Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

17. Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board¹

Washington, June 4, 1958.

OPERATIONS PLAN FOR VIET-NAM

I. Introduction

A. Special Operating Guidance

1. General. U.S. operations in Viet-Nam should be conducted in the context of U.S. objectives which are: to prevent Viet-Nam from passing into or becoming economically dependent upon the communist bloc; to persuade it that its best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the free world; and to assist it to develop stable, free, representative government with the will and ability to resist communism from within and without, and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.

2. Viet-Nam s Special Importance to the U.S. in Southeast Asia. Viet-Nam assumes a special importance in U.S. policies and courses of action in Southeast Asia because of its exposed position as an outpost of the free world face-to-face with a powerful and threatening communist regime occupying part of its territory, and because Viet-Nam is the principal country in the area where a free government and a communist regime compete directly for the same territory and a whole nation. Moreover, the U.S. has made a substantial investment in Viet-Nam’s independence, and with such success, that the most determined efforts are justified to preserve the integrity and strengthen the position of the country. Our success in halting the march of communism in Viet-Nam since the armistice constitutes perhaps the single greatest hindrance to further territorial expansion elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Further consolidation of political stability, accelerated economic progress, and extension of popular support for the government of Free Viet-Nam will not only influence the outlook of the leaders in the rest of Southeast Asia but also serve to diminish the power of attraction exerted by communist north Viet-Nam as the communist satellite regime in the area. Moreover, a strongly pro-U.S. Government at Saigon may be useful in deterring the spread of neutralism in Southeast Asia.

3. The Threat from the Communist Regime in the North. In planning and implementing programs in Viet-Nam, operating agencies should, therefore, take into consideration the fact that the competition between the communist regime in the north and the Government of Free Viet-Nam for the support of the Vietnamese people symbolizes the general struggle between the free-world forces and the Sino-Soviet bloc in Southeast Asia, significantly affects the balance of power in the Far East, and serves to influence trends and attitudes in the rest of Southeast Asia.

4. Re-Unification of North and South Viet-Nam. We continue to support the Vietnamese Government’s desire for re-unification by peaceful means. Since we believe in free elections, we also continue to support President Diem’s position that, if elections are to be held, there must first be conditions which preclude intimidation of the electorate. As the United States stated at the Geneva Conference in 1954, free elections should be under the supervision of the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.

5. Relations with Other Southeast Asia Countries. Although Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia have taken substantially different paths since the conclusion of the three separate Geneva armistice agreements in 1954, it is to American advantage to maximize the inter-relationships between these three countries, and U.S. operating agencies should take into account the effects upon Laos and Cambodia of the courses of action they pursue in Viet-Nam. While relations between Viet-Nam and Laos have not been marred by any special difficulties, Cambodian-Vietnamese relations continue to be strained and recently have been further embittered on a number of specific issues.

6. U.S. Aid Programs.

a. Joint Viet-Nam-U.S. Effort. The implementation of U.S. aid programs should depend upon the amount of cooperation displayed by the Government of Viet-Nam. Maximum efforts should be made to cooperate with the Vietnamese in all operations to avoid the appearance of U.S. unilateral action. Aid programs and programs of technical advice should be joint enterprises, rather than American conceived and American executed projects, U.S. operations should sustain the strong pro-U.S. orientation of the Vietnamese Government and should help solidify its position of leadership with the Vietnamese people. U.S. operations should take into account the need for progress in the economic rehabilitation and development of Viet-Nam in order that the Diem Government might demonstrate both to its own subjects and to those north of the 17th Parallel that close identification with the free world is advantageous in terms of security, material progress and social advancement.

b. The Need for Sound Economic Development. Care should be taken in developing U.S. operations that sufficient resources are provided for an effective military establishment while leaving sufficient margin for sound economic development. U.S. aid should be managed so as to prevent inflationary pressures which might frustrate the achievement of U.S. objectives and nullify many of the benefits otherwise provided by aid programs. U.S. aid should be implemented with enough speed and flexibility to produce tangible benefits which can be seen and appreciated by the Vietnamese people and government.

