Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

210. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs (Meeker)¹

New York, October 4, 1960.

UNITED STATES POLICY AND THE FIFTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The United States faces tremendously increased difficulty in the United Nations for a variety of reasons: (1) the political complexion of the international community and of the United Nations membership has undergone marked change, with the Asian-African agglomeration now numbering more than 40 States; (2) the power position of the Soviet Union, in economic, military, and scientific terms, has been improved and strengthened dramatically since 1945; (3) Khrushchev, seeking to capitalize on these developments is making vigorous and determined efforts to alter subsisting international political structures and relationships to Soviet advantage.

Khrushchev’s strategy involves, within the United Nations, the reduction of Western influence. It involves also the destruction of independent and impartially exercised power in the form of the Secretary-General. And it involves undermining a neutrality on the part of uncommitted countries which could lead them in the exercise of their freedom to join with the West, under the banner of the United Nations, on particular issues of special importance to them.

In his attacks on the United States, Khrushchev has harped on the following themes: (a) the United States is now the leading exponent and practitioner of imperialist colonialism; (b) the United States is materialistic, rich in plunder, and grasping for more; (c) it is callous and crass toward the needs and aspirations of underdeveloped nations for economic improvement and social equality; (d) American capitalist society is rotten, and its unequal international relationships, based on exploitation, are crumbling; (e) the Communist world, in contrast, understands and supports the struggles of the poorer and newer countries; (f) the Communist bloc is constantly growing in relative power.

The United States national election contributes, of course, to the difficulty of the current situation in the General Assembly. There is not a great deal that can be done to offset the attendant uncertainties of the election. As suggested at the Delegation meeting this morning,² there are some mechanical and tactical steps that can be taken by the United States Delegation: close liaison with other delegations, conducted widely and continuously; good communication and coordination within the United States Delegation; impressing upon other countries in the Western alliance the necessity of taking a strong public stand on important East-West issues.

It is a truism that the substance of United States policies affects most importantly this country’s posture in international relations. For that reason it is worthwhile to review certain of these policies on United Nations questions and see if they can be improved.

The area of colonialism

Nineteenth-century colonialism has no future. The United States would have done well to reach this conclusion fifteen years ago and proceed to act on it. Our NATO allies would have disliked intensely such a decision, but would have had no alternative to accepting this as United States policy. The United States would, moreover, have done the allies a service by withdrawing completely our support of their illusions about colonial empire.

The colonialism issue, in its traditional form, is still alive in certain areas. Perhaps the most important example is the Portuguese colonies. In United Nations contexts, the United States should be prominent in taking the position that these colonies must be prepared, as rapidly and effectively as possible, for full self-government and independence; such preparation should be under appropriate United Nations supervision.

While Portugal is yet to take the necessary steps for embarking on this course, the United States should not support its Security Council candidacy in the face of Asian-African opposition. We should promptly stimulate a suitable and promising country to run for the Council.

The time is long over-due for altering fundamentally our attitude toward the Algerian problem in the United Nations. Abstention is a highly unprofitable position to take. It should be our effort to bring about the drafting and adoption of a resolution which will be satisfactory to the African-Asian countries and put maximum pressure on France to agree to and implement early independence for Algeria.

New Guinea is another of these problems. The United States should be active in pressing for international supervision over the tutelage of New Guinea so that it may move with reasonable speed toward independence. It would be rational to see to it that this development should be geared in with progress on the Australian half of the island. Very possibly, ultimate political unification of New Guinea would make sense. We may expect bitter opposition from the Netherlands and from Indonesia, and perhaps also from Australia. This prospect should not deter the United States from floating its New Guinea proposals on their own merits.

Latin American problems

The United States faces already an acute problem with Cuba over the Guantanamo base. Difficulties over the Panama Canal are likely to recur and intensify. Before either of these matters develops into a crisis, the United States ought to take the initiative and head off trouble. We should state that we are quite prepared to give up Guantanamo provided no other country is given a base in Cuba. We would propose to Cuba and the United Nations an undertaking by Cuba to grant no military base to any country and an arrangement by which the United Nations would take over Guantanamo on a custodial basis, and for possible future use by international military forces.

With respect to the Panama Canal, we would do well to propose internationalization under an appropriate instrument, with United Nations controls, to assure efficient functioning and access for the ships of all nations at all times. In this case, prior consultation with Panama and other Latin American countries might be undertaken as a matter of choice before making a public proposal in the United Nations.

The making of proposals like these, if rejected by Cuba and Panama, would considerably strengthen the United States position if we were later to resist unilateral encroachments by the two countries.

The President’s programs

The United States ought to proceed promptly and determinedly with the proposals set forth in President Eisenhower’s General Assembly address of September 22.³ We ought to begin consulting on a resolution to give effect to the Africa program. We should also be able to advance specifics on the President’s proposals to remove outer space from international military competition. Whether this is done in the outer space context or the disarmament context is less important than that it should be done and done promptly.

The Secretary-General

It is now late, probably too late, to engage the President in active General Assembly participation on behalf of the United States. It might nevertheless be worthwhile to arrange one or more further meetings for him with selected heads of government and heads of delegation for the substantive discussion of basic United Nations matters: particularly the Soviet and Ghanaian proposals to overhaul the management of the United Nations Secretariat. It could be useful in this connection to emphasize that our disarmament proposals do not envisage placing the control mechanism in the hands of the Secretary-General, nor do we contemplate giving the Secretary-General command over the international forces which would eventually be constituted to keep world peace and security. On this basis it might be possible to come to a fruitful understanding with Prime Minister Nehru, for example, and to stimulate support for getting ahead with our disarmament program: the sooner this is done and we have agreement on a sound and workable set of disarmament arrangements, the sooner the United Nations can dispense with improvisations such as the arrangements for UNEF and the United Nations Force in the Congo.

Conclusion

The above are a few suggestions on significant policy questions in the United Nations where change on the part of the United States would seem to offer the prospect of our coping more effectively with the existing political realities.

1. Source: Department of State, L Files: Lot 69 D 306, LCM Chron. 1960. Confidential. Meeker was in New York as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the 15th U.N. General Assembly.
2. No record of this meeting has been found.
3. See Document 180.