Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

190. Paper Prepared by the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam¹

undated

ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN STABILITY OF GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

I. General Concept

A. Nature of the Threat.

The threat to the stability of the Diem Government in Vietnam has increased, paradoxically, after five years of slow but steady growth of this new Republic. After weathering the storms of partition of the country, the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of refugees, the subjugation of dissident religious sects and the rebuilding of a shattered economy, the government of President Ngo Dinh finds itself facing a serious crisis in its efforts to insure the security of the people against internal insurgency while at the same time, maintaining a posture of deterrence to external aggression.

The threat is not entirely military, although the depredations of the armed communist rebels have, in fact, increased despite the steadily increasing capability and effectiveness of the armed forces. Adverse political forces, both communist and non-communist, are also at work to undermine and discredit the government, whose own political machinations are not above reproach. Despite the growth of the economy of the country, as reflected through increased light industry and rapidly expanding exports, the economic status of the peasant is not much improved over what it was under French colonialism. From the psychological point of view the government has accomplished too little to insure the maintenance of support of a populace harassed by communist coercion and violence.

B. Proposed Actions.

In the considered opinion of MAAG, Vietnam, the actions necessary to meet and overcome the threat to the stability of the government encompass the fields of military, political, economic, psychological and sociological matters.

From the military point of view the two primary weaknesses to be overcome are the lack of effectiveness of the para-military security forces of Vietnam, and the lack of the desired capability of the armed forces. This latter weakness stems from the prolonged commitment of ARVN to security operations, which has prevented the degree of training required to further increase their effectiveness. Actions proposed by MAAG are designed to overcome these weaknesses and to provide the capability for decisive, continuing coordinated action against the Viet Cong, while at the same time improving the posture for defense against external attack.

Politically, further action is required to induce President Diem to eliminate corruption, nepotism and inefficiency in the government.

Actions taken by the U.S. in the economic and cultural fields, although increasingly effective, need further improvement–especially to raise the economic level so as to improve the conditions of the lower class laborers and farmers.

The effectiveness of all of the above course of action, however, will be considerably diminished, if not cancelled, unless strong, coordinated psychological measures are adopted–measures which will strengthen the desire, will and determination of the people to resist penetration and subversion and gain their active support of the Diem government.

II. Specific Courses Of Action.

A. For the U.S. Department of Defense.

1. Security Forces—Civil Guard.

a. Mission It is proposed that the mission of the 54,000 man Civil Guard (civil police functions, static security and offensive actions against Viet Cong) be continued. It is recommended, however, that the Civil Guard take over from the military all static security functions which now constitute a serious drain on the regular armed forces and signficantly diminish their capability for effective pacification operations, training and combat readiness.

b. Organization. It is recommended that the Civil Guard be placed under the Vietnamese Department of Defense for both training and operations. Placement under VN DOD is proposed only until the security situation has been stabilized and the Viet Cong has been defeated. After this time, the Civil Guard should revert to its role as a National Police force under the Interior Department. This course of action is known to be favored by President Diem who has long opposed the US insistence on placing the Civil Guard under the Interior Department. Such placement will result in improved training, improved logistical support and essential effective coordination of the efforts of the Civil Guard and the armed forces. Under this concept Civil Guard units will be employed under the direction of regional military commanders. Studies should be made to determine the feasibility of improving the pay structure of the Civil Guard to place them on a more nearly equal footing with ARVN. One possibility would be the payment of a special allowance when Civil Guard units are engaged in military operations.²

c. Training. It is recommended that responsibility for supervision of, and assistance and advice in, training be placed on MAAG, Vietnam. Initially, US personnel under MAAG will conduct actual instruction, adopting and expanding the program of anti-guerrilla training recently outlined by USOM. Under this program, 50 US personnel will conduct training at several training sites, concentrating their efforts on the training of Civil Guard instructors who would in turn, continue the training of Civil Guard companies. To the extent possible, existing training sites of ARVN as well as of the Civil Guard would be used. Because of the long lead time to obtain civilian trainers, previously proposed by USOM, it is recommended that 40 specially qualified US military personnel be provided to supplement the 10 civilian trainers already due in country under the USOM program. US Special Forces trainers already in country could possibly be retained and utilized to fill a part of this requirement.

Civil Guard personnel who lack adequate basic training would be trained in regular ARVN basic training centers.

