Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

18. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, June 7, 1958.

SUBJECT

• MAAG and TERM Problems in Viet-Nam

Problem

In view of our affirmations to the British, Canadian, French, and Indian Governments about adherence to a 342-man MAAG ceiling in Viet-Nam, how can we resolve the TERM problem in Viet-Nam as well as meet expanded military training requirements?

Discussion

MAAG Ceiling. In 1954 you affirmed to Eden that we had no intention of increasing the MAAG beyond the level (342) obtaining when the Geneva agreement was signed. You also said that this would require the continuing use of French military personnel for training the Vietnamese (Paris Secto 11, Dec. 17, 1954—Tab A²). Affirmation of adherence to the 342-man ceiling was subsequently made from time to time to the Canadian, French, and Indian Governments either directly or indirectly through the ICC.

TERM. In early 1956, we established a 350-man military Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) in Viet-Nam. Its primary purpose was to salvage excess equipment which had been furnished to the French forces in Viet-Nam. A subsidiary purpose was to provide logistical training to the Vietnamese army. The British, Canadian, French, and Indian Governments as well as the ICC were informed only of the primary purpose in our efforts to obtain their concurrence to establishment of this additional mission under the then tense political situation relating to the ICC and Viet-Nam. (Deptels 2705,³ 2790,⁴ and 290⁵ to Saigon, Feb. 9, 15, and 25, 1956; Deptel 2409⁶ to New Delhi, March 28, 1956—Tab B).

Subsequently, however, as equipment recovery declined in volume and the need for additional training personnel grew, training became the function of the bulk of TERM personnel. For some time now only a handful of TERM personnel has been engaged in the original mission of equipment salvage. Practically, the duties of most TERM personnel are indistinguishable from those of the MAAG personnel. Nevertheless, in response to embarrassing ICC questions, Ambassador Durbrow has consistently stated that TERM remains engaged in its salvage mission, and must continue to do so until the job is completed.

Military Personnel on Embassy Roster. In 1957, the Vietnamese Government asked the United States to take over the air force and naval training functions of the French who had been asked to leave. To assist in accommodating this request, 44 military personnel engaged in housekeeping functions were shifted to the Embassy’s roll. This makeshift enabled total military personnel to be increased from the 692 in MAAG and TERM to 736.

Need to Abolish MAAG Ceiling. Abolition of the 342-man MAAG ceiling would enable legitimization of TERM personnel as well as provide flexibility to meet expanded military training requirements.

We would envisage the following gradual solution for the TERM problem to avoid too transparent an operation: As personnel now on the TERM roster complete their tours of duty, they would not be replaced directly. However, new personnel would be added to the MAAG roster for all TERM personnel engaged in training functions (i.e., all but a handful).

Net additional training personnel is justified by the following factors:

1. Withdrawal of French Training Personnel. Experience during the year since the withdrawal of the French air and naval training missions and of certain French instructors in army schools has shown that the U.S. cannot adequately meet the Vietnamese Government’s training requirements in these fields within the MAAG ceiling. While there is no intention of assisting Viet-Nam to build up a large navy or air force, it is not possible for us to carry on air and naval training effectively with the present number of personnel. Out of a total of 736 military, we have at present 148 on the MAAG and TERM rosters involved in air and naval training and administrative support functions, compared to the approximately 284 French engaged in air and naval training functions in 1956 plus an unknown number of French engaged in administrative support at that time.

2. Additional Logistic Training. While the basic training of the Vietnamese army has made steady progress, it has been learned from actual exercises and maneuvers that Vietnamese army personnel has little understanding of essential logistic support. Therefore, considerable additional logistic training has been found necessary. The problem becomes more important as additional replacement matériel arrives in the country.

3. Troop Shifts to Training. Vietnamese troops now ready for training after previous diversion to pacification work have also increased the need for additional MAAG personnel if Viet-Nam is to create an effective deterrent of 150,000 men, the present force level.

4. Reserve Program. When the reserve program is established, additional MAAG personnel requirements may result from the training of reservists. This, however, should enable an eventual reduction of the over-all Vietnamese force levels.

Total Number of Personnel. We do not anticipate that the total number of U.S. military personnel in Viet-Nam will rise above 800 compared with the present 736.

Legality Under the Geneva Agreements. This increase would be insignificant compared with the nearly 200,000 French troops withdrawn since the armistice, and would, of course, not raise the military potential of South Viet-Nam over that of the French Expeditionary Corps at the time of the armistice. We, therefore, are of the view that the slight increase in our military personnel can be considered as consistent with Article 16 of the Geneva agreement which prohibits the introduction “of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel” (underlining added⁷). FYI. The Legal Adviser’s Office has taken the position that this interpretation of Article 16 to permit the substitution of U.S. training personnel for departed French personnel is of equal force with any other interpretation of this obscure article. FYI.

Proposed Course of Action

Since any action regarding abolition of the MAAG ceiling will require approaches to the British, Canadian, French, and Indian Governments, we should tell all four governments:

1. Changed conditions require additional MAAG personnel for training purposes. The U.S. has assumed responsibility for the training of Vietnamese troops, whose mission is to help defend that country against armed aggression and Communist subversion. It has become impossible for the U.S. to carry out satisfactorily its responsibility with the present personnel available. Additional personnel, therefore, are urgently needed and must be provided.

2. We shall begin phasing out TERM as its salvage work is completed.

3. Additions to the MAAG will be handled in such a way that the total number of American military personnel in Viet-Nam will at no time be materially larger than the present number.

Some of the four governments to be consulted may suspect that part of the TERM personnel are already engaged in training, and may charge us with bad faith in our original presentation of TERM to them. If such a charge is raised, it would probably be by the French or Indian governments. We would have to meet it by maintaining our original position about TERM’s salvage mission, as we have consistently done to date.

Recommendation

1. That, in view of your affirmation to Eden about adherence to the MAAG ceiling, you raise abolition of the ceiling with Prime Minister Macmillan along the lines recommended above.

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, MAAG–TERM. Secret. Drafted by Mendenhall with clearances from SEA, L/FE, EUR/BNA, Department of Defense, and Murphy. In a letter to Durbrow, June 10, Kocher described the drafting and action taken by the Secretary on this memorandum as follows:

   “Attached for your information is a copy of a memorandum which Mr. Robertson sent to the Secretary on June 7, 1958, with regard to the MAAG and TERM problems in Viet-Nam. This memorandum underwent many vicissitudes and changes following the draft which you saw while you were here in Washington, and finally emerged from FE in the form attached. It reflects several suggestions which Mr. Robertson himself made, particularly in the ‘Proposed Course of Action’ section.

   “The Secretary decided that Prime Minister Macmillan was not the person with, whom this subject should be raised. Mr. Robertson is, therefore, proposing to call in the British Ambassador in about two weeks (i.e., after Mr. Robertson’s appearance before the House Appropriations Committee on the aid program and after Garcia’s visit). A simultaneous approach by the Embassy in London to the British Foreign Minister is planned. [Telegram 9086 to London, June 18; ibid., Central Files, 751G.5–MSP/6–1858]

   “We shall keep the Embassy informed of developments concerning this matter.” (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 52, 310 ICC, 1956–58, TERM)

2. Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XIII, Part 2, p. 2385.
3. Ibid., 1955–1957, vol. I, p. 640.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5/2–1356)
5. Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. I, p. 644.
6. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.5/3–2856)
7. Printed here as italics.