Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

147. Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board¹

Washington, April 29, 1960.

OPERATIONS PLAN FOR VIETNAM

A. Objectives and General Policy Directives

Regional Objectives.

1. To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into or becoming economically dependent upon the Communist bloc; to persuade them that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the Free World; and to assist them to develop toward stable, free, representative governments with the will and ability to resist communism from within and without, and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of the Free World.

Present Application to Viet-Nam.

2. The substantial nature of U.S. programs in Viet-Nam has helped to bring about progress in achieving U.S. regional objectives described in paragraph 1. However, there has been a substantial increase in Communist guerrilla and terrorist activity which requires emphasis on measures designed to combat such activity. Viet-Nam has long been persuaded that its best interests lie, politically and economically, in cooperation and affiliation with the rest of the Free World. The government is essentially stable. In connection with the other objectives, our principal emphasis will be on encouraging and assisting Viet-Nam to preserve its political independence, on making the government more representative of the entire population, and on reducing its economic and military dependence on the United States.

General Guidance.

3. Assist and encourage Viet-Nam further to develop a strong, stable and constitutional government enjoying good international prestige which will appear in increasingly favorable contrast to North Viet-Nam. Support the government’s position that simultaneous elections in both zones of Viet-Nam can only take place after it is satisfied that genuinely free elections can be held in both zones. Help weaken the Communists in North and South Viet-Nam to facilitate the eventual peaceful reunification of a free and independent Viet-Nam under anti-Communist leadership. Aid Viet-Nam in strengthening its armed forces, with due regard for the Armistice Agreement, so that Viet-Nam may assure its internal security and provide limited initial resistance to Viet Minh attack.

4. Encourage the Vietnamese to develop military defense plans consistent with U.S. plans and policy and with SEATO policy. Discreetly demonstrate in other ways U.S. interest in helping Viet-Nam defend itself against external aggression.

Vietnamese Leadership.

5. The U.S. has been closely associated with the leaders of Viet-Nam since the country gained its independence. With U.S. backing these leaders have given the country security, relative stability and increasing military and economic strength. Politically they have created a constitutional government with most powers in the hands of the President. There is some complaint about lack of democratic liberties among urban intellectuals and some responsible government officials. However, the regime appears well established among the people. President Diem is greatly respected for his honesty and dedication to his country’s welfare. However, his brother and close collaborator, Nhu, is disliked and regarded with suspicion. They are attempting to create an official philosophy, called Personalism, designed to offset the local appeal of communism. Internationally and domestically they are strongly anti-Communist. They are intensely and realistically aware of the fact that as an inexperienced and relatively under-populated Asian country, their fertile rice land is very desirable to the North Vietnamese and Chinese Communists. They oppose the reunification of Viet-Nam except on terms which would exclude the Communists. They favor the concept of regional cooperation, but have been involved in recent attempts to overthrow Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia.

Guidance.

6. As long as it is in the U.S. interest we should continue to support leaders who have successfully led their country to independence and with our aid have created a strongly anti-Communist country. Limited discreet contact should be maintained with potential leaders of the non-Communist opposition. We should be careful in giving the present leaders advice and criticism in order not to disturb a situation favorable to the free world. While it is in our interest to stimulate the growth of democracy in Viet-Nam and to encourage government practices which will increase the popular support of the present government, advice on these subjects should be offered discreetly to avoid injuring the sensibilities of a government proud of its new independence.

7. In view of the heavy dependence of the Vietnamese Government on U.S. aid and of Vietnamese sensitivity as a newly independent nation, we should express our views discreetly to that government with respect to possible abuses of U.S. aid. Critical public discussion of the Vietnamese aid program, indirectly involving the government of Viet-Nam, adversely affects U.S. interests in Viet-Nam. This is particularly true of public statements made in Viet-Nam.

Collective Security and the Communist Threat.

8. Viet-Nam faces a North Vietnamese army more than double in size and highly organized subversive units, backed by North Viet-Nam. The latter can move with little interference across the Cambodian border. During recent months there has been a substantial increase in Communist guerrilla and terrorist activity. The North Vietnamese military force is backed by Communist China. Viet-Nam voluntarily abides by the provisions of the Armistice Agreement which limits the amounts of training and logistic support which can be furnished by foreign countries. In this situation the United States could appear to the Vietnamese to be a remote source of protection to the average Vietnamese.

