Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

97. Despatch From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

No. 163

Saigon, December 7, 1959.

REF

• Department’s Circular Airgram 1333 of August 11, 1959²

SUBJECT

• Role of the Military in Less-developed Countries: Vietnam, a Country Team Assessment.

Summary

In Viet-Nam no recent military take-over has taken place, nor is there a present trend toward one. However, a somewhat authoritarian solution similar to that recently resorted to in certain other Afro-Asian countries has characterized the Diem regime since its inception, and makes it desirable to reassess at this time political developments in Viet-Nam and their implications in the light of U.S. interests.

While unlike most other countries in this area Viet-Nam has not been the scene of recent competition by an overt communist organization with the democratic forces, the division of Viet-Nam between the communist North and the free South and the extent of covert communist forces and activities have substantially influenced the GVN toward authoritarian techniques. The GVN has also placed heavy emphasis on the development of a political system which conforms (a) to the traditions of Viet-Nam rather than to those in an alien Western environment and (b) to Viet-Nam’s condition as an underdeveloped country requiring strict discipline on the part of the people if the country is to emerge from that condition.

The Diem Government is continuing the creation of democratic facades which have so far been imbued with little life, but which provide a skeletal framework for eventual political evolution in Viet-Nam. At the same time the regime has been expanding the role and activities of its peculiar mechanism, the semi-covert elite Can Lao party, for insuring that political control remains in its hands.

Viet-Nam’s evolution to date has given rise to two of the problems raised by the NSC paper attached to ref airgram: (1) Dissatisfaction exists among a considerable number of intellectuals because of the failure of the regime to fulfill their hopes for rapid installation of democracy in the Western sense. In view, however, of the absence of any real leadership among the dissatisfied intellectuals and the fact that they are confined to a thin stratum of society largely in Saigon, this problem is more of incipient than current importance. The intellectuals have no link with the mass of the peasants in the rural areas to whom, as a matter of fact, the Diem regime is devoting particular attention in its political, economic and social programs because of Diem’s conviction that mainland China was lost to the Communists as a result of the Nationalist Chinese failure to give adequate attention to the rural area. (2) As is the tendency in countries in which military regimes are dominant, the balance between security and development considerations has been tipped by Diem very much in favor of the former. During the past two years he has given increasing attention to development, but security still takes priority whenever a showdown choice must be made.

Thus far, the military have played little direct political role in Viet-Nam despite the regime’s reliance on the army as an instrument of political stability. No Vietnamese military figure of sufficient stature to really oppose the Diem Government is apparent on the scene. Nevertheless, in case of future crisis, particularly one which might arise over Diem’s succession were he to die or be killed in office, the military will probably play an important role. At present it is believed likely the military would support a constitutional solution–elevation of Vice President Tho to the Presidency. Tho’s main obstacle to the succession would be posed by the Ngo family, especially the President’s brother Nhu. The outcome of a conflict over the succession, if it should arise, is not clear, but it is conceivable that a military figure might emerge to take over control.

We consider the US policy implications of the above to be as follows: We should give continued full support to Diem’s Government as long as it remains benevolent. We should not attempt to make it over in our Western democratic image, but should, whenever feasible, try to induce it in its own interest to give gradually greater recognition to basic human rights and representative government and make some concessions to the intellectuals in an effort to win wider support among them. We should continue to try to obtain a proper balance between security and development needs in recognition of the importance of development to both stability and security. We should continue to observe carefully political tendencies among the military and be prepared to move rapidly in case of political crisis. We cannot avoid identification with the Diem regime, but should not worry particularly about this as long as on balance the government conforms to our interests.

I. Introduction

1. This paper reviews the problems discussed in reference Circular Airgram as they appear in Viet-Nam. It has been concurred in by the Country Team.

2. One or two preliminary points should be made about the Vietnamese situation prior to a full discussion. In Viet-Nam, as distinct from certain other countries in this area, we face no recent military take-over nor present trend toward one. On the other hand, the authoritarian solution pointed up by the paper under reference has in many ways characterized the government of Viet-Nam since the inception of the Diem regime. In the first flush of enthusiasm over the Diem Government’s victory in 1955, both Americans and local intellectuals may have idealized its democratic prospects. This may have led to disillusionment when the iron of its authority failed to disappear, but the change in attitude largely occurred among the observers, while the real nature of the regime remained approximately the same. The several-year experience of the strong-executive, somewhat authoritarian Diem regime in Viet-Nam thus may offer guidelines as to possible future developments in countries only now turning to solutions of this nature. Also, viewing the future of Viet-Nam from this more advanced point, one can perhaps identify some of the difficulties this solution will present in the future.

