Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

263. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report¹

December 9, 1960.

COUNTRY

South Vietnam

SUBJECT

• Alternate Political Leadership for Vietnam

DATE OF INFO

November 1960

PLACE & DATE ACC.

… (3 December 1960)

SOURCE

…

Field Comment. This report was prepared primarily for the internal use of the originating organization. However, it is disseminated in the belief that the commentary may be useful to other agencies interested in the current political situation in South Vietnam. The views expressed are those of the source.

1. The abortive coup of 11–12 November against the Government of Vietnam (GVN) provides a significant point of departure for an assessment of potential alternate leadership for Vietnam. The coup eliminated certain candidates and revealed significant aspects of others. It also brought out the preeminent importance of Ngo Dinh Diem himself and the degree his presence has blocked the rise of alternatives. This inverted pyramid resting on one man, however, bears the seeds of serious difficulties in the event of his removal by death, a new coup, or an unexpected result or popular reaction to the Presidential elections of April 1961.

2. For convenience, the potential sources of alternate leadership will be discussed in six general categories below. These categories are by no means exclusive and individuals and groups placed in one often have strong ties within others. It may be expected that alliances and enmities will be formed and revised among them as the situation changes. Such alliances may prove to be the key to the success of contending figures for power.

3. One major alternative is left unsaid, the Communist Party. It can nonetheless be expected to play a very large role, both in its continuing effort to unseat the Diem regime and in any struggle for power which occurred as a result of his unexpected departure. A major problem will be the extent to which the Communists establish contact with and support competing non-Communist figures.

Army

4. As the major locus of power in Vietnam, the Army offers the most obvious potential of assuming political power in the event of the disappearance of the President. Such a development could take several forms:

a. General Le Van Ty: Assumption of power by General Ty would be highly unlikely except as an unwilling action compelled by chaos in the country. Even in such case he would not be likely to represent the real power in the situation, as he does not today within the Army itself, but would be a figurehead. There are several other generals who might also serve as such a figurehead (compare General Le Van Kim’s nomination for this role during the recent coup) but their chances of achieving this role are not great.

b. Several Generals offer the potential for real leadership of an Army-led regime. Primary among these is General Duong Van Minh, a southerner close to the Vice President, with considerable popularity within the armed forces. He would thus appear to have the necessary elements to enable him to seize and maintain power. His relative inaction during the recent coup casts some doubt on his forcefulness, but this stand may have reflected a “wait and see” position which would leave him available to assume leadership if necessary and appropriate, but not to lead an attack against the Diem government. Other leading candidates among the generals are General Nguyen Khanh, obviously a vigorous and ambitious officer of considerable capabilities as demonstrated during the coup. General Tran Van Don, well respected within the Army and apt to secure support. General Thai Quang Hoang,² who disposes a considerable force in the Saigon area and has demonstrated a vigorous approach to using it, and General Ton That Dinh,³ a field commander of considerable vigor. These figures would be the forceful type who could either as individuals or as members of a committee assume political leadership in a critical situation. There are already reports of mutual competition and antipathy among them, a natural reflection of personal ambition.

c. Other officers with political ambitions and the strength to translate these into force also exist within the Army, even though the recent action of the parachutist lieutenant colonels proved a failure. Such officers might learn from the 11 November experience and do a better job or they might prove to be of great importance in swinging the weight of their units to one or another faction contending for power. Identifying them is a difficult process, however, made no easier by the fate of the leaders of the 11 November coup.

Government Figures

5. A distinct group is represented by the figures whose major strength is their position in the GVN governmental structure. This group could be expected to cleave together to retain their positions and privileges against contenders, following the disappearance of the President. It contains a number of fairly strong figures, among them several ministers without particular political complexion, whose established reputations and technical capabilities would be helpful to the continued operation of any government in Vietnam. Thus they have a certain asset which they could utilize during a struggle for succession:

a. Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho, the first of these, represents constitutional succession and might take at least temporary power. He has indicated privately his disinclination to run for office again in 1961. This attitude has culminated a steady growth of unhappiness on his part with the small consideration he felt he has received from the President and those making major decisions. His departure would be welcomed by figures opposed to him, such as Ngo Dinh Nhu. During the coup. Vice President Tho also revealed a certain vacillation and weakness in a crisis which does not recommend him for the intense responsibilities of the Presidency, and indicates rather clearly that he would not be likely to lead an attempt to secure the post. He is nonetheless popular, especially among the southern population, and he has certain friendships within the Army.⁴ He might thus be utilized as a non-Communist front behind which a struggle for power could take place or behind which the real center of power rested. He himself would not be apt to provide the real leadership.

