94. Despatch From the Consul in Hue (Heavner) to the Department of State1
REF
- Consulate Despatch 16 of February 25, 1958 and 3 of August 30, 19572
SUBJECT
- Conversation with Ngo dinh Can.
Introduction
After more than a year in Hue and numerous approaches, the reporting officer finally succeeded in meeting Ngo dinh Can, the iron-fisted and mysterious political boss of Central Viet Nam. Although it is well known that the President’s younger brother is the real power in Central Viet Nam, he refuses to receive foreigners on the grounds that he has no official position. An alternate excuse, useful if the foreigner is unofficial, is poor health.
Ngo dinh Can consented to see the reporter on the condition that the interview must be kept secret and that no report would be made either to Saigon or Washington. Perhaps in an effort to smoke out the reporter, he stated with some irritation that a previous Consul had reported meeting him. For the above reasons, and in the hope of future contacts, it is requested that the mere knowledge that Can has received the reporting officer be severely restricted.
The Interview
Ngo dinh Can’s home, situated near the Phu Cam Cathedral and surrounded by a high wall topped with three strands of charged wire, can only be described as bizarre. The bare earth of the yard is studded with artificial rock formations, little pools, terraces, and clipped shrubs, but there is not a blade of grass to be seen. Under the trees, flocks of caged birds call raucously, while crouched on a side porch are two enormous stuffed tigers. Province Chief Ha thuc Luyen, [Page 247] who accompanied the reporter, was moved to comment that Can is very fond of animals because he has no wife or children.
In the house itself the reporter was received in a room cluttered with ornately carved screens, chairs and exotic bric-a-brac, including a stuffed leopard (which Can did not shoot), elephant tusks, and Chinese scrolls and mirrors. A large brass Buddhist urn was a rather surprising feature of the room, and in one corner was a Zenith transoceanic portable radio. Can said that he sometimes listens to the Voice of America and the BBC on this set. He was evidently rather proud of the “old fashioned things” in the room.
Can appears to be in good health. (The Director of the Hue Hospital Doctor Le Khac Quyen, once observed that he sees Can frequently during his almost daily calls on the President’s mother, and in his opinion, Can enjoys excellent health.) During the interview he wore heavy gold glasses of a rather stylish design and a traditional black Vietnamese robe with small pearl buttons. The reporter noted with surprise that his graying hair is wavy; quite possibly he affects a permanent wave.
Can’s manner at first was distinctly aloof; he neither smiled nor spoke as he shook hands. After sitting in uneasy silence for a moment, the reporter ventured some polite chatter, finally launched into generalities about American objectives in Viet Nam. Can replied in a low voice, halting frequently and looking at the floor. As the conversation progressed, however, he raised his eyes, spoke with increasing speed and assurance and corrected the reporter’s misapprehensions about Viet Nam and himself with a sweet smile. The interview lasted over an hour, and Can seemed in no hurry to end it then.
Though evidently rather shy and suggesting in his manners a man at once strong-willed and yet rather feminine, Can did not leave any impression of mental or physical abnormality. This came as a bit of surprise, for several Vietnamese, including millionaire shipping magnate Nguyen van Buu had led the reporter to expect a very peculiar individual.
Can spent a large part of the interview emphasizing his non-official status and advancing this as his reason for not wishing to see foreigners. He insisted that he is a “representative of the people” and as such cannot seem to be too close to the Americans or even to Vietnamese officialdom. He explained that his role is to watch over the welfare of the people and to intervene on their behalf when officials make errors or when government policy is not appropriate.
When the reporter observed that security in Central Viet Nam, particularly in Quang Ngai Province, seems to have deteriorated over the past year, Can replied that security is not a serious problem. A handful of agents in the mountains of several Provinces constitute no real threat, he said, and waved aside the suggestion that the elaborate [Page 248] security precautions which the reporter observed in Quang Ngai meant the Viet Cong are strong there. Asked if he had visited Quang Ngai himself, he replied that he travels all over Central Viet Nam.
