Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

83. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, July 7, 1959—10:45 p.m.

28. Joint State–Defense–ICA– … Message. Saigon’s 2525 May 29, repeated other addressees July 7.²

1. Requests by President and Vice President for advice and suggestion for dealing with increased guerrilla activities South Viet-Nam including growing sabotage US-financed equipment being given urgent and intensive study by US agencies concerned. At your discretion you may inform appropriate GVN officials following measures taken:

a. Order issued authorizing subject GVN concurrence provision MAAG advisers down to and including infantry regimental level and artillery, armored and separate marine battalion level. These advisers at field headquarters of Vietnamese units indicated authorized furnish advice on preparation daily plans and render on-the-spot advice based on situation existing at time. This would include tactical as well as logistical advice. MAAG advisers must however confine their activities to advisory functions and are directed not to participate directly in combat operations or accompany units on anti-guerrilla operations in areas immediately adjacent to national boundaries. (CINCPAC letter May 25 to CHMAAG Saigon.³)

b. ICA has detailed Melville M. Fruit to Saigon for 90 days to initiate new Civil Guard program pending arrival Frank Walton as Chief USOM Public Safety Division. Walton expected arrive early August. Fruit formerly in charge ICA public safety program in Indonesia where Mobile Brigade was established as efficient part of civil police force. While program for re-equipping and re-training Civil Guard can be expected yield results only over longer term, Fruit prepared assess need for any specific police technicians in dealing with current character internal security problem and initiate recruitment process if not now available in Saigon.

2. Defense is considering detailing U.S. Army Special Forces teams to MAAG Viet-Nam to act as advisers on anti-guerrilla tactics. Request Country Team views this suggestion. If affirmative, request estimated size and number of teams required. Also desire Country Team recommendations as to methods if any of introducing teams into Viet-Nam without affecting MAAG ceiling or whether priority of this mission justifies allocating team spaces within present MAAG ceiling.⁴

3. We glad GVN has sent 10 army officers to attend British jungle warfare school in Johore in view conspicuous Malayan success in handling terrorist problem (Weekas 26 and 27⁵) Did Fruit stopover Philippines en route Saigon to investigate possibilities for training Vietnamese with Filipino constabulary indicate this might be useful means for assisting GVN in dealing with guerrilla problem?⁶

4. In addition above which deals with armed forces and police actions for coping with guerrilla problem, believe it necessary for US agencies try obtain further information about nature internal security situation to determine whether political, economic and psychological measures necessary as well. If terrorists and saboteurs being brought in singly or in small teams as strangers to target areas, security actions may be sufficient to expose and destroy them. On other hand, if these acts perpetrated by locally established Viet Cong organizations which require support local population, then further measures needed to secure cooperation of local people with GVN authorities. Unclear in Washington which method of mounting terrorist acts prevails.⁷ As related factor Saigon’s 2345⁸ and 2408⁹ indicate no conclusive information available regarding rumored peasant dissatisfaction GVN. Suggest Embassy consider advisability assigning Vietnamese language officer responsibility for extensive traveling in provinces of greatest insecurity in southern Viet-Nam for purpose obtaining better picture of above factors. We recognize sensitivity this matter to GVN, but concern over sabotage US-financed equipment might provide appropriate handle for such US action.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5/5–2959. Secret. Drafted by Mendenhall with clearances from SEA, FE, and in draft from Defense and ICA approved by Parsons. Sent also to CINCPAC and repeated to Manila, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore.
2. See footnote 4, Document 72.
3. Document 74.

4. In telegram 212 from Saigon, July 24, the Country Team responded:

   “3. Re paragraph 2, Deptel 28. A three to five man special forces team, fluent in French or Vietnamese to train selected groups in anti-guerrilla/psychological war techniques can be utilized early 1960 by Civil Guard project. Suggest team be introduced into Viet-Nam as civilian members of USOM/PSD project with responsibility to USOM. MAAG concurs.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5/7–2459)

5. Weeka 26, telegram 2756 from Saigon, June 27. (Ibid., 751G.00(W)/6–2759) Weeka 27 is not filed with the Weeka series and has not been found.

6. In telegram 212 from Saigon, the Country Team reported as follows on Fruit’s stopover in Manila:

   “1. Fruit’s stopover Manila indicates results may be obtained on long-range basis by training Civil Guard personnel with PC/PAF organizations. USOM/Manila estimates January 1960 earliest possible date class can be accommodated. Probably March–April. Director Civil Guard and Minister Interior desire training in ranger-type activity and psychological war techniques. Also agreeable to specialized anti-guerrilla training in Malaya and Korea. Emphasize these are long-range programs since Civil Guard cadres must first be selected then given language training and other indoctrination in Viet-Nam.”

7. The Embassy responded in telegram 212 as follows:

   “4. Re paragraph 4, Deptel 28. Information available here indicates terrorism and sabotage not restricted to one origin but consist of both types mentioned. Viet-Cong has underground and covert [garble], with certain amount of support from local population either willingly or through coercion, and in addition has bases in jungle from which individuals and teams operate. Country Team and government itself well aware importance political, economic, and psychological measures in addition to military and police action, as shown in Ambassador’s talks with President June 25 (Embassy despatch 1 [Document 82]). Progress along these lines is of course subject to available resources and effectiveness of cadres. Country Team continuing press importance this subject, as well as our efforts to get most accurate view possible of real situation, both through direct reporting by Vietnamese-speaking Embassy officers … . Coming electoral period, incidentally, should provide an excellent test of the real situation.”

8. In telegram 2345, May 6, the Embassy reported in general on the internal security situation in Vietnam and noted that it was unable to confirm Diem’s assertion that the situation was worse than any time since 1955. The Embassy specifically reported on peasant discontent as follows:

   “Rumored peasant dissatisfaction and discontent in south. Part of this apparently based on resentment against new provincial officials who come from central Vietnam, are followers of President’s brother Can, and fail understand mentality or problems southerners. Embassy recently received information indicating difference of opinion within GVN between those who advocate placing more emphasis on winning over peasants by taking positive steps assist them, taking into consideration psychological factors involved, and those who would primarily rely on armed forces to suppress dissident activities these areas. Indications are that latter view at present winning out.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5/5–659)

9. Document 72.