Guidance.

9. We should continue to assist the Vietnamese, through implementation of the military assistance program, to develop the combat capabilities of the Vietnamese armed forces to assure Viet-Nam’s internal security and to provide limited initial resistance to North Vietnamese attack. Our logistic support should conform with U.S. policy on the Armistice Agreement. We should keep the present Vietnamese armed force level under constant review in terms of the external menace and should seek to reduce the man-year costs of Vietnamese troops. We should provide adequate support to the Vietnamese military budget while working to reduce over-all military costs and to increase Vietnamese contributions to those military costs and to economic development.

10. We should encourage Vietnamese defense planning consistent with that of the U.S. and SEATO. We should encourage the attendance of Vietnamese observers at SEATO military exercises and Vietnamese participation in appropriate civilians aspects of SEATO. We should maintain U.S. advisors at Vietnamese armed forces schools and provide, as possible, for attendance of Vietnamese military at U.S. or U.S.-sponsored armed forces schools. Finally, in the event of communist aggression in the Southeast Asia treaty area, we should invoke the UN charter or the SEATO Treaty, or both, and, if requested by the Vietnamese Government, take the necessary action, military or otherwise: Provided that prior Congressional approval for military action has been obtained unless the President deems the emergency so great that immediate action is necessary to save interest of the United States.

Overseas Internal Security Program.

11. Viet-Nam is emerging from a period during which the Vietnamese communists controlled much of its territory. North Viet-Nam is still under communist control. Government control and administration over considerable areas of Viet-Nam is handicapped by poor transportation and communications and lack of trained administrators. Many sections are almost inaccessible. These problems are slowly being resolved. But as long as they exist Viet-Nam will be a target for communist Vietnamese subversion.

Guidance.

12. We should train the Vietnamese armed forces for their internal security role. We should train the Vietnamese Civil Police to maintain internal security as set forth in the present program. We should obtain clarification of lines of authority for internal security between the Vietnamese civil and military authorities and within the civilian services. We should encourage the maintenance by Viet-Nam of the Self Defense Corps. We should continue the translation of training materials dealing with internal security. As the situation improves, we should encourage the reduction of internal security forces.

Minorities.

13. Although 85 to 90 percent of the population of about 12.5 million are Vietnamese, there are three important minority groups: (a) the Chinese who strongly influence the economy, (b) the hill tribes (Montagnards) who live in the thinly populated mountains covering the western half of the country and bordering on the porous frontiers of Cambodia and Laos, and (c) the indigenous Cambodian minority south of Saigon who, while themselves politically inert, provide the pretext for annual Cambodian complaints at the UN. All these minorities are potentially susceptible to communist influence. The government’s policy is to assimilate them in order to minimize any threat to the national sovereignty.

Guidance.

14. So long as the Viet-Nam Government’s treatment of its minorities does not violate accepted standards of international justice or interfere seriously with U.S. programs, advice should be offered cautiously. The government might be encouraged to try to raise the living standards of the mountain tribes to facilitate their integration. The treatment of these minorities should be observed so that we may be aware of any undue discrimination which may become the subject of international attention.

Regional Cooperation.

15. In the long-run struggle for national survival Viet-Nam cannot stand alone in competition with communist bloc countries of Asia whose population is fifty times larger than its own. Even the U.S. at a distance of 12,000 miles cannot guarantee the safety of a small nation from every contingency of war, infiltration and economic pressure. Furthermore, U.S. aid to Viet-Nam is diminishing. Regional cooperation may provide a broader base for inspiring Vietnamese confidence in their country’s future. Without regional strength Viet-Nam has less chance of preserving its independence from communism. Regional cooperation is difficult for a country newly independent and strongly nationalistic. Furthermore, Vietnamese leaders have considerable disdain or suspicion for the people and leaders of neighboring countries with whom it would be necessary to cooperate.

Guidance.

16. We should encourage Viet-Nam to cooperate with other Southeast Asian countries on a basis of mutual aid, and to support indigenous efforts to develop regional associations so long as they do not weaken SEATO or the spirit of resistance to communism. We should seek to strengthen Vietnamese relations with Cambodia and to assist in improving Vietnamese relations with all other free Asian nations. We should encourage visits between high ranking officials of these nations and Viet-Nam, with particular attention to neutral countries. We should support and encourage Vietnamese participation in feasible regional projects such as the Mekong River Valley and the regional telecommunications projects.