3. There is an additional preliminary point with regard to Viet-Nam which is of importance: the division of Viet-Nam and the direct military threat posed by communist military forces in the North has, of course, affected the situation here. A positive result of this situation has been the outlawing of overt communist organizations and activities in South Viet-Nam. Viet-Nam has thus not had the problem of a substantial build-up of an overt communist organizational framework in competition with that of democratic forces. Such a situation did exist, of course, prior to the Geneva Truce in 1954, and the Communists were clearly winning the race at that time. However, the separation of the country has arrested the overt development of organized communist political strength in South Viet-Nam. This is not to say that covert communist organizations do not exist. They do, but their ability to organize mass support has been severely limited.

II. Viet-Nam’s Strong Executive-Type Government

1. Despite a propagandistic assertion of democratic practices and institutions, the present regime in Viet-Nam makes little attempt to hide either from its own people or from others the fact that real political decisions are made in a fairly authoritarian manner. Justification for this practice is readily presented and they include most of these in the referenced paper; the lack of experience of the people in making political decisions, the deadening hand of the earlier colonial regime, the lack of efficient cadres, the lack of traditional discipline and responsibility, and the importance of security against a vicious foe. Behind these is the traditional belief of those exerting power, especially the Diem family, in the benefits of a system providing guidance and direction to the untutored masses by wise and learned Mandarins. As a direct descendant of this group and firmly committed to the principles of respect for authority, public service and integrity stemming from its ideals, President Diem is little inclined to launch into any widespread experiments in democracy when he sees more important work ahead.

2. One additional justification for the authoritarian solution and one emphasized especially by Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother and adviser to the President, is the concept of the “forced march”. This metaphor is used to describe Viet-Nam’s need to advance swiftly in its economic, cultural, and political development. Since the President and his fellow rulers of the government are convinced of their knowledge of the correct route toward the goal, they at the same time insist that the “forced march” be conducted under full discipline. Many of the democratic principles outlined in the Constitution are thus in effect part of the goal, rather than present rights, and are being initiated at a most cautious pace, in many respects only in form rather than in substance. The full fruition of these democratic principles is postponed until the “forced march” reaches its goal.

3. Even the goal of the Diem regime is not apt to resemble a New England town meeting on a nation-wide scale, nor will it apply with precision the precepts of the American Bill of Rights. Viet-Nam under Diem’s tutelage is carving out a political system of its own, according to the President one better suited to the traditions, character and situation of the Vietnamese people. This system of “personalism” lays at least as much emphasis on the individual’s obligations to the community as it does to his rights within it. This double aspect varies somewhat from the major emphasis given in Western constitutional systems to democratic rights and it provides the basis for a larger measure of discipline of the individual on behalf of the interests of the community (as expressed by its governmental organs). Consequently, the Vietnamese Constitution even as an ideal, provides much more scope for the exercise of governmental power than does the average Western democratic constitution. It is the contention of the present leaders of Viet-Nam that such a system is better suited to the problems of an underdeveloped Asian nation today, and they are disposed to cite as examples the cases of some Asian nations which have tried and failed to make great leaps forward into twentieth century Western democracy. At the same time, both the personalist philosophy and the Constitution assert that more than the exercises of naked power is intended, and that the objective of the “forced march” is one of greater individual freedom and development than has existed in Viet-Nam to date.

III. Trends in Viet-Nam’s Development

1. Trends with both positive and negative effects upon U.S. interests can be found in Viet-Nam. There is little doubt that the past five years have been highly successful. Any perspective which includes the terrible low point of the immediate post Geneva period can only admit that developments since that time have been almost miraculously favorable for U.S. interests, namely, the continued freedom of South Viet-Nam from communist control. Consolidation of Diem’s political and administrative control, elimination of the sects, the ouster of Bao Dai, establishment of the republic, promulgation of a constitution, resettlement of about 800,000 refugees, increased effectiveness of the army, pacification of most of the country against the Viet Cong, overcoming of inflation, and the initiation of economic development and land reform have all been favorable developments.