In anti-guerrilla training of Civil Guard, special emphasis would be placed on psychological training aimed at improving the patriotism and motivation of the individual, while at the same time stressing the importance of gaining the enthusiastic support of the people in the areas in which the Civil Guard operates.

Training for specialists, such as radio operators, would be provided by quotas at regular ARVN specialist schools.

Upon completion of the training of a sufficient number of Civil Guard instructors at the anti-guerrilla training sites to continue the instruction of Civil Guard companies on an expedited basis, MAAG instructors would revert to normal advisory duties. Field advisory detachments of MAAG would provide the same advice and assistance to the Civil Guard units in the field as they now do for ARVN.

By judicious redistribution of advisory effort and concentration on only the most vital aspects of training advice, it is considered that MAAG can absorb the additional burden of Civil Guard training within its present strength ceiling. It is emphasized, however, that certain functions of MAAG would have to be curtailed and the scope of certain MAAG activities reduced. The proposed program can only be implemented if the MAAG strength is maintained at its current level.

d. Equipment. It is recommended that the Civil Guard be equipped with US type small arms and ammunition identical to that used by the regular armed forces, and with adequate and suitable individual clothing and equipment comparable to ARVN’s. More effective and timely communications equipment must be provided either from US military stocks or by continuing USOM action to procure radio equipment—provided such equipment is capable of netting with ARVN equipment. Adequate transportation must also be made available. It is proposed that initially the 3/4 ton trucks rendered excess by ARVN’s vehicle exchange program will be turned over to Civil Guard.

e. Supply and Maintenance. Civil Guard units would be supported by ARVN supply and maintenance installations and facilities in the same way as regular VN armed forces. Food and other items not provided by the US would be provided by ARVN, with reimbursement of the military budget from the VN national budget.

f. Budgetary Support. Budgetary support for US furnished equipment as enumerated above, would be provided by Department-level transfer of funds from ICA/W to DOD. Equipment would then be programmed, procured and delivered through normal MAP channels.

2. Force Basis—Regular Military Forces

a. Rangers. It is recommended that the present Ranger force of 9,800 be retained as a permanent part of the force basis and that an additional 5,000 rangers be added to the force basis. Ranger operations to date have been on the whole very encouraging. The increase in Viet Cong activities to the west and north of Saigon since the Ranger force was formed, however, and the requirement for increased surveillance of borders and sea coast to prevent infiltration of VC and their resupply, establishes the need for this increase. Furthermore, the Rangers will in the near future encounter the same problems as the regular forces resulting from prolonged operational commitment, and the increase will permit necessary rotation, rest, and retraining of Ranger units. This force should receive MAP and DS budgetary support.

b. Army. To improve the training of the Army and to insure its readiness to resist external aggression, it is essential that four of the seven infantry divisions of ARVN be left intact in the center and north of the country—two in the vicinity of the 17th parallel and two on the high plateau. These four divisions, relieved of static security missions by the Civil Guard and of operational commitment, would then be permitted to undergo greatly needed training. It is also essential to retrain the Marine Corps Group at its station on the coast and place it in reserve. At present, the equivalent of three regiments of these four divisions are and have long been committed to combat operations. This is also true of two battalions of the Marine Corps Group and major portions of the three other infantry divisions and airborne brigade. The number of troops currently on pacification operations cannot be reduced. Therefore, to reconstitute the four divisions and Marine Corps Group in training and reserve, it is necessary to increase the force level of ARVN by the equivalent of the three regiments and two battalions now engaged in operations. This will require the addition of 10,000 spaces to the existing force basis.

When the above is accomplished and the four divisions have been adequately retrained, a system of rotation will be established. This will be accomplished by committing freshly trained units to operations and withdrawing their equivalents from operations to reserve and retraining.

In addition to the 10,000 regular army and 5,000 Ranger spaces required above, an estimated 5,000 additional support troops will be needed to expand ARVN’s facilities for the supply and maintenance of the Civil Guard and of the 15,000 additional regular army forces.

The force level will therefore have to be raised to approximately 170,000. This proposed increase in force level should be considered temporary. After stabilization of the security situation, the force level should be reexamined and consideration be given to reduction to the present level of 150,000.

c. Air Force. An urgent need exists for the establishment, equipping and training of a Joint Operations Center to provide adequate control over close ground support. While no additional personnel will be required for this function, necessary equipment and technical assistance must be provided.

