Office of the Historian

98. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Anderson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)1

Washington, December 16, 1959.

SUBJECT

  • Viet-Nam: MAAG Ceiling
1.
The GVN has notified the ICC that TERM will probably leave by the end of 1960. Defense is pressing to start to increase MAAG and CINCPAC suggests this be done without consulting the ICC. Ambassador Durbrow says the ICC must be consulted first and wants to start consultations soon. We want to reach agreement with DOD as to the future size of MAAG before starting consultations.
2.

I attach (Tab A)2 a memorandum for use with Admiral Edward J. O’Donnell, OASD/ISA, suggesting that prior to implementing an increase in MAAG the ICC be informed that, due to the increased threat from the DRV, it will be necessary to raise MAAG from 342 to 685, a figure well below 888, the total number of U.S. and French military training personnel in Viet-Nam at the time of the Armistice3 but that we reserve the right to increase to 888 in case of hostilities or a serious increase in the threat from the DRV.4

3.

This will be slightly smaller than the present MAAG–TERM total of 692. The purpose of the reduction is to facilitate ICC acceptance by a show of reducing the U.S. military presence in Viet-Nam. I [Page 273] believe the negotiations would be easier than if we stick to the 692 figure or ask for an increase, even a small one.

In addition MAAG would continue to have 51 persons officially attached to the Embassy for administrative purposes. We are suggesting that this group be phased out during calendar 1961 to reduce the risk that the ICC, which is trying to improve its methods of checking MAAG personnel, might later uncover them.

4.
The position taken in this memorandum is in accordance with Ambassador Durbrow’s latest telegram5 on the subject (Tab B) except that he 1) does not specifically recommend a 1 percent cut, although he says it may be necessary to cut the figure to obtain ICC concurrence; 2) does not suggest the possible phasing out of the 51 administrative support group during 1961. We think it wise to indicate now our belief that this problem will have to be faced.
5.
I hope that we can settle the matter without asking you to intervene. If you concur in the above, I will discuss the matter with Admiral O’Donnell6 and probably leave the attached paper with him. If we agree, I will concur in the attached draft cable (Tab C)7 in reply to CINCPAC’s query (Tab D).8
  1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, MAAG–TERM 1959. Secret. Drafted by Wood.↩
  2. Attached but not printed.↩
  3. Article 16 of the Geneva Agreement forbids the introduction of troop reinforcements, but permits troop rotation. [Footnote in the source text.]↩

  4. In telegram 072247Z from Pearl Harbor, November 8, CINCPAC noted a “current sympathetic attitude” in the Indian and Canadian members of the ICC and stated it was apparent that the United States could no longer delay effecting an orderly decrease in TERM and a compensatory increase in the MAAG ceiling to be phased in gradually during CY 1960. CINCPAC spoke also of a “requirement” for filling the full 888 spaces. (Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, MAAG–TERM 1959)

    In telegram 1897 from Saigon, December 10, Ambassador Durbrow agreed with CINCPAC on the need to “resolve MAAG ceiling soonest” but opposed doing so prior to consultations with Canada and India. He pointed out also “that 888 figure has never been put forth by Embassy except for purpose of demonstrating that we have legal basis for increase MAAG above present 342 and that at no time has there been any intention of expanding MAAG to that figure. Embassy has never anticipated that MAAG personnel would total more than about 692… . Moreover, it is always possible we may have to agree to somewhat smaller number in order to obtain ICC assent… .” Durbrow also recommended not converting TERM members to the MAAG roster, but instead effecting the changeover as replacements arrived. In conclusion, he reemphasized that in order to “avoid too blatant admission we have been using TERM personnel for MAAG purposes” it was necessary to initiate the gradual changeover early in 1960. (Ibid., Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/12–1059)

    ↩
  5. Telegram 1897.↩
  6. For a report of the meeting between O’Donnell and Anderson, see Document 100.↩
  7. Attached; printed as an enclosure, ibid.↩
  8. Telegram 072247Z.↩