asked if there were any who would vote against and the Secretary said no; that the British and French will abstain and Canada will vote for it. The Secretary said this resolution was filed by 42 nations. The President said none of the 42 were not a recipient of aid. The President said he is beginning to think the whole UN Charter needs redoing which the President said DeGaulle has been calling attention to for some time. The President said he supposed we had better go along with the resolution since he is forced, but the President said we must make clear on the record as to why we do it paragraph by paragraph so there will be no misinterpretation of our meaning.3 [Page 457] The Secretary said he had just come from a meeting with Gates and Anderson and would send to the President tonight the statement for NATO.
[Here follows discussion of a meeting with Gates and Anderson and of a statement for NATO.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations.↩
- See supra.↩
- Herter telephoned Bohlen at 4:50 p.m. and told him to instruct the U.S. Delegation to make a statement before the U.N. General Assembly defining the U.S. position on each paragraph of the resolution. Caccia telephoned Herter later that afternoon on another matter. Herter informed him of Eisenhower’s decision, noting that “he had really gagged over it,” and that the President was no happier with it. Bohlen called back at 6:10 p.m. to discuss the U.S. explanation. Herter and Bohlen agreed that the United States would make its statement before the vote. (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)↩