c. The Need for Prompt Aid. In order to insure Vietnamese support for U.S. objectives, U.S. aid operations should be continued so as to meet Vietnamese needs on a timely basis. Continuing attention should be given to achievement of maximum performance and production of tangible results with minimal delays.

d. The Need to Husband Resources. Because of the need for both the U.S. and Viet-Nam to husband their resources, and because of a demand within Viet-Nam for greater economic development, the impact on the Viet-Nam Government’s budgetary situation should be taken into account in the development of future U.S. aid programs in accordance with NSC 1599–e.²

7. Armistice Situation. Operating agencies should take into account for the time being the existence of the Armistice Agreement and the supervisory role of the International Commission to which the Vietnamese Government has pledged cooperation. While the Commission offers certain obstacles to some U.S. operations, it serves to discourage communist efforts to alter the status quo.

8. U.S. Private Investment. The Government of Viet-Nam is highly nationalistic and anxious to secure full economic as well as political independence. It has repeatedly announced its support for free enterprise principles and has occasionally stated that it specifically favors private capital investment by U.S. investors, but it has failed to translate these words into consistent actions. Instead, its actions have often tended to discourage private investment. U.S. agencies should strive to maximize U.S. private participation in the economy of Viet-Nam whenever consistent with U.S. policy goals, and should accordingly provide maximum possible assistance to U.S. private investors and businessmen interested in Viet-Nam, both in the U.S. and in the field.

9. Overseas Internal Security Program Guidance. Insecurity in the west and southwest near the Cambodian frontier continues to be the most serious problem. In these areas there has been a discernible increase in armed dissident activities reflected in a higher frequency of murders, assassinations of local officials, highway robbery, banditry and river piracy.

The tenuous state of Cambodia–Viet-Nam relations renders solution of this problem difficult. High Vietnamese officials, including the President, are concerned by what they judge to be a deteriorating situation in Cambodia and by the use of that country as a base for communist conspiracy against Viet-Nam. They maintain that dissident bands not only enjoy a “privileged sanctuary” in Cambodia but receive some degree of assistance in money and propaganda facilities from the European diplomatic missions and the Chinese Communist economic mission in Phnom Penh. If the communist regime of north Viet-Nam should succeed in establishing representation in Phnom Penh a marked increase in dissident activities might be expected.

It is assumed that undetected groups of experienced clandestine political agitators and espionage agents continue to function among the urban population, including the approximately 700,000 overseas Chinese, especially Chinese youth. Extensive communist efforts are in progress to subvert minority groups primarily in isolated areas bordering the Western frontier through which run trails used for clandestine infiltration of south Viet-Nam. The Vietnamese communists continue to have a capability for the penetration of government offices and for harassment or propaganda in the villages. The civil administration and local civilian security forces need greater professional competence effectively to counter these communist efforts. The Vietnamese Government disposes of military, para-military, civil security and police forces as follows (current strengths are indicated): Army, Navy and Air Force: 140,361; Sûreté–VBI: 6,500; Municipal Police: 10,500; Civil Guard: 53,775; and the Self Defense Corps: 49,550.

10. Chinese in Viet-Nam. U.S. actions with regard to the overseas Chinese community are to be subordinated to and kept in harmony with U.S. objectives for the country as a whole. One primary aim of U.S. policy is to prevent the communists from exploiting the overseas Chinese and to strengthen anti-communist activities within the Chinese communities. The encouragement of the overseas Chinese to identify their interests with the host country is a basic guiding principle, but it is also U.S. policy to encourage support for the Government of the Republic of China in situations where this assists in denying the overseas Chinese to the communists and does not conflict with our over-all country objectives. Detailed courses of action and the principles governing them are contained in the OCB paper, “Guide Lines for U.S. Programs Affecting the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia,” December 11, 1957,³ which should be studied by the officers responsible for action in this field.