2. Some of the present difficulties in Viet-Nam can almost be said to stem from its success in climbing from the depths of 1954. Now that it has achieved a situation of relative stability, a clamor for the luxuries of freedom arises. Some consideration of recent developments will demonstrate both the existence of this malaise and that nonetheless very real steps ahead are still being taken.

3. One of the major advances made by the government has been in the field of public order and security. Communist and bandit armed gangs or assassination teams still exist and strike, but their threat to public order is certainly not what it was five years ago. The armed gangs are generally restricted to jungle hideouts or safe havens over the Cambodian border, and communism is now more a clandestine and underground problem rather than a danger to the security of the state. The absence of communist violence during the recent elections to the National Assembly was the most dramatic evidence of the increase in public order and security. There is much to do in this field, but the GVN has certainly achieved substantial results.

4. In the area of political development toward a democratic and popular government, Viet-Nam can show only small steps of progress. Furthermore, in great part these steps amount only to the erection of a facade and the reality of the situation remains one of authoritarian control by the regime. Nonetheless, the developments in question indicate that the regime does hold its own type of democratic ideal as a long-term goal and is creating at least a skeleton onto which a living democracy adapted to Viet-Nam’s traditions and needs can later grow.

5. It is also engaged in a necessary educational process, of which even lip-service to individual rights and duties is an important element. Perhaps not fully comprehended by those creating them, also, is the possibility that certain of their political facades may develop a reality, initiative and even independence of their own. As will be outlined later in this paper, the regime believes it has a technique for retaining control over this development, but experience in other countries of the world has occasionally shown such “monsters” escaping from Dr. Frankenstein’s direction.

6. Most significant effort by the government in the field of political development is its creation and extension throughout the country of so-called “private” professional and political organizations. The most recent effort on a large scale has been that of the Farmer’s Association (Embassy Despatch No. 27 of July 20, 1959³). Others include its high-pressure effort to organize the government’s political party, the Movement of National Revolution, down to the most isolated village, and to buttress it by also creating certain minor parties such as the Vietnamese Socialist Party. The continual promotion of the concept of personalism and of community effort may well lead to greater assertion by the individual Vietnamese that he have a voice in the determination of his own destiny. The establishment of the trappings of an independent judiciary and individual rights has also started the process by which these may assume reality and have clearly pointed the direction of future progress and public pressure therefor. None of these activities have brought about more than a modicum of popular influence upon governmental policy, but there is little doubt that they have increased the individual stature of the Vietnamese and formed at least a framework for the development of a governmental system reflective of the will of the people.

7. Against these rather positive comments on political developments, several quite negative features must be brought into clear focus. As stated above, the comparative success of the government in solving some of its most serious problems has permitted the attention of its critics to turn to other areas of dissatisfaction. It can be said that a “revolution of rising expectations” is taking place in the political field as well as in the economic. Particularly, the more articulate intellectual class, now that it feels that the imminent military and subversive threat has been reduced, is highly critical of the failure of the government to apply democratic procedures and principles more rapidly. The regime, as authoritarian ones perhaps always do, has insisted upon the continuing necessity for the “forced march” and the concomitant necessity for this type of discipline. Nonetheless, the recent elections provided a rather dramatic demonstration of the government’s present and future vulnerability in this field. The more sophisticated electorate of one district of Saigon gave a smashing majority to a candidate whose main reputation was that of being an oppositionist to the present regime. Outside of Saigon, it is doubtful that the population’s political interests have evolved much beyond an interest in security and the economic benefits of a good crop sold to advantage. Nonetheless the evolution which has already occurred in Saigon can be expected to take place in provincial centers and eventually the countryside, as communications, information and economic interdependence grow. Thus the government will face a serious problem in its relations with its population. Some indications exist that it is aware of this and it is taking some steps to solve it by speeding its program of building the structures of democratic organizations (but retaining full control). The dangerous aspects of this situation are apparent. The government is caught in the dilemma of seeing a need for some relaxation of its absolute control but being afraid to do so, both for the sake of its own skin and continued progress in the country.

8. A specific area of danger to the government is the trade union field. This area has been exceptional in the Vietnamese scene in that two trade unions apparently possess some independent existence and power and are far beyond the facade state. The hand of control has reached even into this area, however. The result has been at least the partial estrangement of certain union leaders from their former support of the government. At the moment, they lack an alternative focus for their loyalties and their opposition is thus muted. They could be expected, however, to turn to an alternative if a substantial one should arise. On the other hand, if the government does succeed in imposing its control on the unions, it can be expected that their strength will wither as they become a facade. In the absence of a real receptacle for workers’ loyalties, it could only be expected that the clandestine communist network will make contact with them.