17. We should encourage Vietnamese economic cooperation with Japan and the Republic of China with particular reference to the advantages of the Japanese reparations program for Viet-Nam and to contributions which Chinese technicians from Taiwan and Vietnamese businessmen of Chinese origin can make to to the Vietnamese economy. We should encourage the United Nations Technical Assistance Board (UNTAB), the free world members of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), and of the Colombo Plan to commence or to expand civilian technical assistance programs in Viet-Nam which are, to the maximum feasible extent, tied in with regional programs. U.S. aid programs should be planned, to the extent feasible, to stimulate appropriate further regional cooperation.

Communist Viet-Nam.

18. Compared to Viet-Nam, Communist North Viet-Nam (called the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam) has the same population, and army over twice as large, more mineral resources, a greater industrial potential, and less arable land. Its population is industrious and its leadership determined. It receives considerable economic, military and technical assistance from the communist bloc, particularly from Communist China. When Asian leaders in the area begin to see clear evidence as to which zone of Viet-Nam is making the greater progress their views and policies may be affected.

Guidance.

19. We should continue to help Viet-Nam consolidate its military strength and build up its economic and political viability as quickly as possible. We should aid Viet-Nam’s propaganda against the Communists, particularly by assisting in increasing broadcast facilities to North Viet-Nam. We should seek to increase Viet-Nam’s international prestige and oppose all attempts of Communist North Viet-Nam to gain international recognition. We should maintain the export embargo on U.S. trade with North Viet-Nam.

The Geneva Agreements.

20. The United States is not a party to the 1954 Geneva Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam but has undertaken to refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb it. Although denying that it is bound by this agreement, Viet-Nam has agreed not to interfere with the enforcement of its terms. India supplies the chairman and Canada and Poland are the other members. The International Control Commission (ICC) makes an inefficient attempt to enforce the Geneva Agreements in Viet-Nam and in Communist Viet-Nam. The ICC has not exercised any real control over armistice violations and has been prone to criticize Viet-Nam for minor violations while ignoring flagrant violations by North Viet-Nam. One result has been to limit to some extent the military contribution which the United States makes to Viet-Nam in terms of training and materiel.

21. After repeated urging by the ICC, the Viet-Nam Government with U.S. concurrence, has agreed to the termination by the end of 1960 of the U.S. Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM), which actually performs as a component of the MAAG. The U.S. is endeavoring through friendly members of the ICC (Canadian and Indian) and the British Government (Co-chairman of the Geneva Conference) to obtain the ICC’s tacit acquiescence to an increase in MAAG strength. The objective of this approach is to provide sufficient MAAG strength to assure adequate training of the Vietnamese military forces and to compensate approximately for the withdrawal of TERM personnel. The value of the ICC is that its presence as an international body may have inhibited overt communist attempts to take over Viet-Nam. As the balance of power between the two zones of Viet-Nam solidifies, this inhibiting influence is probably of decreasing value. However, an overt attempt to end the ICC would subject the U.S. and Viet-Nam to considerable criticism, and at this time, there is no compelling reason to bring about its termination.

Guidance.

22. For the present the U.S. should cooperate and urge the Vietnamese Government to cooperate with the ICC. Should cooperation with the ICC significantly inhibit U.S. efforts to develop an effective defensive capability on the part of Vietnamese military forces, the nature and extent of such cooperation should be reviewed. The question of whether it is in the interests of the U.S. and of Viet-Nam for the ICC to continue should be reviewed periodically.

The Role of France, the UK and Australia in Viet-Nam.

23. Vietnamese rubber exports, mostly grown and handled by French planters, provide two-thirds of the value of Vietnamese exports. French cultural, economic and technical assistance are helpful. At the same time Vietnamese suspicions of French motives still exist. French sensibilities about American purposes in Viet-Nam are also evident. The UK and Australia provide less aid than the U.S., but as friends of Viet-Nam and of the U.S., and because they are less deeply involved in the tensions of providing and receiving aid, the Chiefs of their Diplomatic Missions are often able to be helped in our relations with President Diem.

Guidance.

24. U.S. officials should work as closely as possible with the representatives of France, the UK and Australia in Viet-Nam without exciting Vietnamese suspicions.

Economic Development.

