Office of the Historian

32. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense’s Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin)1

Washington, September 17, 1958.

SUBJECT

  • Self-Defense Corps in Vietnam

It was heartening to see State message 312 to Saigon, 3 September 1958,2 which mostly concerned the Civil Guard in Vietnam and [Page 81] reflected credit on Lt. Col. Bob Evans of ISA who has been working so long on the problem.

This State message also briefly mentions the elimination or substantial reduction of the Self-Defense Corps. I have a thought on that which you might consider for discussion with Walter Robertson.

One of our policy aims is to “broaden the base” of a government, making it more representative of and responsive to the people. A strong factor in bringing this about in our own country in our young years as a nation was the right of our people to bear arms for self-defense. It is difficult for dictatorships of either the Right or the Left to be established when a people are armed. Thus, my feeling about the Self-Defense Corps has always been that it was a factor, by arming the people, in helping us build the democratic institutions we felt were beneficial to Vietnam. Security screening gave us some assurance that the Communist enemy wasn’t being armed, so this factor holds true.

It would be wise to think further on substituting controlled police forces for this body of armed people. I am a strong proponent of having effective security forces, but I believe it is also a wise U.S. investment in the development of Vietnam to help the power of the people to grow.

I know that General Williams, Chief MAAG–Vietnam, has an MP officer monitoring the Self-Defense Corps. Perhaps MAAG isn’t getting this billet filled by an officer who can guide the Self-Defense Corps into the well-motivated and effective force required. It is suggested that General Williams be asked to comment on the Self-Defense Corps, its value and effectiveness, and his thoughts on improvement.3

  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 62 A 1698, 324.5 Vietnam. Secret.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. A communication to DOD/ISA from Williams along these lines has not been found. In a conversation, however, held in Saigon on November 15 with Charles H. Shuff, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in ISA for Military Assistance Program, Williams was recorded as commenting on the SDC as follows: “Diem said he cannot always have an Army of 150 thousand. He would have to reduce someday and what would he do with all the senior officers? So there is no doubt that he thinks eventually his force strength will come down. But I don’t think he expects to even think about doing it in the very near future. The first step is to develop the Self Defense Corps to be more effective. I know it is coming up by leaps and bounds. We support a strength of 43,500 at 300 piasters per man. The Vietnamese pay the rest of the monthly salary. We furnish no arms, equipment or anything else. They are armed with old French rifles. Uniforms are what each village provides. The village or province makes up the difference in pay that averages around 1000 piasters. I looked very long at that 43,000 item in the budget again this year. I had a hell of a time getting it in last year because the Country Team was opposed to it, but finally they agreed. This year the Country Team hasn’t expressed an opinion because they have neither approved or disapproved the budget. So the budget is back at CINCPAC and CINCPAC has passed on it, to best of my knowledge, but the Country Team hasn’t.” (Center of Military History, Williams Papers, Notes on Shuff Conference 1958 (95))↩