64. Letter From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific’s Chief of Staff (Riley)1
Dear Herb: This letter is in partial reply to yours of the 9th2 and to enlarge on my proposal to allow MAAG advisors to accompany their counterparts on certain anti-guerrilla operations.
In your letter “no direct participation” by American advisors appears to be the major factor. I believe the “no direct participation line” can be maintained and still realize many of the results desired. Be assured, I have no desire nor do I think it would be appropriate for U.S. military advisors to get closely involved physically with guerrillas.
Our Combat Unit advisors are at Field Army, Corps, Division and Regimental Headquarters, only. In addition, we have advisors to Artillery and Tank Battalion Headquarters and at the Headquarters of each of the two Marine Battalions.
My concept is that the advisor should take the field with the Headquarters of the Unit he is advising and there advise the Vietnamese Commander and his Staff as to preparation of daily plans, monitor the day-to-day conduct of the operations and render on-the-spot advice based on the situation as it exists at the time. This to include logistical as well as tactical matters. The logistical questions that come up normally have to do with medical support, evacuation of wounded, transportation problems, road and trail construction, bridging, supply procedures, maintenance of equipment, etc.
[Page 183]Additionally, the advisor could determine local training deficiencies and the requirements necessary to correct the deficiencies. He could also more correctly evaluate requests for additional equipment, road building materials, heavy engineer equipment and things of that nature. In those operations where Army, Navy, and Air Force elements are all involved, he could pressure for better cooperation and coordination.
Finally, I could get daily a first hand report of the actual situation and thus be in a position to give intelligent advice to the President when he asks for it. Within the last week or two, I’ve had to tell the President and also the Field Commander, General Minh, that I simply did not have sufficient information to intelligently comment on the course of the operation northeast of Bien Hoa. Although a total of 14 Infantry Battalions, plus odds and ends were involved, the various and sundry reports given to me by Paratroop Headquarters, First Region Headquarters and by ARVN General Staff were so at variance I couldn’t afford to give the advice being asked of me.
It has never been my intent to suggest that advisors accompany attacking units or get into fire-fights. Army, Corps, Division and Regimental Commanders do not get closely and physically involved in that sort of thing in anti-guerrilla operations. If they do, they cease to be senior commanders and take on the duties of the patrol leader or the duties of the Company or platoon leader.
I also bear in mind that if I should suggest to the President that the U.S. advisors accompany their counterparts in anti-guerrilla operations, he might give me a flat refusal. Or again on the other hand, if I told him my reasons and brought up a few first hand recent examples where such would have been advisable, he might give his approval.
Kindest regards,
- Source: Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Official Correspondence January–July 1959 (54). Confidential.↩
- Document 62.↩
- Printed from a copy which bears this typed signature.↩