b. Truong Vinh Le, President of the National Assembly: constitutionally the third ranking official in the GVN, he would almost certainly offer no real challenge for power. In view of his obvious lack of color, ambition or support, it is highly unlikely that he would be anything but a complete figurehead in the unlikely event he should be thrust into office.

c. Nguyen Dinh Thuan, Secretary of State at the Presidency: a government official obviously becoming of increasing importance, but whose power stems principally from President Diem and his brother Nhu. Nonetheless Thuan is developing a considerable reputation and might be able to rally support from his key governmental position. He is clever and capable, but appears to have little independent popular appeal. As a civilian rallying point, he might offer an important service as a compromise leader, and would probably exercise well responsibilities thus assumed.

d. Other officials: A number of other officials might be characterized in more or less the same terms as Nguyen Dinh Thuan, for example, such individuals as Bui Van Luong, Tran Ngoc Lien and Nguyen Thai. None would appear to offer the potential for top leadership, but they might be of considerable value and importance in secondary positions.

e. New Institutions: Several potential, but not yet actual, centers of power exist in some of the new institutions in the course of formation. Among these might be included the political parties, the Farmers Associations, the Youth Movement, and the Women’s Movement. These are as yet shadow institutions but can be expected to gain strength over the course of time and may perhaps be in the position to exert at least some influence on the choice of leadership in Vietnam.

Ngo Family

6. The Ngo family is an institution and a power in itself and can be expected to unite to face any major challenge to its present control of the destinies of Vietnam:

a. Ngo Dinh Nhu: Ngo Dinh Nhu’s widespread unpopularity, and that of his wife, make it unlikely that he would assume power easily. The coup, however, displayed his strength and determination under I crisis and it could be expected that he would wield considerable political power through the Can Lao Party in choosing the succession to the President. He is thus a force to be reckoned with.

b. Ngo Dinh Can: As the key figure of Central Vietnam, long engaged in building a political machine there, he might retain power even in the face of the fall of his brothers in Saigon, even by secession and establishment of a separate regime. If the South fell to Communists or neutralists or an extended civil war developed there, this possibility might be far from undesirable. However, Can does not appear to offer the potential of replacing the President on a nation-wide basis, and could be expected only to act as a political boss behind the scenes.

c. Ngo Dinh Luyen: The appeal of Ngo Dinh Luyen is in great degree a result of his distance from Vietnam. In a critical situation, however, his return might rally support as did that of President Diem in 1954. He would have to have some local center of power, however, with which to ally, which at this moment does not appear to have been arranged.

Oppositionists

7. The intellectual and traditional oppositionists showed definite weaknesses during the recent coup, and a number of its leading figures tried to climb on the paratrooper bandwagon before it had demonstrated its solidity. Some have thereby effectively eliminated themselves from a political potential. Others seemed not to have any manipulable political strength which they could use to influence a crisis. Any new government, however, and particularly one weak in civilian leadership, would be likely to seek to exploit their reputations or call upon their technical abilities in the field of government, which would give them a basis for influencing the direction taken by such a government. Their use would also be a symbolic repudiation of the Diem regime, which would increase their attractiveness. A number of them also are articulate and highly political, and would no doubt seek and achieve considerable public attention in any crisis. They would also have a considerable importance with respect to the foreign community.

a. Dr. Pham Quang Dan: This primary opposition candidate to Diem has eliminated himself from the active political scene by his leap onto the paratrooper bandwagon during the coup. If he should escape and become an exile figure, he might still be of some importance. His appeal, however, seems highly demagogic in nature, supported neither by the specifics of a program nor any real organizational base. Thus he might rally considerable support initially but his ultimate direction might prove obscure and subject to the pressures of contending forces (including the Communists). He would also not appear to have the organizational ability to operate the government effectively, which would also weaken him with respect to the Communists.