Regarding security in South Viet Nam as contrasted to Central Viet Nam, he believes bad communications in the south are an important factor. He also observed that the “southerners” do not have a true nationalist spirit like that of the people of Central Viet Nam. He traced this to the long period of close contact with the French, Cambodians and other foreigners. He also observed that there were always more lawless elements in the south than in Central Viet Nam.
Asked if Central Viet Nam’s security apparatus could not be duplicated in the south, he stated that CVN administrative techniques and security controls certainly can be exported to Saigon. He observed that a number of CVN administrators, including at least two Province Chiefs, have been sent to work in the south. He made a point, however, of adding that he himself has gone to Saigon only twice since 1954, both times for medical treatment.
Can stated that he believes Viet Nam can only be reunited by force. He observed that the Reds are building up north Viet Nam just as the U.S. is strengthening the GVN, and he sees no possibility of a negotiated reunification.
As for the development of the nation, Can indicated that he believes education is the key to a better future. He would emphasize primary education, feeling that the educational level of the whole people must be raised. He commented that in Laos and Cambodia a number of highly educated people have not been able to develop the country or prevent Communist penetration because the great mass of the people have had no education. He criticized the U.S. aid program because of USOM’s insistence that half the cost of the schools built must be borne by the community and because USOM only pays teachers’ salaries for one year. He feels this policy places too much of a burden on the poor villages of Central Viet Nam.
Can did not seem overly concerned about the slowness of economic development in Viet Nam. The suggestion that unfulfilled economic expectations could lead the people into the arms of the Communists provoked a sweet smile and a gentle shake of the hand. He seemed content to observe that Viet Nam has been independent for only five years, and that the economy naturally develops slowly after a long period of economic stagnation and exploitation under the French.
Comment
Ngo dinh Can exercises nearly absolute power in Central Viet Nam, and judging from recent trips to Pleiku and Kontum, it is the reporter’s opinion that Can is also in effective control of that part of [Page 249] the country. (Besides meeting a number of officials in Pleiku and Kontum who said plainly that they were working for and reporting to Can, the reporter was invited by the Pleiku Chief of Province to an elaborate reception in honor of Can’s birthday. Asked why he had not made his pilgrimage to Hue to present birthday greetings in person, as hundreds of high officials from all over the country did, the Chief of Province replied that Can had told him to remain in Pleiku and celebrate the event there.) Although initially his power may have depended heavily on his relationship to the President, Can’s organization now enjoys a considerable degree of autonomy. His supporters are so indebted and committed to him that, should the occasion arise, he could probably act quite independently.
This does not mean that Can is ever likely to openly oppose President Diem. The reporter has been told that Can and Diem often disagree, but “like man and wife.” But Can’s influence on the men under Diem appears to be growing, and he is evidently extending his organization step by step into all of Viet Nam. And he influences the President himself by appealing both to family sentiment—it is he who cares for their aged and helpless mother—and by pointing to the success which he has had in rooting out Communism and controlling Central Viet Nam.
In view of Can’s large and apparently growing powers, his evident fear and distrust of foreigners, his apparent lack of information on and sympathy for the American aid program, and his views on reunification are not reassuring [sic]. Nor is his dismissal of the security problem in Quang Ngai a good sign. His denial of what many officials concede to be a serious situation there could mean that he is afraid of losing face with the President if it becomes evident that he has not in fact been so successful in eliminating Communism as he has claimed to be. But it may also mean that he is not getting the full story from his subordinates. Although he stated that he travels widely in Central Viet Nam, the Consulate is of the opinion, based on remarks by a number of informed Vietnamese, that Can rarely stirs from his home in Hue. In short, the reporter feels that Can’s deliberate isolation, not only from foreign influence but also from his own people, is potentially dangerous.
Can’s motives remain opaque. That he is determined to maintain and extend his power is clear, but what he intends to use his power for is uncertain. His evident interest in education—he has backed the University of Hue strongly and is known to be responsible for building several new secondary schools—is encouraging. And although he dismissed the problem of raising peasant living standards rather easily, his people are playing a leading role in the resettlement program [Page 250] and are deeply involved in every new economic project in Central Viet Nam.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.11/11–959. Secret; Limited Distribution.↩
- See Document 6.↩