Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

149. Letter From Professor Wesley R. Fishel of Michigan State University to the President of the Republic of Vietnam (Diem)¹

[?], April 30, 1960.

Mr. President and very dear friend: Although I feel sure that Mr. Ladejinsky, Ambassador Chuong, and others have kept you informed in general of what I have written and said over the past several months, I believe it is time that I wrote you again directly. My last letter to you was written more than six weeks ago; I apologize for not writing to you more frequently.

Recently I had the pleasant opportunity to meet with Nguyen Dinh Thuan and Vu Van Thai while they were in Washington and New York. As you know, their visit was quite successful, due in large measure to their superb ability to explain the situation in Vietnam persuasively to significant audiences in both Government and business circles. I was present at some of their sessions, and had occasion to speak with others who were involved in the meetings I did not attend. I can report to you that all who met and talked with them were impressed by the urgency of your cause. At the same time, I would not, were I you, look for immediate results of major importance. Rather, it is safe to say that had they not made this visit to the United States, certain unfavorable things might have occurred with respect to our policy vis-à-vis Vietnam.

The truth of the matter is that a great deal of uneasiness with respect to Vietnam exists today in official and business circles. There are four major elements which contribute to this attitude, and I outline them for you herewith:

1. Weakness of leadership: there is much criticism of the failure of your Ministers and of civil servants generally to accept responsibility and to act on their own initiative—which, you will certainly remember, is something you and I have discussed countless times over the years. With only a handful of exceptions your Ministers are regarded as sycophants—courtiers who regard their jobs as too important to them for them to chance your anger should they act boldly, make a mistake, and have to account to you for it. Again, this is a problem you and I have often pondered. Its solution lies in the hearts and minds of the men involved, and in yourself as well. Certainly the fact that Vice President Tho, Secretary of State Thuan, Vu Van Thai, and a few others who are also men of courage are counted among your aides is evidence that you subscribe to the principle that a strong leader likes strong aides. I will add, in the utmost candour as always, that ranking officials and business leaders in the United States who are interested in your welfare and in the future of your people and your country, have paid close attention to the nature of your Ministers and other senior officials. Indeed, much of the support you continue to receive from such men as Senator Mansfield, Senator Fulbright, and other members of Congress, or from present or potential investors of significance, results from their assessment of the strength of the character, honesty, integrity, and ability of such men as those whom I have named above. Similarly, indications of dishonesty, corruption, graft, and other self-seeking activity on the part of certain other persons are scrutinized soberly and painstakingly, by these same men. I cannot stress this fact too strongly. I wish I were with you in Saigon at this moment so that I might discuss it with you more frankly, for it is dangerous to spell out these matters in a letter.

2. Slowing of democratic development: you know from reading my recent articles that I understand fairly well the situation in your country and the reasons that you have adopted the policies of your regime. It must be said, however, that my interpretations of developments and policies in Vietnam are not always shared by other experts here. Naturally, they do not know you or your philosophies as I do, and they tend to be more skeptical of your motivation and of your sincerity of purpose. At the recent meetings of the Association for Asian Studies (the organization which you addressed in Cleveland in 1953), I was questioned sharply about the “dictatorship” in Vietnam. The events of this past week in Korea have brought Vietnam more sharply into the public picture, and one must expect reflected activity as a consequence of the Korean revolution. I presume you are prepared for such occurrences. One can only guess at the form they will take—Communist propaganda stressing the authoritarian character of your government and crying for “democratic reforms”, or perhaps other, non-Communist, political activity, as by some of the “intellectuals” in the opposition in Saigon, taking advantage of worldwide interest in Korea to call attention of the international press, for example, to the situation in Vietnam. Again, one can only guess, but it would seem safe to predict that some action will occur soon. (See also my remarks about your Ambassador, below.)

3. The security situation: I have been carefully questioned by my friends in Washington concerning the “deterioration” in internal security in Vietnam. Among other things which I have been asked are the following: Is the security crisis genuine? Or is it faked because you want more American aid (much as the French were accustomed to stage a “crisis” just as the U.S. Congress was about to pass on Mutual Security aid to France/Indochina between 1950 and 1954)? If the crisis is indeed genuine, does it indicate that your regime is failing? That it is disintegrating? That popular support for your government is declining? That the Communists are more active? And so on….²

In this connection, M. Bernard Fall is preparing a sharply critical article on Vietnam. In New York the other day he boasted publicly that when he wrote about the deterioration of security in The Nation³ magazine some two years ago—and I had contradicted his interpretations and his facts at that time—he had been right and I had been wrong! Now he intends to prove that your government is about to fall; that the people oppose you; that corruption is rife in your regime; that your “government en famille” is destroying all possibility of democratic growth in Vietnam; that his map of terrorist activity in Vietnam (which he published in Pacific Affairs⁴ in 1957 was correct; and that, furthermore, he has once more secured from Confidential French files similar evidence of terrorist activity in Vietnam today, which he now plans to publish.

