223. Notes of a Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Irwin) and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant), Washington, November 11, 1960, 2:15 p.m.1
Mr. Irwin said he was calling about Saigon. There were some thoughts expressed in Defense as to the contacts that could be possible and things that could be said by the military there to this new military group which had some fairly close relations with some of our people and the fact that it might come more acceptably from them than from another source. Defense wanted to discuss the advisability of this and what, if anything, should be said.
Mr. Merchant said he felt the thing to do was for our military in Saigon to follow the Ambassador’s guidance. It is still a terribly confused situation. State has put out a press statement here to the general effect that we did not believe that the action was communist-inspired, that we deplored disturbance and bloodshed in a friendly country particularly one bordering the communist world, and that we hoped for an early restoration of peace, order, and stability. The Department approved the line that Ambassador Durbrow has been taking. It is a little early to sort out any particular approach. A very considerable degree of discretion has to be left in the hands of the Ambassador. Did Defense have any particular ideas as to the line-up forces?
No, replied Mr. Irwin, but it was felt that if there were high-ranking people there, what should they say. Admiral Felt, who is enroute to Bangkok, might usefully stop there.
Mr. Merchant said he thought it would be far better for him to stay out.
Mr. Irwin said one view in Defense was that it would be better for him to go there, in which case, what should be said and to whom.
Mr. Merchant said his own view is that we have to operate on general principles in this confused and rapidly changing situation. We have to leave it up to the political judgment of the Ambassador to use his instruments as seems best. Mr. Merchant himself would be opposed to have CINCPAC in that country at this particular time unless it was decided that there was some particular point we wanted to get across. For the moment we want to sit fairly tight and watch developments. Mr. Irwin asked what line Durbrow was taking.
[Page 641]Mr. Merchant replied that essentially it was that no one can profit from a civil war except the communists and anything done to humiliate or downgrade a man of Diem’s stature is not going to help.
Mr. Irwin said some things may depend on the attitude of the particular military toward not only the U.S. but toward the Embassy or MAAG.
Mr. Merchant said he had not, of course, seen all the traffic regarding the coup but he has read about 40 telegrams so far, and from his own reading no anti-American attitude was noted and the general principles on which they are operating seem pretty good. But as far as personalities are concerned, it’s still confused. He did feel strongly that this was no time to have an officer of Admiral Felt’s position and rank going into the country. He hoped that Defense would check this out with State.
Mr. Irwin said naturally they would check it out and he would keep in touch with Jeff’s area2 and check out with them if they have anything specific in mind.
Mr. Merchant continued that he thought we must give latitude to the man in charge on the spot and let him play the cards in this rather confused initial stage.
Mr. Merchant then asked if Mr. Irwin had had the latest word on the jets for Cambodia and Mr. Irwin said that he had heard from Mr. Gates that the President said to go ahead.
The conversation closed with Mr. Merchant stating we would keep in touch with Defense and asking that Defense keep in touch with Mr. Parsons on the Saigon matter.