26. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cumming)1
Dear Hugh: I am reporting the following long conversation with Wolf Ladejinsky in this manner since there is no rush about it and the suggestions made are somewhat sensitive and unorthodox.
A couple of days ago the President called Wolf from his luncheon, which is unusual, and said he wanted to talk to him “urgently” about the deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia brought about by the Cambodian recognition of Red China. The following is the gist of the conversation as reported by Wolf, who incidentally said he might send Jeff Parsons, an old friend, a letter on this subject. (Therefore please show this to Jeff.)
The President is so concerned not only by the prospects of the Chicoms coming to Cambodia but also about the “deteriorating situation” in Laos, Thailand and Burma that he fears Viet Nam will soon be the only country fully committed to the West in this area. (This is not a new idea. He discussed it with me at some length late last year and there have been recent indications …that Nhu is thinking along the same lines.) In view of this eventuality Diem hopes that the U.S. and the GVN can work more closely together in the most flexible manner possible to fight the growing communist strength in the area by covert and/or overt means. Diem is convinced, as you have probably seen from other reports, that:
- a.
- Not being Asians, Americans do not understand the Oriental mind and point of view. We are naive in our approaches and as Europeans we can not have “entré” into the inner circles and inner thinking of anti-communist elements in the various Southeast Asian countries.
- b.
- On the other hand Vietnamese, Diem in particular, “understand” their fellow Asians very well and have the capability and capacity to operate covertly and overtly in the anti-communist field. Although Wolf did not say so, Diem apparently inferred that if we should decide to cooperate in this matter we would be called on primarily to give the necessary wherewithal and perhaps on occasions equipment to permit the Vietnamese to carry out these operations.
In connection with this Diem, very flatteringly to me, suggested that since I had had considerable experience in dealing with communists and did not appear to be naive in these matters, that I should be nominated some sort of “autonomous Secretary of State for Southeast Asia” with authority to cooperate closely with the GVN and supervise the activities of other American Chiefs of Mission in the area.
Regarding the first part of the proposition, i.e. the U.S. and GVN working hand in glove, I told Wolf that matters of that kind were out of my field and therefore I could not give him an indication one way or another as to what Washington’s reaction would be. I tried to make it clear as a personal opinion, however, that such an operation would be so complex, delicate, wide ranged and sensitive that I doubted whether such a matter could be worked out satisfactorily….
Regarding the second Super Chief suggestion, I told Wolf that this matter had been discussed at some length in 1955 prior to my assignment to Singapore. I stated that suggestions had been made that the American Consul General in Singapore should be given similar authority to that accorded to Rob Scott, British Commissioner General for Southeast Asia and the Australian and New Zealand Commissioners for Southeast Asia. I added after careful study it had been concluded that, under the U.S. Government and Foreign Service system, such an arrangement would not work. I pointed out that if an American Chief of Mission is known to have specific autonomous authority, those with whom he dealt would gain the impression that almost anything he said in discussion or otherwise would automatically be taken as approved U.S. policy, when of course, no matter how qualified, no U.S. Chief of Mission could have the necessary current background and world-wide picture as well as the full understanding of U.S. policies to be able to make substantive spot decisions. I added that under the present system a Chief of Mission who is known to be subject to policy guidance laid down in Washington, as well as Washington clearance on specific substantive matters, can nevertheless on occasion be quite effective in discussions and arguments by expressing his personal opinion on substantive matters and thus influencing those with whom he is talking. However, since it is well known that such personal opinions may be overruled by Washington, [Page 71] they are not taken as definitive U.S. policy or beliefs. In other words, if a Chief of Mission is not known to have some extra special authority, he can in many ways be more effective on occasion in using the personal opinion approach. In my discussion I made it clear to Wolf that I felt most certain, for the reasons I had outlined, it would not be possible to grant to any U.S. Chief of Mission the type of authority and jurisdiction Diem had suggested.
Wolf told me that the President asked him to discuss this with me as soon as possible and Diem indicated that he would take it up with me later. In view of the cold water I threw on both propositions, I doubt whether Diem will approach me on this subject.2 In any event, recently we have had several indications that Diem and Nhu are developing some grandiose ideas about their own capabilities in the counter subversion and covert operation fields. In view of these several approaches I hope that you, Jeff, and Headquarters will give us some guidance and suggestions as to how to handle this matter.
With kindest personal regards,
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 65 F 98, 320 Vietnam–Cambodia 1958 Aug–Dec. Secret; Official–Informal.↩
- According to a letter from Durbrow to Cumming, August 11, Diem did raise this issue with Durbrow on August 7. Durbrow reported that he used basically the same arguments as with Ladejinsky, but Diem urged that the United States consider seriously his proposals. Diem did not press for American cooperation in covert operations, but urged that the United States work more closely in coordinating intelligence information. If the “Super Ambassador” suggestion could not be accomplished, Diem suggested a closer cooperation among U.S. Chiefs of Mission in Southeast Asia. Durbrow assured the President that this was already the case. (Ibid.)↩
- Printed from a copy which bears this typed signature.↩