9. Turning to economic development, considerable progress has been achieved (land reform, land development, agricultural credit, rising exportable rice surplus, loans program for increased rubber culture, crop diversification, rehabilitation and expansion of transportation system, establishment now under way of some new industrial plants). Nevertheless, the present pace of developing the economy is insufficient for several reasons. It is unlikely unless accelerated to enable Viet-Nam to achieve viability. Indications are that it is also being outstripped, at least in basic development, by the more brutal “forced march” being conducted in North Viet-Nam. It is probably inadequate to satisfy in long term the “revolution of rising expectations” occurring as a result of the social, cultural and political advance of the people.

10. Proper balance between security and economic development requirements continues to be a difficult problem in Viet-Nam. While President Diem has shown much greater awareness of development needs over the past year and a half than previously, both in his conversations and in his public speeches (witness his 1958 and 1959 “State of the Union” messages to the National Assembly), he still gives first priority to security. Thus, when there is a competing demand from development and security standpoints for the same governmental resources, his inclination continues to be to give the nod to security. His fundamental reason for this is that if security does not exist, people will not invest or work hard to increase production which will either be taken over by the Communists or destroyed by them.

11. In addition, the role of private enterprise in development, particularly in the establishment of small industries, is restricted by the government’s mistrust of the entrepreneurial group in general, its suspicion of private foreign capital and its tendency to reserve governmental approval of private projects for those in political favor with the government. The government’s attitude toward private enterprise derives from such factors as the mandarinal concept that the interests of the people will be better served by the governmental administration, Viet-Nam’s past history of colonial exploitation, fear of domination of Chinese capital in a free enterprise system and certain less than satisfactory recent experiences with private American capital. Only gradually can private enterprise be expected to play a larger role in the Vietnamese Government’s economic philosophy. Meanwhile, joint government-private industrial projects, the government’s compromise between capitalism and state enterprise, will remain a prominent feature.

12. Politically the restraints on private entrepreneurs result in a dissatisfaction among business circles, especially in the Saigon area, akin in nature to the unhappiness of the intellectuals over political controls. In the case of both the intellectuals and businessmen this means that the government is failing to make maximum use of limited available human resources and talents in promoting the march forward.

IV. The Can Lao Party

1. A peculiar characteristic of the Vietnamese picture is the role of the Can Lao (Revolutionary Workers’) party. The Secretary General of this party is the President’s brother and adviser, Ngo dinh Nhu, and the party is the expression par excellence of the political philosophy of the Diem regime. It is not comparable in function to regular political parties, however, it does bear close similarities to, and may even be consciously modeled on, a communist party of restricted membership in a communist country.

2. The Can Lao party is reputed to have some 20,000 members throughout the population. These members are organized in clandestine cells in their neighborhoods or places of work. The cells ostensibly engage in self-improvement activities, such as the study of the personalist philosophy, and they provide a mechanism for control of the personal lives of the individual members. The function of the member is, in his daily work, to exert positive influence by applying and expressing the principles of personalism, and also to keep his party superiors informed of the “true” situation surrounding him. He thus is responsible for reporting misdeeds by other government functionaries, the appearance of suspicious or subversive individuals, and the political attitudes and feelings in the community of which he is a part. In time of crisis, the members of the party can be called upon to participate in more violent forms of the exercise of political action, terror, etc., as might be necessary. It can be seen that this mechanism provides the Diem family with an excellent system directly to gather information and exert influence through all levels of the government and society.

3. Another function of the party is to provide an extra-legal method of accomplishing results which for one reason or another are not desired to be accomplished through normal government channels. Examples of this appear in the economic field. In certain cases, the party’s leaders have admitted that the party has acted as a focal point for the collection of funds, perhaps by somewhat questionable tactics, and used these funds to launch new industries or activities deemed beneficial to the community or the nation. The activity in question was perhaps not eligible for other assistance but was felt by the party leadership to be desirable.