b. The Caravelle Group: Dr. Phan Khac Suu is the leader and typical of the intellectual oppositionists, such as Tran Van Do, Tran Van Van, Ho Van Nhut, etc. Suu has attained considerable popularity by being the sole opposition representative within the National Assembly and demonstrated an interest in capitalizing upon this during the recent coup. He, like Dr. Dan and Hoang Co Thuy, is temporarily out of public life as a result but might return in a crisis. The other members of this group fall more or less in the same category, but are less likely to seek the leading position.

c. Dai Viets: Of the oppositionist “parties” the Dai Viets appear to be the only group with any substantial organization, in addition to their extensive traditions. They would thus have the capability of delivering some strength to a competing faction and of creating new strength in an open situation. A prime figure of this movement is Dr. Dang Van Sung who in addition to his relatively clean reputation as a Dai Viet also has been able to maintain some contact with Ngo Dinh Nhu. He could be expected to exercise his influence in the direction of moderate steps to improve the GVN but not create a chaotic situation which would be exploited by the Communists.

d. Exiles: The exiles, particularly as far away as France, would not be likely to play a very significant role. Few appear to have the organizational machinery necessary to exert political force in a crisis and nor [sic] to have the overwhelming national reputation which would lead them to be called to solve a critical problem. They would, however, undoubtedly throw their weight with one force or another in a factional struggle for power and would have a certain influence on the situation. Among the figures who might be of significance in such a case would be Buu Hoi, who could almost be characterized as an exile despite the fact that the GVN now exploits his reputation by naming him as Ambassador to Morocco; General Nguyen Van Hinh, whose name still conjures a certain magic in the minds of some Vietnamese; General Duong Van Due, who left Vietnam in December 1958 and who still retains the friendship of several high military figures; or Nguyen Bao Toan. The former Emperor, Bao Dai, would have practically no appeal and the likelihood of any other member of that family reassuming imperial power is minimal.

e. “Has-beens:” There are a number of “has-beens” both in Vietnam and abroad, former ministers and men of similar significance. None appear to have any substantial political power. They could be expected to do little more than lend their names to one or more factions struggling for position. Among these would be ex-Prime Minister Nguyen Van Tarn, Tran Van Huu, Bui Luong, former head of the CVTC, Tran Van Lam, and others.

Can Lao Factions

8. The Can Lao, although probably exaggerated as a well-organized and coordinated force, nonetheless includes many of the revolutionary and vital political elements of the country. Even were the Can Lao to be proscribed, it would be reasonable to expect many of these figures to continue to be prominent on the political scene, although not as contenders for the top position. It may be loosely divided into the following factions:

a. “Young Turks:” This group is an informal collection of younger figures, such as Dang Due Khoi, Tran Van Dinh or Ton That Thien. To date the mentor of the group has been Ngo Dinh Nhu but there are some indications that the group is assuming a status of its own, perhaps under Nhu’s over-all aegis but with certain ideas of independence picked up from their cosmopolitan experiences. This group also has some access to the secret services of the GVN and could be expected to try to manipulate these to strengthen their position in any crisis.

b. Labor: The Can Lao labor faction is led by Tran Quoc Buu, who has close associations with Minister of Agriculture Le Van Dong. Buu controls the most significant independent political force in Vietnam, the trade unions, and could be expected to utilize them in any struggle for power, although on 11 November he assertedly used his influence to hold his unions in check. Dong, a southerner well known in the country and with considerable ambition, has associated himself closely with Buu and might provide the political front behind which Buu’s labor movement could move. Combined with a strong military figure, this could be formidable ensemble.

c. Central Vietnam Group: A group of younger officials and deputies have a loose association stemming from a common origin in Central Vietnam. They maintain an over-all connection with Ngo Dinh Can, but there is some doubt as to whether he fully controls their activities. As individuals or as a group they could expect to wield some influence in a critical situation. Among the figures involved in this group, which rather strongly opposes certain of the other Can Lao factions, are Vo Van Hai, Do Cao Minh, Ngo Khac Tinh, and Lieutenant Colonel Le Quang Tung.

d. Tran Kim Tuyen: Through his position in the Palace as Nhu’s alter ego, Tuyen has built a series of relationships, especially in some of the key governmental offices, which would allow him to dispose of considerable power in a crisis, in addition to that offered by his SEPES organization. His colleagues include such figures as Tran Van Tho, Colonel Nguyen Van Chau and Cao Xuan Vy.

e. Others: Other and smaller Can Lao factions exist and might have some influence, although they would not offer high leadership. Among these are that of Huynh Van Lang, Tran Van Trai⁵ and possibly Colonel Do Mau.