11. Attitudes Toward U.S. Personnel Overseas. The Operations Coordinating Board has given particular attention over the past several years to ways and means of improving foreign attitudes toward U.S. personnel overseas. This involves both the positive actions which can be taken to improve these relationships as well as the removal of sources of friction and difficulties. The special report prepared by the Board, “United States Employees Overseas: An Inter-Agency Report,” dated April 1958,⁴ is an effort to provide on an over-all governmental basis a common approach and guidance in this field. All supervisory employees in the field should familiarize themselves with the substance of this report and all U.S. personnel should know the substance of the Conclusions and Recommendations set forth in Section V, Volume I. Attention is directed to the President’s remarks in the Foreword of the report.

12. American Personnel. Although the U.S. and its citizens continue to enjoy popularity in Viet-Nam the large scale of American representation in that country presents a potential source of offense to Vietnamese sensibilities. American personnel should be limited to the absolute minimum required for effective operations, and should be made fully aware of the necessity for discreet and circumspect personal behavior. While the general attitude toward the U.S. is friendly, extreme nationalism and concomitant anti-western feeling are not far below the surface.

B. Selected U.S. Arrangements with or Pertaining to Viet-Nam

13. U.S. Involvements Which May Imply Security Guarantees. Viet-Nam was designated in the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty on September 8, 1954.⁵

14. U.S. Commitments for Funds, Goods or Services.

None

15. Other Arrangements.

a. A pentalateral agreement for mutual defense in Indochina was signed at Saigon on December 23, 1950,⁶ providing for the establishment of a Military Advisory Assistance Group.

b. An economic cooperation agreement between the U.S. and Viet-Nam was signed on September 7, 1951,⁷ and entered into force on the same date, providing for a U.S. economic aid mission in Viet-Nam. It was amended March 7, 1955, by an exchange of letters.⁸

c. By an exchange of notes in April 1955,⁹ the U.S. accepted responsibility for assisting Viet-Nam in the organization and training of its armed forces.

II. Current and Projected Programs and Courses of Action

(Individual action items when extracted from this Plan may be downgraded to the appropriate security classification.)

(All target dates are continuing unless otherwise specified.)

A. Political

16. Popularize, particularly in neutralist nations of Asia, the image of a genuinely independent Viet-Nam striving by its own will and as much as possible with its own resources to enhance its ability to defend and strengthen its independence.

Assigned to: All agencies

17. Continue to encourage and assist the Vietnamese to develop a strong and stable government which enjoys popular support. Stimulate the gradual growth of democratic processes in Viet-Nam.

Assigned to: State

Support: ICA, Defense

18. Stimulate improvements in the administrative and political control structure with a view to increasing the stake of the population in supporting the present government as well as to enhancing the efficiency of the government’s operations. Continued assistance in the field of public administration supports this objective.

Assigned to: State, ICA

19. Continue to encourage the GVN in its policy of trying to raise the living standards of the indigenous “Montagnard” populations; support, as appropriate, reasonable, practical, step-by-step efforts toward their eventual integration into the national life of Viet-Nam.

Assigned to: State, ICA

20. Through diplomatic means, in consultation with the Vietnamese Government, explore the possibilities for maintaining the International Commission in existence with curtailed activities and responsibilities.

Assigned to: State

Support: USIA

21. Continue to assist the Vietnamese Government in demonstrating the superiority of Free Viet-Nam over Communist Viet-Nam (DRV) by taking the initiative in the political, economic and psychological fields.

Assigned to: State, ICA, USIA

22. Deter the Viet Minh from attacking or subverting Free Viet-Nam or other neighboring states.

Assigned to: State, Defense

23. Continue to impress the Vietnamese communists with U.S. willingness to defend free countries of Southeast Asia in case of aggression or subversion from within; persuade non-communist governments in Asia, particularly the Government of Laos, of the continuing Vietnamese communist objectives of seeking communist hegemony in the area; enlist the full assistance of the Governments of Thailand, Viet-Nam, the Philippines in efforts to strengthen Lao willingness to resist communist encroachments.