4. These functions of the Can Lao party have been spelled out in some detail because they bear heavily on one of the central points of the papers under reference, i.e., maintaining authoritarian control during the development of a country such as Viet-Nam, but at the same time laying the groundwork for eventual development toward democratic institutions. The Can Lao party, in theory, would provide the cement to maintain control while the government establishes the facades of democratic organization and institutions. It might thus be considered a technique to assist other less-developed countries through their immediate problems toward political democracy.

5. There is one very obvious and very great danger in this technique, that of corruption, in financial or power terms. There is considerable rumor and some firm indications that the picture painted in the paragraphs just above of the functions and activities of the Can Lao party is not accurate. These instead imply that the party is used as a mechanism for the exertion of favoritism, the formation of cliques, the execution of autocratic control with no attention paid to the attitudes and feelings of the population, and the accumulation of substantial financial holdings at home or abroad by certain families and individuals. Because of the clandestine nature of the party, temptations along these lines certainly exist. At the same time its clandestine character also makes it difficult to prove or disprove most of the allegations. Thirdly, the clandestinity undoubtedly leads opponents of the regime to suspect and denounce party manipulations in more cases than may actually exist. Lastly, misdeeds may exist on certain levels of the party at the same time they are frowned upon by higher levels.

6. This is naturally a subject which is under the closest possible observation by American agencies in Viet-Nam. It must be recognized as the great danger of any reliance on the Can Lao “cement” technique, especially in view of the strong traditions of corruption in Asia.

V. The Role of the Military

1. The Vietnamese military and officer corps have hardly been mentioned in this paper up to this point despite their appearance in the paper’s title and emphasis in the paper under reference. While this is not an accurate presentation of the great degree the present regime depends upon its military forces, it is an accurate reflection of their lack of participation to date in the internal political affairs of the nation. Nonetheless, their political potential for the future is considerable.

2. The military forces and the internal security forces and police are main reservoirs of strength available to the government. They are the principal deterrent to DRV military attack, and they have been the primary instrument of the government in its drive to pacify the country and eliminate Communist and other dissident elements which threaten internal security. They have also been used as an expression of the government’s presence throughout the country in the form of guard units, etc. The officer corps has been of further assistance to the government as it has supplied an extensive number of key administrative officers needed by the government to conduct its affairs and to launch its program of development. For example, a considerable proportion of the chiefs of province are military officers.

3. In view of this heavy dependence by the government on its military forces and the officer corps, it is perhaps paradoxical that the military plays a small part in the political life of the country. The fact that this is so is in part a result of its preoccupation with the priority task of creating a strong army in order to deter and repel if necessary, an attack from the North. In part, of course, it may stem from the comparative success the government has had to date in solving the country’s problems, so that there has been no temptation for the military to interfere to do better. Considerable credit must also be given the influence exerted by United States MAAG officers, who have continually both preached and given the example of the American military tradition of abstaining from political affairs.

4. Another reason for this situation can be ascribed to the Diem regime itself. It is not a coincidence that the President maintains in his own hands the office of Secretary of State for Defense, and that he and his brother Ngo dinh Nhu closely follow assignments, promotions, etc., of senior officers. Ngo dinh Nhu has himself emphasized that the military must be kept out of the political arena. He has admitted that other Asian nations have had to be saved by the military, but he contends that countries with effective political organizations with strong philosophical bases can meet the communist threat without turning to military leaders, and that Viet-Nam qualifies as one of these. He has stated that an army which enters into the internal politics of a country loses its quality as a national force and becomes a political aspirant for political power, and that the attention it pays to politics is paid for by poor military training of the army.

5. Nonetheless, Ngo dinh Nhu and the Can Lao party apparently feel it essential to penetrate the military establishment just as every other force in the country. There is, for example, a “Military Committee” of the Can Lao party. Its efforts have resulted in certain of the rumors of the favoritism and influence mentioned above, but careful investigation by MAAG brought no specific evidence of detrimental effects upon the military effectiveness of ARVN. It can be assumed, however, that the Can Lao maintains at least a representation within ARVN, which would signal any steps by military leaders toward the political arena.

6. It is the judgment of the Country Team that there is no Vietnamese military figure sufficiently prominent at this time to rally opposition to President Diem or to the government. It is universally accepted that the senior Vietnamese officer, Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Le Van Ty, has no political ambitions, is fully loyal to the Diem regime, and probably is not sufficiently effective to mount and carry out a military coup. Furthermore, it is the opinion of MAAG officers with close contact with senior ARVN officers, that there is very little consideration given to such a prospect by ARVN figures. Thus the likelihood of any kind of coup or military take-over against the present government is minimal for the near future. What the role of the military might be in the future circumstances is discussed below.

