Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

219. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, November 11, 1960—5 p.m.

1019. Secretary of State for Presidency Thuan phoned me at 1410 that armor en route from My Tho has already arrived Phu Lam and two battalions will also arrive here from My Tho in half hour. He said Seventh Division Troops from Bien Hoa have arrived at Ben Loi bridge en route Saigon.

I asked Thuan whether intention was to use these troops try to relieve Presidential Palace. Thuan replied he thought so and asked whether I considered this good idea. I told him that I hoped that Revolutionary Committee and President Diem could get together and agree to cooperate as Civil War could only benefit Communists. I added I hoped committee would not have too unreasonable demands so that they and President could get together. I repeated this line two or three times to Thuan.

I also told him that we had report that Diem had asked for entry U.S. Marines through Father De Jaegher. I told him Marines could not be sent in as they are not near here and their entry would require Washington decisions. I suggested he get word to Diem that we would not bring in Marines.

We talked again with Thuan at 1440 who had received report at this time from Ngo Dinh Nhu about negotiations in progress at Presidential Palace between Diem and Revolutionary Committee.

This committee, according Thuan’s information, consists of Hoang Co Thuy and some paratroopers whom he did not identify. He said certain paratrooper representatives of committee carrying on negotiations with Diem. Nhu states Diem is seeking moderate solution and that is reason he directed troops not to fire on attackers.

According Thuan, Nhu told him Revolutionary Committee is demanding that Diem become “supreme adviser” (apparently an honorary title without executive authority). Thuy and paratroopers would constitute cabinet. According to Nhu, if solution proposed by committee prevails “military regions” would not accept it. Nhu told Thuan committee is trying get in touch with McGarr and me and Nhu thinks we should urge committee agree retain Diem as President because of his great prestige.

I told Thuan committee not in touch with me. I said there was no change in U.S. position that Diem is President. I said Diem and committee should try arrive at strong compromise as possible to oppose VC in view necessity confronting them with unified front. I indicated if one side or other has to make some concessions in order reach agreement I believed that desirable in order ensure unity against Communists.

Thuan phoned again at 1450 to say he had relayed my position to Nhu and Nhu urged that I take steps to get in touch with committee and ask it keep Diem as President because of his prestige. He said only demand committee has made was that Diem become “supreme adviser”. I said if committee gets in touch with me I will find out what its demands are and said I continued feel strong [strongly] compromise desirable.

At 1500 General McGarr phoned me that Revolutionary Committee and press representatives were at his home and he wanted to know what line he should take with them. I told him to impress following on revolutionary group. We hope revolutionaries will keep President Diem in active role because of his prestige both in Viet-Nam and abroad. Beyond that, we cannot give them any advice, and their problems must be worked out by them. However, we strongly support united stand against Communists. I emphasized McCarr should not talk to the revolutionaries in presence of press representatives who had accompanied Revolutionary Committee representatives to McCarr’s house, and suggested conversations in separate room. This is interim report.² More to follow.³

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11–1160. Secret; Niact. Received at 7:22 a.m. Also sent niact to Manila for Felt and CINCPAC niact for PolAd. Passed to OSD and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force.

2. The Department of State responded to this report in telegram 774 to Saigon, November 11, 3:58 p.m., as follows:

   “While coup evidently aimed particularly at Diem entourage, would hope Vice President Tho who has not been closely associated with activities Diem and his family could continue play important role GVN regardless status Diem. Tho’s experience and knowledge of current government problems would seem be extremely useful in maintaining legality and continuity of government. Believe he respected and trusted by ARVN.” (Ibid.)

3. Document 221.