Assigned to: State

Support: Defense

24. Probe weaknesses of the Viet Minh and exploit them internally and internationally whenever possible.

Assigned to: State, Defense, USIA

25. Continue to support the Vietnamese Government by diplomatic, military, economic, and psychological means. In these efforts the main object should be to maximize the attractiveness of Free Viet-Nam in contrast with conditions in the communist zone of North Viet-Nam.

Assigned to: All agencies

26. Strengthen Vietnamese relations with and representation in Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, Malaya and the Republic of China. Keep the GVN as fully informed as possible of developments in Indonesia in order that it may guide its relations in the best interests of the Free World. Support visits by high-ranking officials of Southeast Asian countries to Viet-Nam and vice versa, particularly from neutral countries.

Assigned to: All agencies

27. Discourage the establishment of Communist Vietnamese diplomatic missions by persuading concerned governments and international agencies that the Communist Vietnamese are merely satellites of the communist bloc. Conversely, encourage Viet-Nam to strengthen diplomatic representation in strategic countries.

Assigned to: State

28. In consultation with SEATO members encourage Viet-Nam to participate in all civilian aspects of SEATO.

Assigned to: State, Defense

B. Economic

29. Continue to exert influence to persuade the Vietnamese Government to allow maximum private participation by Vietnamese and foreign investors in the organization and management of new industrial enterprises. Attempt to secure provisions in any new investment legislation or regulations attractive to private investors and to obtain fair and liberal administration thereof. As appropriate continue also to seek improvement of the investment and overall business climate through the curtailment of extensive economic controls.

Assigned to: ICA, State, Commerce

30. Continue the embargo of U.S. exports to North Viet-Nam, restrict the movements of shipping, and impose control on North Vietnam assets if such course becomes desirable in conformity with existing U.S. policies in other areas.

Assigned to: State, Commerce

Support: ICA, Treasury

31. Support and encourage Vietnamese participation in feasible regional projects, such as Mekong development planning and the regional telecommunications project.

Assigned to: State, ICA

32. Promote trade between the U.S. and Viet-Nam, maximize information services to American businessmen on trade opportunities in Viet-Nam and encourage U.S. and Vietnamese businessmen to get together to develop direct trade contacts.

Assigned to: State, Commerce

Support: ICA

33. In the disposal of U.S. agricultural surpluses, consideration should be given to the effect of such disposal on Viet-Nam’s normal rice markets. Continue to consult the Vietnamese Government in advance of any proposed sales of surplus rice in countries of Asia, Europe, and Africa.

Assigned to: State

Support: Agriculture, ICA

34. Continue to seek to negotiate a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation on terms compatible with U.S. interests.

Assigned to: State, Commerce

35. Encourage the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration to send the maximum number of competent technicians to assist the Vietnamese Government and to train Vietnamese specialists. This type of program activity to be most efficacious should be closely coordinated in the field with U.S. programs. Encourage Colombo Plan countries to expand their programs of technical and economic assistance to Viet-Nam.