VI. Future Crises

1. Certain favorable and unfavorable possible long-term trends of the Diem regime have been described above. Some foreseeable events, however, could very greatly affect the overall picture in Viet-Nam and these are appropriately considered in a paper dedicated to the problems of stability and development.

2. The first and most obvious danger would be the death of President Diem. In a constitutional regime with firm traditions such as development might be regrettable but not necessarily catastrophic. Since the government of Viet-Nam at the present stage, however, is little more than the projection of President Diem’s ideas and leadership, his demise would raise a problem of the first order.

3. Were the President to die or be killed, the Constitution provides for the succession of Vice President Nguyen ngoc Tho. The question on which it is difficult to form any firm predictions is whether the Constitution would be followed, and secondly, whether the solution it provides would be an enduring one.

4. Vice President Tho’s chances of succeeding, at least for an intermediate period, are considered good. He is likely to receive the support of the armed forces. He is well regarded by Major General Duong Van Minh, the senior ARVN general aside from Chief of Staff Le Van Ty—Tho arranged for Minh’s release from a French prison in which they were cell-mates. Vice President Tho has also made distinct efforts in recent months to travel widely in the country and to become well known to the population and to the administration. He is well and favorably regarded by many technicians and political personalities as well as by members of the Embassy and the United States Economic Mission (USOM).

5. The principal obstacle to Vice President Tho’s succession would be posed by surviving members of Diem’s family, and especially by the President’s brother Ngo dinh Nhu. On several occasions, the latter has made slighting reference to Tho’s qualifications for the succession and, indeed, to his qualifications for the high office he now holds. Reports have been received that a secret agreement exists under which Vice President Tho would immediately resign if the President died, and be succeeded, at least temporarily, by the then President of the National Assembly, who would be expected to follow the orders of the President’s brother Nhu until a suitable successor could be chosen. It is clear that Nhu disposes of considerable political power through the mechanism of the Can Lao party, and he could be expected to be ruthless in using it in such a crisis. Whether the Vice President would accede to his demands or use his influence with the administration and the army to fight, politically or even militarily, is by no means clear at this moment, however. No more clear is the outcome if such a conflict came to pass. Aside from the main conflict with Tho, a side conflict might well arise among those seeking to displace him, involving one or more of the President’s brothers, or acceptable front men and individuals who have at least the first elements of political power or public popularity.

6. Even assuming an orderly succession for an interim period, the President’s death might lead to a later leadership and governmental crisis. Thus, if the Vice President’s leadership should not prove sufficiently vigorous and effective, a host of possible efforts to replace him might arise. One of these might well be led by the President’s brother Nhu with the support of the Can Lao mechanism. Another might be the result of an agreement among senior military officers that a strong hand was needed, and their selection of one of their number to provide the country with the necessary leadership. A third might be a crystallization of some of the present opposition to the Diem regime around a vigorous leader or even one of the present Cabinet or Assembly offering a different approach, and a bid for power with popular support. Prediction so far ahead is, of course, a hazardous art. It can only be said at this juncture that the potential exists for any of these efforts to fill a leadership vacuum. Which would prove to have the greater power when the time came is almost impossible to determine. It can be said, however, that as long as the President remains alive and his programs of political and economic development progress, the likelihood of a constitutional and stable succession increases.”

7. Assuming the continued life of the President, a crisis will arise at the next presidential election in 1961. There is little chance that opposition to Diem will be able to express itself to any degree. However, a dispute will undoubtedly arise over the selection of the candidate for Vice President for the ensuing five years. The forces mentioned above as opposed to Vice President Tho are already beginning to refer to the advisability of retiring him and replacing him with a figure with “higher qualities of leadership.” Such a conflict will probably be restricted to the palace, as its final resolution would be in the hands of the President himself. His decision, however, will be most revealing of the degree of influence exerted upon him by his brothers and their Can Lao concepts of political organization, as distinct from the political powers which may assemble on the side of Tho.

