211. Memorandum of a Conversation, Suite 35–C, Waldorf Towers, New York, October 4, 1960, 3 p.m.1
SecDel MC/103
PARTICIPANTS
- U.S.
- The Secretary
- B.E.L. Timmons, Advisor, USDel, UNGA
- Sweden
- Osten Unden, Swedish Foreign Minister
- Mrs. Agda Rossel, Swedish Permanent Representative to the UN
- Per Lind, Member of Swedish UNGA Delegation and Deputy Director of Political Affairs, Swedish Foreign Ministry
SUBJECT
- UN Problems; Algeria; Nuclear Testing
The Foreign Minister called on the Secretary at 3:00 p.m. today.
The Secretary opened the discussion by saying that the bitter Soviet denunciations of Mr. Hammarskjold, the office of the Secretary General, the UN Secretariat and the very structure and purpose of the UN, had left a very bad impression among delegations of the various countries to the UN General Assembly. Mr. Unden and Mrs. Rossel said they agreed thoroughly with the Secretary’s statement. The Secretary said it was difficult to know what the Soviets had in mind or were planning to do. He said that we had been analyzing the situation to see if it seemed likely that the Soviets were preparing to walk out of the United Nations. The Secretary remarked that we did not think the Soviets would walk out, and Mr. Unden said that he was of the same opinion.
The Secretary said that Mr. Hammarskjold’s two interventions, in reply to Khrushchev’s attacks, had been excellent. The United States is giving its fullest support to the UN and to Mr. Hammarskjold, and any compromise in the direction of the Soviet proposals must be resisted.
[Here follows discussion of the Congo.]
Returning to the question of the Soviet attack on the Secretary-General, Mr. Unden said he had not believed that Khrushchev would pursue the attack on Hammarskjold. It is very difficult to see what it really means. The Secretary said that the attack on Hammarskjold had come toward the end of the first Khrushchev speech, thus making it appear that Khrushchev had almost as an afterthought added the [Page 393] attack on Hammarskjold, probably during his ocean crossing. This was undoubtedly due to the very effective way that Hammarskjold had handled the Congo situation and the failure of the Soviet attempt at unilateral intervention there.
Mr. Unden said that Khrushchev has now bound himself to his demand for revision of the UN structure, and that it would be difficult for Khrushchev to retreat from this position. The Secretary said that certainly the attack was a very strong one, but Khrushchev can and often does change—usually without notice.
The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister if he planned to speak in the UN general debate. Mr. Unden said he was preparing a speech, which would deal largely with the Congo and disarmament, and that he expected to deliver it on Wednesday, October 12,2 as the second speaker in the morning.
[Here follows further discussion of the Congo.]
Turning to the resolution on the resumption of contacts between the President and Khrushchev tabled by Indonesia, India, U.A.R., Ghana and Yugoslavia, the Secretary jokingly asked Unden if he had felt “excluded” by not having been asked to join in co-sponsoring the resolution. Unden said that he certainly did not, that Sweden was not a member of any “neutral bloc”, and that the very idea of such a bloc is a bad concept. The Secretary agreed, saying that we would hate to see a neutral bloc develop in the UN.
The Foreign Minister expressed the view that the five neutral nation resolution might have been taken “as offered” without debate. The Secretary said that now, with the original resolution and the Australian amendment3 both on the table, it appeared that further amendments would be offered. We thought that, among other things, passage of the resolution in the form it was originally tabled would establish a dangerous trend, as one might find the UN then calling upon various statesmen to enter into discussion of this or that matter, or to take certain actions, etc. We thought that this tended to “personalize” the diplomatic process. Unden said he thought that probably resolutions of this nature “should not be taken too seriously.”
[Here follows discussion of disarmament, Algeria, and Africa.]
Speaking of the Soviet proposal on colonialism,4 the Foreign Minister inquired whether we had any further information. The Secretary said he had seen no substantive resolution yet. The only Soviet documents circulated were the Soviet anti-colonial “declaration” and a procedural motion to have the subject debated in plenary rather than in the First Committee.
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Drafted by Timmons on October 5 and approved by S on October 11. A summary of SecDel MC/103 was transmitted to the Department of State in Secto 26, October 4. (Ibid., Central Files, 320/10–460)↩
- For text see U.N. doc. A/PV.901.↩
- Regarding this proposed amendment, see footnote 4, Document 208.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 184.↩