Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume II

157. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Staff Secretary (Goodpaster) and the Secretary of State, Washington, September 8, 1960, 11:55 p.m.¹

Washington, September 8, 1960, 11:55 p.m.

Goodpaster telephoned that the UN meeting had been on the President’s mind and the President was inclined to think he should go up. The President thought he was entitled to make the first speech that is made and was disposed to go even if Khrushchev was there, make his speech as if Khrushchev weren’t there and then leave. He feels that if he waits and then goes up that Khrushchev has gotten the jump here. Khrushchev could stay around for some time working up the situation and snarling and accusing the U.S. The President thought he should make the opening speech. He said it would probably be attacked and rebutted by Khrushchev but it would be better than the other way around. As to the content of the speech he (the Pres.) has Moos working on a draft that came over from the State Department² and some suggestions from C.D. Jackson. The Secretary asked if there wasn’t someone in Nixon’s office (Jim Shepley) who had been working on a draft and Goodpaster said Shepley and C.D. Jackson had teamed up on it. The Secretary said that Jim Shepley had been in to talk to Gerry Smith about this speech. Goodpaster said there were only two things in the works, he was quite sure. The Secretary said it took the UN a couple of days to get organized. The 22nd date, the time we have reserved, appears to be at the very beginning. The Secretary said he thought we could get it transferred to first place and Goodpaster said the President thought that he as host was entitled to this spot. The President does not intend the speech to be a polemic against Khrushchev but it would be constructive and positive in tone. It may, he said, deal with the strain that has arisen between him and Khrushchev and added that this had not been ruled out. The main thrust would be to come up with proposals in a constructive way on how to put the world on a better footing. Goodpaster said the President wanted to raise with the Secretary the idea itself; whether the Secretary’s trend of thinking was the same as his as to his getting up there at the beginning and whether it was possible to make this arrangement. The Secretary said we had had a meeting in the Department on this subject³ and the opinion was divided on whether or not the President should do this. The Secretary said he himself thought the President should not, and he did not want Khrushchev to think that merely by beckoning a finger he could bring together the Heads of State. The Secretary also mentioned the message we had sent on this to the field.⁴ The Secretary said there was a lot to be said for doing it. Goodpaster asked if the Sec. would give some thought to this and he knew Pres would want to talk to him.

The Secretary mentioned to Goodpaster that he had not been invited to Wadsworth’s swearing-in at the White House yesterday.⁵ Goodpaster said that Wadsworth must have assumed we were handling it and that he (Goodpaster) and Stephens assumed it was being completely set up by State.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. Drafted by Asbjornson.
2. Not found. Malcolm C. Moos was an administrative assistant to the President.
3. Not further identified.
4. See footnote 1, Document 151.
5. James J. Wadsworth was sworn in as Representative at the United Nations in a September 7 ceremony at the White House; he presented his credentials to Secretary General Hammarskjöld the following morning. Ambassador Lodge had resigned on September 3 to participate in the 1960 Presidential election as the Republican Party candidate for Vice President.