8. A serious crisis could be expected in Viet-Nam if there were a substantial diminution of United States aid. The present force level of the army and the present rate of economic development are both dependent on the maintenance of very substantial levels of U.S. assistance for a number of years. The large scale difficulties which would be caused in the military as well as the economic field by too rapid a reduction of this aid would create very substantial problems even to the leadership of as strongly seated an autocrat as President Diem.

9. In the field of “second stage revolutions” under the leadership of the intellectual class, there are some indications of storms to come. As stated above, there is substantial dissatisfaction among many of the articulate intellectuals, and some public resentment over the excessive control techniques imposed by the administration and the Can Lao’s clandestine power. However, there is certainly no current likelihood of the organization of a second stage revolt or military coup. The major element missing at this writing is any clearly defined or effective leadership. No such center of power appears in the military, and the intellectuals do not seem to have gravitated around any one leader, either in Viet-Nam or in exile. A figure being discussed at this time, Dr. Phan quang Dan, does not appear capable of organizing such a complicated operation. Lastly, the Communists, while certainly present in the country clandestinely, do not have sufficient organized strength around which opposition to the Diem government could crystallize.

VII. U.S. Policy Implications

A. Political

1. The strongly executive type, somewhat authoritarian government of President Diem is compatible with our interests in Viet-Nam as long as that government remains benevolent as demonstrated by its efforts to improve the conditions of the Vietnamese people. We should, therefore, continue to give it our full diplomatic and material support not only because of its strongly anti-Communist external stance, but also because of its sincere endeavor to remove conditions which breed Communism from within.

2. We should be prepared to acknowledge to ourselves that even over the longer term democracy in the Western sense of the term may never come to exist in Viet-Nam. We should welcome the Diem Government’s attempts to develop the ideology of Personalism as a counterbalance to the lure of Communism. The leaders of this government stand almost alone among the leaders of underdeveloped countries in this endeavor, however faltering and obscure it may seem at times. We should also look with tolerance on the GVN’s efforts to establish a political system which it considers in conformance with local traditions and needs. We should not attempt to make over Viet-Nam in our own image. Excellent as the democratic, liberal and parliamentary institutions and methods are for countries like the U.S. and the U.K., recent developments in certain other Afro-Asian countries indicate that they cannot be expected to flower at an early date in such countries.

3. We should, nevertheless, whenever feasible, bring our influence to bear on the Vietnamese Government to try to induce it in its own interest to recognize basic human rights and give gradually greater reality to representative government. Such actions importantly affect the international prestige of the Government, its propaganda position vis-à-vis the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam, and its degree of support by Vietnamese intellectuals.

Following the National Assembly elections of August 30, 1959, we attempted to induce the government for these reasons to seat all of the genuine independents who were elected. Though the seating of several independents was not challenged, we were unsuccessful in the conspicuous cases of Dr. Phan Quang Dan and Nguyen Tran. A second example of what we can try to do in this area is to encourage the government to permit some legislative initiative to the new National Assembly. This was denied to the first assembly to the detriment of its prestige.

4. We should not only encourage the Government to seek greater support among intellectuals through measures of the type discussed above, but also to make better use of the human resources they represent. This is important both because dissatisfied intellectuals can be leaders of “second-stage revolutions” and because the immense area of work to be accomplished in an underdeveloped country makes it desirable to use all of the limited talents available.

Perhaps relaxation of the Government’s severe restrictions on travel outside of Viet-Nam would be the single most important action which could be taken in this connection. The intellectuals, often educated abroad, either deeply resent this severance of their contacts with foreign countries, or, if already abroad, have serious apprehensions that they would not be permitted to leave Viet-Nam once they return. A more liberal attitude by the government toward foreign travel should attract many educated Vietnamese in France to return.

5. We shall also, as appropriate, encourage the government to allow some substance to the trade unions in the collective bargaining field. If the working class cannot look to trade unions under non-Communist leadership as the promoters of its interests, it will be far more susceptible to Communist subversion.

6. We believe in view of the extensive U.S. support of the GVN it is extremely difficult for the U.S. to avoid identification with the Diem regime even though we may not like some of its acts. As long as the image which the GVN presents is one which is, on balance, in conformity with our interests, we should not be overly concerned over our identification with the regime. In any case, certain of our actions, such as our effort to influence the GVN to seat all independents elected to the new National Assembly, can be discreetly made known—for example, to the diplomatic colleagues of allied countries—and thus prevent complete U.S. identification with all acts of the GVN.

