209. Telegram From the Delegation at the United Nations to the Department of State1
Secto 24. Subject: Averoff’s Call on Secretary. During a call on Secretary morning Ocober 4, Averoff urged amendment five-power resolution on Eisenhower–Khrushchev talks in lieu support Australian resolution. Congratulated on his seconding speech on postponement [Page 387] of resolution2 Averoff said Yugoslavs very offended and hoped efforts could be made save face of neutralist sponsors lest Khrushchev benefit even further from propaganda value. Averoff thought President’s reply3 clear, dignified and highly acceptable because left door open. Averoff undertook to sound out Yugoslavs further and Secretary agreed consult with him and other friends as we developed line on resolution. Secretary expressed concern that UN might establish pattern of recommending chiefs of state discuss all measures (for example Nasser–Ben Gurion, Hussein). He hoped effort would be to avoid resolution which attempted press personal meeting especially since latest Khrushchev statement slammed door except on impossible conditions.
Averoff described King Hussein’s speech4 as courageous and helpful in stiffening spines of delegates on other subjects.
He characterized US friends as being unhappy about ChiRep question saying they followed US only for reasons of decency and loyalty and found no real arguments to counter Soviet and neutralist attacks on US policy. The Secretary described ChiComs as declared aggressors in Korea, who intended take Formosa by force, and who had repudiated signed agreement on repatriation of Americans.5 Secretary admitted question became more difficult each year and was anomalous in view large number Chinese not represented in UN but he believed Communist Chinese must declare intention stand by provisions of Charter as condition to entering. Averoff agreed and added Formosa should be guaranteed.
Averoff discussed Sino-Soviet relations but averred real evidence of difficulties between Communist states should not be basis for policy since Commie leaders would take measures avert serious clash except possibly where some material consideration involved (i.e., if China should seek extend borders into Soviet territory). The Secretary visualized potential Sino-Soviet trouble if ChiComs should attempt unilateral effort capture Formosa and Averoff concurred.
Averoff and Secretary agreed Khrushchev’s behavior in UNGA outrageous and noted that new African states behaving generally with great restraint in situation.
Averoff said he would be leaving soon, going to Paris for Common Market talks which were not proceeding favorably. Then he would return Greece, where possibly necessary call Parliament into [Page 388] session in order fight out charges made by Nazi war criminal (and exploited by Commies) that PM and other high officials were Nazi collaborators. He thought crisis could be resolved successfully.
Averoff expressed support for Sarper and Gursal, but concerned over Turkish internal problem and trials which he thought would be accompanied by bloodletting. However, FonMin indicated his information that Menderes would not be executed since he had large and even increasing support among peasants.
Averoff referred repeatedly to report on Bucharest meeting6 and suggested Department should study Albanian speeches in last and present UNGA, noting Albanian swing away from Soviet idolatry to fawning on Peking.
Lewis Jones and Guy Hope present at conversation.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Conference Files: FRC 83–0068, CF 1769. Confidential. Repeated to Athens. Drafted by Hope and cleared with Krebs and Seip. A memorandum of this conversation shows the meeting took place at the Waldorf Towers at 9:45 a.m. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)↩
- For text of Averoff’s October 3 statement before the U.N. General Assembly, see U.N. doc. A/PV.883.↩
- See Document 203.↩
- For text of Hussein’s October 3 address before the U.N. General Assembly, see U.N. doc. A/PV.882.↩
- For text of the Agreed Announcement between the United States and the People’s Republic of China of September 10, 1955, see 1955, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. III, pp. 85–86.III, pp. 85–86.↩
- Not identified.↩