It is a matter of some pain to us who are your friends that your enemies are better able to secure detailed information about what is happening in your country than we are! Last summer, you may recall, I presented you with a list of questions concerning security and asked you for answers to them so that I might prepare a serious, authoritative article on that subject which—I felt—might convince officials and scholars in the Free World that you continue to fight a war against the Communists even today, and that you deserve to be supported. Certainly, we know this to be true, but one must have detailed evidence to convince skeptics who now believe (a) that accounts of terrorist attacks in Vietnam are fabricated, or (b) that if they are true they indicate a weakening of your government’s power, rather than an intensification of subsersive activity by the Viet Cong. May I once more, speaking for myself personally, as well as for your other friends with whom I have discussed this matter: Col. Lansdale, Sen. Mansfield, Mr. Cherne,⁵et al, request that you be kind enough to ask Mr. Hai to send me answers to the questions I asked, so that this question may be dealt with once and for all? Otherwise you must continue to expect articles such as that which appeared in the New York World Telegram (by Mr. Colegrove) the other day, and those which Time magazine has published in recent weeks. You may also be interested to know that M. Fall is in contact with Joseph Alsop, with whose writings you are quite familiar.

4. Administrative reform and reorganization: it is well known that you embarked some years ago on a program of administrative reform and reorganization. Ordinance 57–A, for instance, has often been cited as a measure of importance; the elimination of the delegues as officials of real power is also mentioned as a helpful step; the training of large numbers of civil servants has been acclaimed. At the same time, I reminded frequently that much confusion of authority is apparent as one looks at Vietnamese administration today. It is pointed out that when a terrorist attack occurs, there is often a fatal delay in responding to it while it is decided whether the garde civile, the dan ve, the sûreté, or the army has responsibility for meeting the challenge. It is even charged that in some cases two or even three of your security agencies will attempt to take charge simultaneously. The insinuation of a political element in this picture (the Can Lao Nhan Vi) is said to cloud the situation considerably. (Since I am here in the United States, and not in Vietnam, I cannot evaluate these charges accurately myself, but I can tell you that whether it is true or not, it is commonly believed in very responsible quarters.) There is also considerable criticism in the State Department, for instance, of the continuing failure of provincial chiefs, district chiefs, and so on, to get close to the population; there is also much criticism of your seeming reliance on “repression” in trying to solve the problems of government in the field. (In particular, the reputedly “brutal” activities of the Vietnamese marines have been severely criticized.)

In addition to the four elements I have outlined for you above, I feel that I must speak to you frankly at this time about some other matters as well. (You have asked me to be honest with you at all times; I hope you will accept the remarks which follow, with this fact in mind.) You have known for a long time my evaluation of the loyalty you do or do not receive from your Ambassador in Washington. In July of 1954 you sent me a long letter commending M. Tran Van Chuong to me as one of your “loyal friends.” I have tried to consider him in this light since that time. But it has become increasingly difficult for me to do so. I cannot refrain from saying that we in this country do not consider him among the “friends of Vietnam” living in the United States. His ambitions for higher office continue to plague him and his wife. And his unhappiness with the Agrarian Reform in Vietnam he has made known publicly on several occasions—the most recent being a reception given by Mr. Buttinger⁶ for Gen. O’Daniel⁷ on the occasion of the publication of his story about Vietnam, written for American youth (see the review I have attached for an indication of how this book is being received). On this occasion he spoke—eloquently as always—to try to convince his audience (American publishers, businessmen, etc., and Vietnamese resident in New York City) that the Agrarian Reform in Vietnam was a terrible mistake; that landlords like himself have been badly treated, and so on. (If you wish, I believe I can secure a tape recording of his speech, made by the Voice of America for rebroadcast to the world. Please let me know if you want the recording.)

One member of Ambassador Chuong’s staff, M. Nguyen Phu Duc,⁸ has succeeded in alienating the friendship and support for your government of some important Americans. Furthermore, your Ambassador has virtually succeeded in destroying the organization of your friends in America, of which, as you know, I am an active member.⁹ It is extremely difficult for us to understand why you continue to sanction this activity.

[Here follows discussion of personal matters and private business transactions]