7. We should be prepared in case of political crisis, such as may arise in connection with the succession to Diem, to move rapidly to support U.S. interests. This requires continuing collection and analysis of information on the political situation and personalities. Since the subject of succession is sensitive, the collecting of such information, including contacts with the opposition and possible successors, must be handled with utmost tact and care. Much of it must be carried out by well-trained lower level Embassy … personnel to prevent arousing antagonism on the part of the Government.

B. Economic

1. We shall continue as in the past to influence the GVN toward the proper emphasis on security and development needs. The proposed level and uses of FY 60 and 61 Defense Support aid are intended to serve this purpose (see Saigon’s Telegram 1270, October 10⁴).

2. We shall also do what we can to change the government’s attitudes toward private business and to expand the role of private enterprise in Viet-Nam, but we should expect only gradual and partial progress in this respect for the time being (see also in this connection Saigon’s Telegram 1270).

C. Military

1. We shall also carefully observe political tendencies which may develop among the officer corps. Our MAAG officers stationed with units of the Vietnamese armed forces as training advisors are potentially useful sources of information of this type.

2. We shall also seek to influence the officers of the Vietnamese armed forces along the proper lines. MAAG has consistently aimed at inculcating in Vietnamese officers the U.S. concept of a responsible, dedicated, non-political corps, and this will be continued. While it would appear desirable in principle to bring the more prominent Vietnamese officers to understand the importance of balance between security and development needs in case the military plays a large role in the succession to Diem, it is believed too risky to do this at the present time because of likely irritation to the GVN which would soon come to realize the purposes of such efforts, and embarrassment to MAAG and the Embassy.

D. Informational-Cultural

1. Our information and cultural programs should continue to favor moderate political solutions. These programs should be addressed to the existing and emerging elite, the government bureaucracy and military personnel. They should pursue this general psychological objective by (1) projecting a negative image of communism,(2) fostering confidence in the power and purposes of the free world,(3) stimulate awareness of the benefits flowing from cooperation with the United States and other nations of the free world, (4) promoting understanding of basic western values, and (5) encouraging Vietnamese political and social cohesion and self-confidence.

Elbridge Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.90/12–759. Secret. Drafted by Mendenhall, Paul E. Carr, and William E. Colby. For Colby’s account of his duty in Vietnam, see William Colby, Honorable Men, My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), pp. 141–179.
2. In this circular airgram, the Department of State sent a study entitled, “Political Implications of Afro-Asian Military Takeovers,” May 22, which was presented to the NSC on June 18. Although not formally approved by the Council, President Eisenhower commended the study. A summary of the conclusions of the paper as well as the memorandum of discussion at the NSC meeting of June 18 relating to it are scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of Foreign Relations. Also included in the airgram was an extract of an article by Guy J. Parker, entitled “Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade,” as published in the spring 1959 edition of World Politics. Finally, the airgram contained a copy of the oral presentation made before the NSC. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.90/8–1159)

3. In despatch 27, the Embassy reported that the South Vietnamese leadership’s concern with deterioration of security in the countryside led it in late 1957 and 1958 to consider a rural recruitment campaign by the National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) to win over the peasant farmers and thus gain political control of the countryside. According to the Embassy, the NRM began to organize cooperative Farmers’ Associations (FA’s) in March 1959, but little had been done to give them economic function or viability. The Embassy offered the following comments on the program:

   “The FA’s effectiveness as a scheme to combat the security situation has merit, although it is not a panacea. It is not designed to cope with the threat of violence to its membership. The GVN has other agencies for that. The FA is designed to give the GVN political support by showing the farmers that it can provide local organizations to help them with their problems. Like most new governments in SE Asia, the GVN’s political organization is in the greatest need of development at the local level. This also is where the communist threat is strongest.

   “The NRM may make political capital out of the movement if it employs persuasion instead of coercion in its promotional activities and demonstrates a capacity for enlightened leadership.

   “A danger exists, due to numerous small organizations to be created, that communist elements may penetrate the movement.

   “The GVN’s recent tendency to assume a monopoly over the distribution of fertilizer for general farm use raises the possibility that the NRM may wish to employ this device as a further means of controlling the FA and uncooperative farmers.

   “Several years success will be needed before the FA will become a political asset to the GVN. A growing and successful pattern of operation over the course of several years is required.” (Ibid., 851G.20/7–2059)

4. Document 92.