Assigned to: ICA, State

Support: Commerce

36. Sustain the Vietnamese Government in its determination to avoid economic contact with communist countries.

Assigned to: ICA, State

Support: Commerce

37. Continue economic and technical assistance programs, with emphasis on: (1) Capital projects directed at (a) rapidly increasing production, primarily for local consumption, and (b) improvement of transportation and distribution facilities. Activities under this section include large-scale highway rehabilitation and improvement, restoration and improvement of internal waterways, improvement of airport and port facilities, the construction and expansion of power generating and distribution facilities, improvement of municipal water supply systems, and the expansion of existing, and/or construction of new, industrial facilities. Complete the survey of Viet-Nam’s power needs and consider extending assistance in connection with the building of suitable power facilities. (2) Improvement in rural life. The U.S. should provide appropriate assistance for land reform, tenure, and development programs, including the resettlement in fertile and strategic areas of displaced persons and farmers now living on marginal lands. Activities in this field may also include the creation and extension of rural credit facilities on reasonable terms, diversification of crops, expansion of livestock and fisheries production, and restoration and expansion of irrigation systems. Educational and health services provided by the U.S. and Vietnamese Government should be focussed increasingly on practical improvement of village life. (3) Encourage the Vietnamese Government to improve its budgetary and fiscal administration and increase its tax revenues so that its budget may assume a progressively greater share of governmental and developmental costs. (4) The training of additional Vietnamese technicians and administrators in essential fields of activity should be increased insofar as practical.

Assigned to: ICA, State

Support: Commerce

38. Continue to emphasize technical assistance. Continue to educate Vietnamese technicians through improving essential training facilities in Viet-Nam and through sending several hundred Vietnamese annually to the U.S. and other countries for training.

Assigned to: ICA

Support: State, Agriculture

39. A rural development and improvement program should be a major component of U.S. aid. It should include appropriate assistance for land reform. It should also include improved credit facilities, irrigation, better roads and canals, and extension of improved elementary education and health services to the villages. The Government of Viet-Nam should be encouraged to strengthen the economic and social basis of sound community organization in order to develop grass roots support for the government.

Assigned to: ICA

Support: State, USIA

40. Since the Vietnamese Government has, in the past, expressed strong objections to the conclusion of triangular aid arrangements without regard to its views, endeavor whenever possible to meet its views on this subject.

Assigned to: ICA, State

41. Encourage Viet-Nam to develop economic relations with Japan and the Republic of China, and, as appropriate, to accord recognition to the contributions to the Vietnamese economy non-citizen businessmen have made and continue to make under proper conditions.

Assigned to: All agencies

Support: Commerce, ICA

C. Military

42. Should overt communist aggression occur against Viet-Nam, take actions in accordance with U.S. policy, and prepare appropriate contingency plans now to facilitate such actions.

Assigned to: State, Defense

43. On occasion of an imminent or actual communist attempt to seize control from within, take action in accordance with U.S. policy, and prepare planning studies now to facilitate such actions.

Assigned to: Defense, State

44. Encourage Viet-Nam as feasible to contribute to the preparation of military studies for the defense of the treaty area, being conducted by the SEATO Military Planning Office.

Assigned to: Defense, State

45. Jointly with other SEATO powers, or separately, when appropriate, continue to encourage Viet-Nam to send military observers to SEATO military exercises.

Assigned to: Defense

Support: State

46. Continue to implement the military assistance program for Viet-Nam. The FY 1958 program provides for construction and consumable items, spare parts, overhaul of naval vessels, and ammunition. The proposed FY 1959 program provides for maintenance and training support. Major items of equipment include communications equipment, trucks, and training ammunition. (Financial information appears in the attached MSP Pipeline Analysis.)

Assigned to: Defense

Support: State

47. Seek to influence Vietnamese defense planning so that it will be consistent with U.S. and SEATO plans. Promote a spirit of cooperation among the Vietnamese officials and people in order to develop an atmosphere favorable to the employment of U.S. forces, if they should be required in the defense of Viet-Nam.

Assigned to: Defense

Support: State

48. Within the temporary MAAG ceiling develop through training the maximum combat capabilities of the Vietnamese armed forces, including logistical support services. Develop adequate reserve forces. The present Vietnamese armed force level of 150,000 should be kept under constant review, relating such review to the external menace and to the developing capabilities of the Civil Guard and other internal security forces. Constant efforts should be made to cut the man-year costs of Vietnamese troops.