Finally, may I express my deep disappointment that M. Thuan was not authorized to extend and enlarge the Harold Oram¹⁰ contract while he was here? You will probably remember that I was very dubious about this firm when Mr. Cherne first proposed them to you in 1954. I wish to tell you very frankly that I have come to know them very well since that time. Furthermore, I have made careful inquiries about them (and other companies in the public relations business). As I wrote to Mr. Ladejinsky on this subject more than six months ago, I consider Mr. Oram, Mr. Jonas,¹¹ and their associates to be among the most dedicated, honest, and capable experts in their field. You may know that they accept only contracts with which they are philosophically in sympathy. Furthermore, their fees are commonly regarded by their competitors as far lower than “necessary”. Which is to say that they are indeed honest, and this is something which cannot be said about most of their competitors. Perhaps you have seen the enclosed holiday greeting they sent out in December. If not, it will interest you to note who are numbered among their clients. I may add that they also handled the Democratic Party campaigns in 1952 and 1956 (that is, the campaigns of Adlai Stevenson for President), even though this activity was without financial profit to them. Here again it is hard for us to understand why there has been so long a delay in authorizing them to go ahead as they have asked. Mr. Thuan and I discussed this while he was here, and I know that he understands-—or should understand—the problems that exist in their relationship with Ambassador Chuong and M. Duc, to say nothing of Mme. Chuong. The latest episode of which I can inform you (since Mr. Oram will never say anything about it to you) is that your Ambassador has asked them (over the telephone, rather than in writing) to say nothing about either security or the agricultural situation in Vietnam, even though our newspapers are filled now with one article after another on these subjects, and it would seem very important for your government to have its views presented properly by your public relations counsel!

I fear that much of what I have written to you will seem bitter as you read it. If this is so, I hope you will understand that my candour in writing these things to you is motivated by the depth and sincerity of my friendship for you, and my profound belief in what you are trying to accomplish in Vietnam. I would not be a true friend if I masked my true thoughts and reactions behind soft and camouflaging language.

Warmest regards.

Faithfully yours,

Wesley R. Fishel¹²
Professor of Political Science

[Postscript]

May 2, 1960.

Mr. President and very dear friend: Before I could post the letter which I wrote to you last Saturday, I received phone calls from friends in New York and Washington alerting me to a petition sent to you by “eighteen prominent political personalities, including several former cabinet ministers.” I therefore did not mail my letter, pending receipt of the text of Tillman Durdin’s article¹⁴ on this subject, plus the reports from NBC, AP, UPI, Reuters, and USIS. None of these reports is very illuminating, but from the names and text that have come to me thus far it is obvious which group is behind this move.

I remember vividly your remarks on several occasions, and as recently as last August, on the failure of Vietnamese intellectuals to understand the nature of the struggle with Communism, and especially the security problem. The petition to which I have referred above is exemplary of that which we discussed on those earlier occasions. However, it has already received very wide coverage in this country, and I have been asked to comment on its significance to two radio and one television audience since yesterday morning! Coming as it does on the heels of the articles in Time, etc., it has attracted much attention, and the fact that Mr. Durdin has written about it, and the New York Times has given it prominent space on Page 1, has brought it to the attention of millions of persons who otherwise might have overlooked it.

In addition, there is an article in the new (May 2) issue of US News and World Report on the security problem, which will focus more public interest on your country and its problems. This last article, however, will help rather than harm.

On re-reading my letter of April 30 I feel somewhat uncomfortably like a fortune-teller or prophet (see page 2) now that “something” has actually occurred, along the lines of my prediction. Unfortunately, the writers of this petition have very cleverly chosen an unusually appropriate moment for launching their missile, and a reliable and highly regarded journalist as the means of conveying news of it to the outside world. Consequently it cannot simply be ignored. However, it can be dealt with, it seems to me, by discrediting its authors by presenting to the world their records of past collaboration with the French and with Bao Dai, and so on. Dr. Chuong’s escapade of Autumn 1954, when he deserted to the Cao Dai, might also be worth bringing to light at this time. If you would be kind enough to have Mr. Hai send me by air mail short biographies of the 18 authors, I will see what can be done. Beyond this act of exposing the iniquities of the petitioners, it also will be useful to emphasize once more the desperate security situation in which your government is now working. I therefore repeat once more my request for the necessary detailed information. Although the petitioners will have much support for their seemingly innocent plea for permission to organize a “responsible opposition party”, among thinking people in this country, your immediate answer, it seems to me, lies in promising such “reforms” after the security situation has been cleared up satisfactorily.

Faithfully yours,¹⁵

1. Source: Michigan State University Archives, Fishel Papers, 1960–1961—Letters to Diem. Personal and Confidential (not a U.S. Government classification).
2. Ellipsis in the source text.
3. Bernard B. Fall, “Will South Vietnam Be Next?”, The Nation, May 31, 1958, pp. 489–493.
4. Fall, “South Vietnam’s Internal Problems”, Pacific Affairs (vol. 31, no. 3), September 1958, pp. 241–260.
5. Leo Cherne was active in the American Friends of Vietnam.
6. Joseph Buttinger, a scholar of Vietnam.
7. Lieutenant General John Wilson O’Daniel was Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam from the winter of 1954 to the fall of 1956, and became Chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Friends of Vietnam in 1957 after his retirement from the Army.
8. First Secretary of Embassy.
9. The American Friends of Vietnam.
10. Harold Oram, Inc., had a public relations contract with the Republic of Vietnam.
11. Gilbert Jonas, a member of Harold Oram, Inc., and of the Executive Committee of the American Friends of Vietnam.
12. Printed from a carbon copy which bears this typed signature.
14. The New York Times, May 1, 1960, p. 1.
15. There is no signature to the postscript.