Additional helicopter capability is badly needed and could best be provided by replacement of the 15 H–19 helicopters by H–34’s. This is an urgent requirement which must be met at the earliest possible date. If H–34’s cannot be provided within less than a year, it is proposed that an additional squadron of 9 H–19 helicopters, programmed for later years, be advanced in the program and activated without delay.

Additional transport and liaison-type aircraft cannot be justified at this time due to the current utilization rate, which although rising, does not justify additional aircraft. If utilization of transport aircraft continues to increase sufficiently, it is proposed that the existing two squadrons of C–47’s be converted to squadrons of C–123, rather than increasing the number of squadrons.

d. Navy. No increase in Navy can be justified or supported at this time except for the establishment of the second River Group. This will require an increase of 400 personnel which can be absorbed if the force basis is raised to 170,000.

3. MAP Support. To support the above efforts, an increase in MAP funding will be required, particularly in the following areas:

a. Initial equipping and maintenance of additional 20,000 troops.

b. Additional ammunition and explosives to support intensified ARVN training.

c. Additional gasoline to support unit rotation and training of Civil Guard.

d. Training of additional helicopter pilots in event a new squadron of H–19’s is activated. No out-of-country training will be required for transition from H–19 to H–34.

B. For Inter-Agency Action.

1. Budgetary support. Of primary importance psychologically as well as from the standpoint of military preparedness, the policy of basing the size of the economic aid program on the balance of payments should be temporarily suspended. At this time of serious crisis in Vietnam, together with costs of the military program, the US has advised GVN of a drastic reduction in aid with a consequent requirement for considerably greater GVN contributions. This has created a feeling of partial abandonment within the Vietnamese who are, in general, believed to be sincerely striving to safeguard their freedom. In addition to a shortage of funds in the 1960 military budget, the GVN is faced with the requirement of increasing its contribution to the military budget from about 520 million piasters in 1960 to nearly 1.4 billion piasters in 1961, based on present plans. In addition, the actions proposed herein, particularly the increase in force level, will raise the 1961 budget significantly. It is recommended that the GVN contribution be increased within its capability to pay, but that the US be prepared to provide additional DS aid in the minimum amount of 1.75 billion piasters in FY 1961. The exact amount required can be accurately forecast only after comprehensive and detailed study of the impact of the above proposals. This is in addition to additional MAP support, from MAP or by interagency transfer to DOD, in amounts not yet determined.

2. Other actions. Of course, Chief MAAG is of the considered opinion that the solution to the overall security problem in VN does not lie in military action alone. Improvements in the field of politics, economics, sociology and psychology, as they mutually affect each other and the military program, are vitally needed. Specifically, the following action is recommended:

Upon approval of courses of action substantially in accordance with the above, representation be made to President Diem from the highest levels of our government. It is suggested that the Secretary of State discuss personally with President Diem the fact that the US stands firmly behind him, that the US is willing to demonstrate this position by increased aid as recommended above, but that the US expects and demands the following:

a. Continued efforts to reduce the public belief of harmful family influence in the government.

b. Reorganization, overtly, of the Can Lao party or its dissolution.

c. Continued efforts to reduce public belief that favoritism and corruption exist. This includes the belief that military promotions are made on other than on a merit basis.

d. Establishment of a centralized agency for coordination of all security efforts, to include military, political, economic, psychological and sociological. This is a matter of greatest urgency.

e. Under policy direction of the above central agency, the decentralization of military and other governmental activities to appropriate action agencies or departments.

f. Intensification of psychological measures to win support of the people.

g. Establishment of a centralized intelligence agency to coordinate the intelligence activities of the several branches of government. There are indications recently that this step may take place.

h. Measures to strengthen loyalty of Youth Groups by increased pay and perhaps by using them to replace the Self Defense Corps.

i. Extensive and broad measures to encourage careful relaxation of restrictions on individual liberty, extensions of popular representation in government, education of civil servants, and the like.

1. Source: Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 65 F 115, 350 International Political Affairs, Vietnam–GVN 1960. Secret. Drafted on September 2, discussed at a country team meeting on September 4, and revised in light of that discussion. This is apparently the version of September 4, as revised after the meeting.
2. The following note is written in an unknown hand on the source text: “Study but don’t act till thing gets rolling, if ever.”