Assigned to: Defense

Support: ICA, State

49. The U.S. should continue to encourage the Vietnamese Government to enlarge its contributions to the military budget and to reduce overall military costs. The U.S. should continue to meet reasonable deficits in the Vietnamese military budget but the deficit should decline as the Vietnamese economy develops. Provide equipment to the Vietnamese forces in conformity with U.S. policy in connection with the Armistice Agreement.

Assigned to: ICA, Defense, State

50. Encourage, within the limitations of available spaces, attendance of Vietnamese military personnel at schools of the U.S. armed forces and at appropriate foreign schools operated or sponsored by the U.S. armed forces.

Assigned to: Defense

Support: ICA, State

51. Encourage Viet-Nam to participate in the Pacific Defense College to be established.

Assigned to: Defense

Support: State

D. Informational and Cultural

52. Provide appropriate information and public relations support for political, economic, and military policies and programs set forth elsewhere in this Operations Plan.

Assigned to: USIA

53. Support the Vietnamese Government’s psychological warfare program against the communist zone with a view to inciting dissatisfaction and encouraging defections. Endeavor to prevent ineffective violence or other self-defeating actions by dissidents.

Assigned to: All agencies

54. Continue to encourage the Vietnamese Government to stress in its propaganda the peaceful re-unification of Viet-Nam through the establishment of conditions which will allow free elections to be held. Provide to the Vietnamese press translations into French and Vietnamese of press reports from Singapore, Malaya, Burma and elsewhere, in which communist subversion is being successfully identified and countered.

Assigned to: USIA

Support: State

55. Expand broadcasting to north Viet-Nam to play heavily upon national sentiment and other appropriate themes without, however, provoking fruitless rebellion.

Assigned to: ICA, State, USIA

56. Explore means by which VOA can provide additional physical equipment and time for broadcasts to north Viet-Nam. Continue simultaneously to use 50% of present VOA facilities for reaching northern audiences. The objective remains to sow dissatisfaction among people in the north with the communist regime and to paint a favorable picture of life in the south.

Assigned to: USIA

Support: State

57. Publicize, without giving impression Viet-Nam is dependent upon the United States, benefits and progress derived from U.S. aid programs, regional defense pacts and free world trade.

Assigned to: USIA

58. Encourage U.S. training and orientation visits for potential Vietnamese government and business leaders. Continue the granting of graduate level scholarships, with extensions to permit attainment of advanced degrees in selected cases. Permit U.S. financing of full undergraduate scholarships at U.S. universities for selected outstanding graduates of Vietnamese secondary schools.

Assigned to: State

59. Increase training of Vietnamese technical and professional personnel in U.S. schools and in U.S.-staffed and/or supported schools in Viet-Nam, insofar as practical. During the current year the International Education Exchange Service of the Department of State has programmed for 7 Vietnamese visitors to the United States, including 6 students and 1 leader. The Department of Defense has programmed for 1,619 Vietnamese military students, including 1,201 in the Zone of the Interior and 418 in third countries, of which 123 are at U.S. bases. U.S. advisory teams are with all major units and schools of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. ICA has programmed for 350 students distributed throughout the United States, Viet-Nam, the Philippines, and other third countries.

Assigned to: ICA, USIA, State, Defense

E. Overseas Internal Security Program

60. Continue to influence the Government of Viet-Nam to clarify areas of responsibility within its civilian internal security organization, so as to eliminate jurisdictional overlaps.

Assigned to: ICA

Support: State, Defense

61. Influence the Government of Viet-Nam to clarify and coordinate areas of responsibility for internal security between its armed forces and its civilian organizations.

Assigned to: State

Support: ICA, Defense

62. Continue training the Vietnamese armed forces for their internal security role, including counter-intelligence within the armed forces, support of police actions, pacification and anti-guerrilla operations, et cetera.

