Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

187. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, August 30, 1960—6 p.m.

495. Our tels 432 and 455 and our G–48, G–58, G–66 and G–82.² Reftels, refairs and other reports indicate among other things that there are now about 5,000 Viet Cong in armed units in South Viet-Nam despite GVN’s claim of having killed 2,000 VC during first six months 1960. GVN admitted losses during same period were 1,339 (of which 260 Civil Guard and 155 armed forces) compared with 793 for previous entire two years. Steady increase in intensity and areas of operations of armed groups during last six months has caused some decline in govt control in certain areas. VC also attempting disrupt economic progress by pressure on rubber plantations, and interference with rice coming from Delta. VC attempts terrorist activities have spread to Saigon itself. It thus now quite clear we are in for prolonged battle with Communist guerrillas with survival Free Viet-Nam at stake. This coupled with growing restiveness various anti-Communist Vietnamese groups, and prospect long unstable conditions Laos, no matter outcome present developments there, make it evident it essential back up our investment here by reinforce assistance to Diem, who is only dedicated anti-Communist nationalist leader in sight. Despite his shortcomings he has recently taken useful steps we’ve been urging on him for long time (G–79³).

Since large proportion ARVN now committed to operations against VC there is urgent need to beef up Civil Guard training and make it better qualified to assist ARVN operations and give protection to rural populations pacified areas. It therefore very much our interest make available more U.S. trainers soonest for CG. Diem and Thuan have asked recently on urgent basis that we make available 100 U.S. trainers for CG with emphasis on ranger training (our G–83 and G–53⁴). They have made it clear have swallowed pride and seek U.S. trainers for CG to act as full-fledged trainers rather than advisors.

Although GVN asked for 100 trainers, we believe 50 is practicable maximum at present. For reasons given above believe it imperative ICA make extraordinary effort obtain soonest additional 40 above 10 now en route. It is necessary to improve CG basic capabilities which, to extent availability training personnel and other practical considerations permit, can be done more efficaciously with Americans in charge and working with trainees on face-to-face basis. Some CG’s are undoubtedly already qualified to absorb considerable ranger training. In view of these considerations we need as trainers well-qualified young personnel (1) who can step up basic and advanced individual training of those CG units which have not received such training, and (2) some of whom can give ranger training to those CG’s already qualified absorb such training.

Basic USOM plan is geared to best counter-guerrilla training possible under circumstances for 208 Civil Guard companies (26,000 men) in little less than two years beginning September 1960. Realization of this objective requires, after initial CG instructor training cycle, that 16 companies be continuous under instruction. USOM anticipates utilization of four training locations with four companies at each. Forty additional trainers would be divided ten to each training location, thus achieving effective results of close, personalized training needed and desired by GVN which could not be attained by thinly-spread original ten-man team now en route. Since that team consists or various specialists (demolition, psywar, weapons, survival, etc.), they will, after initial CG instructor-training cycle, be rotated from one training location to another. (For initial training cycle ten-man team would train CG who will subsequently serve as assistant instructors to U.S. instructors.)

In view of urgency of getting this program under way strongly recommend Department and ICA obtain DOD concurrence to retain after scheduled departure October 1 ten-man special forces team now training ARVN to accelerate training of Civil Guard trainers. Without special forces team initial ICA ten-man team would have to engage in two training cycles for Civil Guard trainers, thus delaying for two months getting trained Civil Guard units into field for action. While it is recognized that special forces team may well have greater capabilities than necessary for regular CG training, it should be noted team will be retained for training of CG counter-guerrilla trainers. While I realize extension of special forces team means continued temporary use by that team of spaces within MAAG ceiling, I am convinced this will do no real harm to MAAG’s mission for training ARVN since increased number ARVN units assigned to operations means fewer units remaining for MAAG training activities. Team is here and can therefore expedite training Civil Guard before dry season in full swing when VC activities expected to be stepped-up further. Moreover, with VN presidential elections scheduled April 1961 imperative have adequate internal security forces to control VC efforts to disrupt elections. Assuming extra 40 trainers could be here by end year extended TDY special forces team would be not longer than two months.

In view need have well-qualified young trainers who should not be accompanied by dependents and who could meet rugged requirements in field training following recruitment suggestion offered: it would seem possible ICA offer civilian contracts to personnel about to be released from U.S. Army special forces or platoon leaders from Army/Marine Corps who have had recent field service with rifle platoons or comparable units in reconnaissance, rangers, pathfinders or paratroopers. In view importance get well-qualified personnel assume Dept, Army and USMC would be willing assist choosing and recruiting personnel from platoon leaders being released. Since these personnel would have true civilian status, MAAG ceiling problem would not arise and any ICC questions could be easily handled.

In order prevent delay implementation this emergency training plan special logistics arrangements required. Pouching requirements.

While I realize these requests will require cutting large amount red tape, I believe growing Communist guerrilla threat to survival of government of Free Viet-Nam warrants most serious effort.

Gardiner and General Williams concur.

Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/8–3060. Secret. Repeated for information to CINCPAC for PolAd.
2. Dated August 22, 24, 8, 13, 18, and 26, respectively. (Ibid., 751K.00/8–2260, 751K.00/8–2460, 751K.00/8–860, 751K.00/8–1360, 751K.00/8–1860, and 751K.00/8–2660, respectively)
3. In this airgram, August 25, the Embassy reported that in response to American pressure the Diem government had made important strides in fields of politics, security, relations with Cambodia, and economics. In the political arena, the Embassy reported that Diem was endeavoring to present himself as a “man of the people” by giving a series of friendly and intimate talks to various Vietnamese groups. The Embassy also detected in Diem the realization that the policy of force-draft labor for construction of agrovilles was causing discontent and that a corresponding shift by the government to reliance on volunteer labor was required. The Embassy was encouraged by Diem’s growing personal interest in correcting corruption. In security matters the Embassy reported three main bright spots of the Diem government: centralization of military command of security forces in the Mekong Delta, new acceptance and interest by the Vietnamese in anti-guerrilla training for ARVN and the Civil Guard, and an expressed interest in centralizing intelligence functions and services in Vietnam. In its relations with Cambodia, Vietnam had in the Embassy’s opinion been conciliatory and non-provocative. Finally, in the economic field the Embassy noted that Diem’s government had raised taxes and prices to generate more revenue. The Embassy added the following concluding comment:

   “While we shall keep pushing GVN, we believe it is important to keep matters in balance and recognize steps GVN has already taken as outlined above. GVN officials are aware they have responded favorably to many of our demands, and have indicated we should not expect them to do everything at once, especially in present emergency arising from their fight with Vietnamese Communists (violence in Saigon itself almost occurred past weekend—our telegram 432). If we demand too much at once, we could provoke strong reaction and might undo some of progress already achieved.” (Ibid., 751K.00/8–2560)

4. Dated August 12 and 26. (Ibid., 751K.00/8–1260 and 751K.00/8–2650)