156. Editorial Note
On September 7, the Department of State transmitted to the Mission at the United Nations the text of a draft aide-mémoire restricting Soviet Premier Khrushchev’s movements during his attendance at the U.N. General Assembly. (Telegram 327 to USUN; Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/9–760) Regarding the draft aide-mémoire, see footnote 3, Document 153.
The following day, Executive Secretariat Director Stoessel explained in a memorandum to Goodpaster that, upon receiving the President’s approval, the Department would instruct the Mission to inform Hammarskjöld and the Soviet Delegation of the telegram’s contents. Secretary of State Herter had approved this approach. Hungarian Minister of State Kadar and Cuban Prime Minister Castro would probably receive similar treatment, but each would be decided on an individual basis. On the upper righthand corner of the memorandum, near the date, appears the handwritten notation by John S.D. Eisenhower: “Pres. approved Told State OK 8 Sep 1960. JSDE” (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series)
On September 10, the Department announced that the Mission at the United Nations had delivered to the Soviet Mission an aide-mémoire regarding Khrushchev’s movements during his visit to the United Nations and released its text. A similar aide-mémoire regarding Kadar’s movements was delivered to the Hungarian Delegation; its text was also released. For texts of the announcement and the two aides-mémoire, which were dated September 9 but delivered on September [Page 311] 10, see Department of State Bulletin, October 3, 1960, pages 521–522. A third aide-mémoire restricting the movements of the head of the Albanian Delegation was delivered to the Albanian Mission.
The Soviet Union responded with an aide-mémoire which Ambassador Menshikov delivered to Herter September 13. A memorandum of their conversation is in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. The aide-mémoire termed the limits placed on Khrushchev “unprecedented in the history of the United Nations.” Stating that the actions “cannot be considered other than as an unfriendly act toward the U.S.S.R.,” it asserted that the restrictions could only intensify international tensions. The Headquarters Agreement, it continued, did not give the United States the right to act arbitrarily against the heads of delegations to the United Nations. The Soviet Government could not accept these actions, protested against the attempts to interfere with the work of its delegates, and expected the United States to ensure that Khrushchev could travel between New York City and Glen Cove. For text of the aide-mémoire, see Department of State Bulletin, October 3, 1960, page 523.
The United States replied the same day, noting that under the Headquarters Agreement, it had a responsibility to protect other nations’ U.N. delegates and to ensure that they could travel to and fromthe United Nations without hindrance. For these reasons, the United States had restricted Khrushchev’s movements. “Travel beyond the limits of Manhattan Island,” it concluded, “is clearly not essential to the normal functioning of a delegation to a session of the United Nations General Assembly.” The text is ibid., pages 522–523.
On September 14, Foreign Minister Szarka gave Legation Chargé Ackerson Hungary’s response to the U.S. aide-mémoire. The note accused the United States of attempting to interfere in Hungary’s internal affairs and of discriminating against its U.N. delegation. (Telegram 96 from Budapest; Department of State, Central Files, 320/9–1460) On September 19, the Department instructed the Legation to ignore the Hungarian note, since no protest to the aide-mémoire had been received in Washington, nor had it evoked much press comment. (Telegram 89 to Budapest; ibid.)
For Eisenhower’s account of the decision to restrict Khruschev’s, Castro’s, Kadar’s, and Shehu’s movements, see Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956–1961 (New York: Doubleday, 1965), pages 577–578. For Khrushchev’s view on the restrictions, see Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), pages 467–468 and 476–478.