Other Groups

9. Certain other groups might exert some influence in a critical situation, although they are not themselves apt to possess sufficient power to achieve national leadership. Among these might be:

a. The sects: The remnants of the sects as time goes by become increasingly weak and disorganized. Nonetheless there is a certain appeal and there is a certain organizational base which could be exploited in a critical situation. Of the sects, probably the Hoa Hao is the strongest followed by the Cao Dai. Both of these have certain contacts with exile figures in Cambodia and France. The Binh Xuyen is not expected to be more than a countryside bandit group.

b. Catholics: The Catholics offer a better organizational base than the sects. Due to their own discipline and their hierarchy’s position, however, they would not be apt to exert all their force in an internal struggle not directly aimed at the Communists. Various Catholic figures, such as Nguyen Van Can, are now endeavoring to build the elements of political-religious movements which would give the Catholics some means of exerting influence in a crisis. These would not be apt to be able to provide national leadership by themselves but would be expected to throw their weight to one or another of the major factions.

Conclusions:

10. This review has shown the existence of a number of factions which could be expected to engage in a struggle for power. The disappearance of President Diem could therefore be expected to be followed by an interregnum, during which this struggle would take place. His natural or even violent death, if not associated with a coup, would probably see an initial assumption of office by the constitutional successor, the Vice President. The latter’s basic weaknesses, however, would be likely to lead to the transference of actual power to some other figure who could acquire Army support or benevolent neutrality, either a vigorous military officer or a strong political figure. The development along one or other of these lines would probably be determined by the alliances made during the critical period among the factions listed above. Most serious result of this interregnum would be a probable diminution of the momentum of the government’s development programs and a reduction of the intensity of its fight against the Communists. The Communists could thus be expected to gain strength during such an interregnum and might themselves begin to exert a direct influence on the struggle among the factions. In the case of an extended interregnum, therefore, the eventual direction of the country’s policies would be hard to predict.

11. The continued domination of the Vietnamese scene by President Diem makes it difficult for alternate leadership to appear through constitutional processes. The GVN’s asserted plans for major reorganization of its structure and the introduction of new and more vigorous personnel may offer some amelioration of this situation, however. The success or failure of the GVN’s fight against the Communists during the coming months might also bring out new leaders and new forces.

12. Should the war against the Communists go badly, and increased discontent arise with Diem’s leadership of the GVN, a new effort to replace Diem might take place. Aside from the ever-present possibility of a junior officers revolt such as the 11 November attempt, it would appear that the most likely source of a serious effort would be one or more of the leading Generals of the Army, either as a purely military action or associated with oppositionist civilians. A second possibility would be one of the Can Lao factions, particularly; the Labor-Dong group, provided it could secure military support. The key to the success of such a coup would be the breadth of the alliances it made among the groups reviewed above, failing which it would be apt to suffer the fate of the 11 November attempt, or merely create a chaotic situation for Communist exploitation. In any case, it is clear that the constitutionally required Presidential election of April 1961 presents a critical date in the history of the GVN. This election could conceivably result in the legal or semi-legal unseating of Diem or, on the other hand, popular revulsion with a sham election leading to another attempt at his violent overthrow.

1. Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 65 F 115, Internal Security (Durbrow démarche). Confidential; Noforn; Continued Control.
2. The following note appears at this point in the margin of the source text, in what is apparently Mendenhall’s hand: “Isn’t he too much of a Diem and Party man. I have had the impression for a long time that other officers don’t like him.”
3. The following note appears at this point in the margin of the source text in the same hand: “Also a party man?”
4. The following note appears at this point in the margin in the same hand: “But we might want to back him strongly if he had initial Army backing, Minh or Kim or Don.”
5. The following note in Durbrow’s hand appears on the source text at this point: “More of a polly [?] and demagog than most. E.D.”