27. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Kocher) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
SUBJECT
- Internal Security Situation in Viet-Nam.
According to Saigon’s Despatch 25, July 25, 1958, “Political Situation in Viet-Nam: January 1–June 10, 1958,”2 the internal security situation in Viet-Nam has shown no significant improvement during the first half of 1958. Assassinations of local government officials and loyal peasants have numbered the following in 1958: 10 in January, 36 in February, 26 in March, 17 in April, figures for May not yet complete. These assassinations reflect a Communist campaign to disrupt provincial administration in the South and demonstrate the government’s weakness to the population. (Full Embassy account on Page 7 of Tab A.3)
We have just received a USIS ticker item reporting a Vietnamese Interior Ministry announcement of an attack on the Michelin rubber plantations4 in which buildings were damaged and one million piastres (about $30,000) stolen. This attack was apparently mounted by members of the Binh Xuyen which is believed responsible for a spectacular attack on another French-owned rubber plantation in January, 1958, and is thought to be under Communist direction. Security forces of the Vietnamese Government, which had been forewarned of an expected attack on the Michelin plantation, claim to have killed 30 of the attackers.
We have been concerned about the impasse in the negotiations with the Vietnamese Government for U.S. assistance in training and re-equipping the Civil Guard to cope with the serious internal security problem. The two points at issue concern the jurisdictional status of the Civil Guard and the number of its personnel:
- 1.
- The Country Team has felt that the Civil Guard should be a civil police organization, and has, therefore, been insisting on Vietnamese agreement to retain it under civilian control. President Diem, on the other hand, plans to shift the Civil Guard eventually from its present civilian control to the Department of Defense. His reason is that he desires to avoid creating in Viet-Nam the political rivalry which has existed between the army and police in Thailand. Shift of the Civil Guard to the Defense Department would, however, raise serious questions re Viet-Nam’s force level basis, ICC controls, and U.S. administration of an assistance program (whether USOM or MAAG should administer and, if the latter, how the increased personnel needed could be assigned within the present MAAG ceiling).
- 2.
- The Country Team has also been insisting on Vietnamese agreement to eventual reduction of Civil Guard personnel from the present figure of some 50,000 to about 32,000. It has contended that a smaller number of well-trained and equipped Civil Guardsmen could do a better job than the present ill-qualified force. The reduction [Page 73] would enable scarce Vietnamese resources to be diverted to economic development purposes. President Diem has, however, continued to assert that the present state of internal security prevents any reduction in Civil Guard strength. Cambodia’s recognition of Communist China will doubtless strengthen his conviction.
We are now clearing a cable to Saigon5 asking for a report on any further developments in the Civil Guard negotiations since the last report in June, recommendations for breaking the impasse if it persists, and comments on certain suggestions which might present a basis for compromise with President Diem.
- Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 60 D 90, Vietnam. Confidential. Drafted by Mendenhall. Cleared with SEA and FE. The source text is an unsigned file copy.↩
- Not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 751G.00/7–2558)↩
- Reference is to despatch 25 from Saigon, not attached.↩
- Subsequent Embassy reports on this attack are in telegrams 268 and 278 from Saigon, August 13 and 14, and despatch 76 from Saigon, September 2. (Ibid., 751G.00/8–1358, 751G.00/8–1458, and 751G.00/9–258, respectively)↩
- Document 31.↩