Assigned to: Defense

63. Continue the present program of improving and strengthening the capabilities of the Viet-Nam Civil Police to maintain internal security and suppress criminal and subversive activities by (a) support of the established training program, (b) encouragement of additional support on the part of the Viet-Nam Government to complete the reorganization of civil police forces, (c) assistance to the Vietnamese Government’s newly established Central Criminal Records and Identification Bureau and Crime Laboratory, (d) provision of equipment necessary to assure efficient and effective operations of the police forces, including the improvement of the communications program, and (e) accelerating the implementation of a program to equip and train the civil guard.

Assigned to: ICA

Support: State

64. Continue to encourage the Government of Viet-Nam gradually to reduce the size of its civilian internal security forces as the internal security situation permits, as improvements in organization are achieved, and as skills rise and mobility is increased by better transport and communications.

Assigned to: ICA

Support: State

65. Continue to translate textbooks on leadership, anti-subversion, counter-intelligence, administration of martial law, riot control, etc., into French and Vietnamese for distribution to Vietnamese armed forces.

Assigned to: Defense, ICA

66. The Government of Viet-Nam should be encouraged to maintain an effective, well-trained and carefully screened Self-Defense Corps, and to continue other activities which emphasize self-help and protection against Viet Minh terror squads.

Assigned to: ICA

[Here follows a chart entitled, “Viet-Nam: Pipeline Analysis, Mutual Security Program.”]

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Vietnam. Secret. Attached to a covering memorandum by Staats dated June 4.

   This paper supersedes “Outline Plan of Operations With Respect to Vietnam”, April 12, 1957, as well as its later annex, “Overseas International Security Program for Vietnam”, January 31, 1958. (Ibid.) The OCB, apparently after discussing a draft dated May 23, concurred with this paper on May 28, subject to reconciliation of a difference of opinion over Diem’s handling of internal security. According to the preliminary notes of the meeting by Richards, dated May 28, the difference was discussed as follows:

   “Split Position in the Viet-Nam Summary Evaluation— In discussing the split position, Ambassador Parsons said the State Department wished to preserve two important points: 1) that President Diem has been heavy-handed with regard to internal security in Viet-Nam; and 2) that the tendency toward authoritarianism in his government posed dangers to the Diem administration since it was encouraging opposition. Mr. Sprague (Defense) said that although Defense was placed in the position of commenting on political factors, the reports they were receiving from Viet-Nam differed from the State reports. It was the sense of the Board that there should be no implication that the U.S. was considering withdrawing support from President Diem. General Cutler thought it unjustified to call Diem’s actions ‘heavy-handed’; he preferred ‘stern’. Mr. [Allen] Dulles thought that Diem had good reasons to place emphasis on internal security.

   “Governor Herter said he believed the split position could be reconciled and asked the Executive Officer to arrange for State and Defense to work out a necessary revision.” (Ibid., Preliminary Notes III)

   The approved paper was referred to responsible agencies for implementation on June 4, according to the covering memorandum. The draft of May 23 has not been found; its destruction was authorized in the covering memorandum.

2. NSC Action No. 1599–e, approved by the President on September 5, 1956, reads as follows:

   “Noted the President’s request that the Department of State, in consultation with the Department of Defense explore the possibility, based upon a study of the rising trends of U.S. aid programs in the entire SEATO area, of arranging conferences with the nations in that area in an endeavor to achieve agreements as to future U.S. aid programs in that area which will be more moderate in their demands upon U.S. resources and the local economies.” (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

   Documentation on this action is scheduled for publication in a forthcoming volume of Foreign Relations.

3. Not printed. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Southeast Asia)
4. Not printed. (Ibid., Overseas Personnel)

5. Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty reads:

   • “1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.
   • “2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.
   • “3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.” (6 UST 83)

6. 3 UST (pt. 2) 2756. For an explanatory editorial note, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. VI, p. 954.
7. 2 UST (pt. 2) 2205. For an explanatory editorial note, see Ibid., 1951, vol. VI, p. 490.
8. 7 UST (pt. 3) 2507.
9. Dated April 22 and 23, 1955; Ibid., 2514.