Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

82. Despatch From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

No. 1

Saigon, July 1, 1959.

REF

• Embassy Despatch 440, June 30, 1959²

SUBJECT

• Conversation Between President Ngo dinh Diem and Ambassador Durbrow Concerning Internal Security with Particular Reference to the Camau Peninsula

On June 25, the Ambassador had a one hour and 45 minute conversation with President Diem. About half of the time was devoted to discussing the internal security situation. Memorandum of Conversation is enclosed³ and may be summarized as follows:

President Diem said that he and the government, which in the past two years had concentrated on the high plateau area, now were concentrating their efforts on improving the situation in the Delta and he was certain that within a year the dissident elements would be eliminated. He, noting that he had recently made two extensive trips to the Camau Peninsula, commented that he had made a point of visiting some of the remotest areas which are supposed to be highly infiltrated by Viet Cong dissidents. He feared many of the isolated peasants in this area were easy prey to the Viet Cong dissidents who extracted tribute. He also had been impressed by the lack of means of communication and transportation. Diem stated that in order to increase the security of the peasants in this area and to help them increase productivity he had ordered military and civilian teams to assist in cleaning out and improving the canals, which he found in very poor condition, and in building roads. Noting that he had given instructions to step-up and improve the training and recruiting of the Civil Guard and SDC, Diem expressed the hope that these forces could be more helpful to the population who in turn would feel that they were well protected. Diem stated, however, that some of the isolated peasants would have to be moved and concentrated in villages where they could be better protected. Although he expected some opposition from the peasants, he was convinced that once in the villages they would realize the advantages they had gained. The President informed the Ambassador that he had, six months ago, instructed the Sûreté to set up a Central File on subversive elements and that file was proving quite efficacious. President Diem and the Ambassador also discussed means whereby more effective use could be made of National Assembly deputies in keeping the government better informed of the population’s desires and needs.

In reply to the Ambassador’s expression of pleasure that the President was carrying out plans to win over the population rather than relying solely on military and police methods, Diem stated he was convinced that it was essential to win the confidence of the people if the internal security problem was to be solved.

President Diem gave the general impression that the situation was still serious, but that there had recently been a considerable improvement which he attributed to the success of GVN efforts conducted by both military and civilian agencies. Unlike the Secretary of Interior, Lam Le Trinh, and the Secretary of State for the Presidency, Nguyen Dinh Thuan, who had recently indicated to the Ambassador that the situation had improved markedly in the past few weeks, President Diem indicated that he realized that much remained to be done to rectify the situation. The President made it clear that in seeking to accomplish this goal he has decided to concentrate not only on the use of force but also by other means designed to promote the welfare of the population.

Comment:

President Diem’s sober comments are particularly interesting in view of the more optimistic remarks of Trinh and Thuan noted above, and similarly statements recently made by GVN officials traveling in Europe (see Despatch 443, June 30, 1959⁴) indicating there has been a marked improvement in the internal security situation. Ngo dinh Nhu, the President’s brother and political advisor, is apparently even more pessimistic than the President, since he was recently reported by a reliable source to have stated that the situation is serious, and Viet-Nam is faced “with what amounts to a full-scale war”… Information available to US agencies corroborates the President’s more moderate view that, while there has recently been some improvement, much remains to be done. Viet Cong terrorism declined somewhat during April and May. Presently available, though incomplete, statistics for June indicate a continuation of this downward trend, similar to that experienced last year. It is believed that this decrease in terrorism is partly due to strong GVN counter-measures instituted in recent months. It is not unlikely, however, that the Viet Cong, exercising their well known tactical flexibility, may have decided that now is the time to lie low, particularly in those areas where Viet Cong is under strong attack. As the Embassy has noted previously, while the extent of terrorism is often used as a barometer with regard to the internal security situation, terrorism presents only one of many tactical weapons in the Viet Cong bag of tricks, and only one factor in assessing the over-all security picture. This is perhaps best exemplified by the situation in the high plateau where there has been little overt terrorism, despite the fact the Viet Cong is actively engaged in infiltration and propaganda activities particularly among the Montagnards. Although GVN countermeasures are believed to be increasingly successful in reducing Viet Cong terrorism, US agencies have no reason to believe that the Viet Cong potential for future troublemaking has been eliminated.

Several of the President’s proposals call for further comment. There are indications that President Diem’s proposal to re-group isolated peasants in villages may meet with opposition, not only on the part of those to be relocated, but also on the part of local officials who would be called on to implement this program… . The President’s proposal to improve and build canals may refer: 1) to the dredging and construction operations currently being undertaken by the GVN in the Camau Peninsula; 2) to a new and more extensive program for which American aid may later be required; or 3) merely to local efforts to clear out and improve some of the existing canals which have been allowed to become overgrown with underbrush and trees since the war years. Any new program of canal construction would presumably require a prior study in order to ascertain the effect on the water table of the Camau Peninsula. USOM believes the canal problem in this area is complicated, and has decided to inaugurate a careful study, beginning in July, which will cover the Mekong delta, a triangular between Saigon, Long Xuyen and the Camau Peninsula, before deciding on recommendations for any major US aid program of canal rehabilitation. It should be noted in connection with the President’s proposal to construct jeepable roads, that in many areas of the Camau Peninsula which are marshy, roads would have to be built up above the surrounding marsh. As indicated by the President, the Sûreté does maintain a “Central File” in Saigon. According to USOM … , this file does not constitute a central repository of information on dissident elements due to the reluctance of other security agencies and provincial authorities to submit information. Its usefulness is believed to be further limited by the lack of adequate evaluation and correlation of information received.

There is every reason to believe that the GVN, as evidenced by the President’s remarks, remains seriously concerned over the internal security situation, particularly during the pre-election period. This concern is indicated not only by the actions cited by the President, but also by the following recent developments: implementation of the legislation providing for Special Military Tribunals and indications that such tribunals will apply justice strictly and swiftly (see Despatch 441 of June 30, 1959⁵); the reported presence of about 30 battalions of ARVN forces which are engaged in operations scheduled to continue to the end of August, presumably until after the election campaign; the recent assignment of ARVN officers to the “Jungle Warfare School” at Johore, Malaya. Whether GVN efforts will be sufficient to eliminate the internal security problem in the delta within a year, as predicted by the President, remains to be seen. The President, in emphasizing the need to combine vigorous use of force against the Viet Cong with efforts to improve the lot of the peasants in order to obtain their support, has expressed a view remarkably close to the reported opinions of Ngo dinh Can, his brother and Political boss of Central Viet-Nam…. It should be noted that the President, while citing various factors relating to the security situation, did not mention the serious problems presented by the Viet Cong and dissident use of Cambodian territory as a “privileged sanctuary”. The solution of this problem appears to be a necessary prerequisite to elimination of the internal security problem in the Delta area.

For the Ambassador:

Chalmers B. Wood
Second Secretary of Embassy

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5/7–159. Secret. Drafted by Andrew J. Fink, III, Second Secretary and political officer at the Embassy.
2. In this despatch, the Embassy transmitted the impressions of Vice President Tho and his party of their trip through central Vietnam. (Ibid., 851G.00/6–3059)
3. Attached, but not printed.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.OO/8–3159)
5. Not printed. (Ibid., 751G.5/6–3059)