25. The Vietnamese Government cannot support an adequate military establishment and provide sufficient prospects of economic progress to avoid political instability without receiving large amounts of economic aid for the foreseeable future. Assistance received from other countries, international agencies and private charitable organizations is helpful, but if U.S. aid were withdrawn, these other sources would be entirely inadequate. Viet-Nam has not reached a stage where large external loan programs appear feasible. The country will continue to need grant assistance in developing roads, canals, irrigation, higher education and agricultural production. The government has not yet produced a useful economic development program and this will probably not be possible until there has been a serious analysis of the country’s economy.

Guidance.

26. As it is in the U.S. interest to make it possible for Viet-Nam to maintain its independence and anti-communist alignment, considerable amounts of economic aid including assistance from the Development Loan Fund should continue to be planned along the following lines:

a. We should provide flexible economic and technical assistance as necessary to attain U.S. objectives.

b. A survey of the Vietnamese economy should be made as promptly as possible which would enable the Vietnamese Government to formulate a sound economic development program which ensure the most effective use of available resources, including U.S. and other external aid.

c. We should encourage the Government of Viet-Nam to improve its budgetary and fiscal administration and increase its tax revenues.

d. We should encourage United Nations agencies, other Colombo Plan countries, and other friendly countries to contribute available resources to promote the economic growth of Viet-Nam.

e. We should encourage Viet-Nam to continue to orient its economy in the direction of the free world and to continue to rely primarily on non-communist markets and sources of supply for trade, technicians, capital development, and atomic development.

f. In carrying out programs involving disposal of U.S. agricultural surpluses abroad, we should:

• (1) Give particular attention to the economic vulnerabilities of Viet-Nam and avoid, to the maximum extent practicable, detracting from its ability to market its own exportable produce.
• (2) Give particular emphasis to the use of Viet-Nam’s resources to promote multilateral trade and economic development.

U.S. Private Investment and Trade.

27. The desirability of U.S. private investment assuming an expanded role and, where feasible, replacing U.S. public assistance abroad, is U.S. policy.

Guidance.

28. We should encourage measures to improve the climate for private investment, both domestic and foreign, and to assist U.S. private capital in investing in the area.

29. We should intensify efforts to promote U.S. exports to Viet-Nam:

a. Import procedures under the ICA-financed commerical import program should be continuously reviewed and modified, where necessary, to insure that U.S. traders have full opportunity to compete for sales in the Vietnamese market.

b. We should actively seek, when appropriate, to insure non-discriminatory allocation of foreign exchange for dollar imports financed from Vietnamese-held resources.

c. Trade promotion activities generally should be more vigorously pursued, including the encouragement and facilitation of trade contacts between U.S. and Vietnamese traders, publicizing trading opportunities in Viet-Nam, and promoting increased familiarity with American products.

Informational and Cultural.

30. In our relations with Viet-Nam we face the usual problems of a large donor country and a small, proud recipient country. This is complicated by profound historical, linguistic and cultural differences and by vast mutual ignorance. The good will generated by our helping Viet-Nam achieve and maintain its independence has lasted five years, but must be expected to diminish especially if Vietnamese leaders feel the aid program is being cut too rapidly to permit them to meet their country’s problems.

Guidance.

31. Advice, suggestions and criticism should be given privately at a high level. We should continue our language and area training programs. We should continue to emphasize the orientation program for all Americans assigned to Viet-Nam. We should strengthen informational, cultural and educational activities to foster increased understanding of the culture and policies of the United States and to expose communist aims and techniques. We should provide appropriate information and public relations support for U.S. policies and programs relating to Viet-Nam. We should encourage U.S. training and orientation visits for potential Vietnamese leaders. We should maintain contact with potential leaders after they return to Viet-Nam. We should facilitate contacts between private individuals and organizations having similar interests in Viet-Nam and the United States.

Attitudes Toward US. Personnel Overseas.

32. The acceptance by the people and government of Viet-Nam of the presence on their soil of official U.S. personnel directly affects our capability to achieve our national security objectives. To this end, programs should be developed and improved to encourage and strengthen the natural inclination of the individual American to be a good representative of his country and to promote conduct and attitudes conducive to good will and mutual understanding. In this connection, the OCB has developed two comprehensive documents which contain recommendations for action and serve as guidance for senior U.S. representatives overseas:

a. “United States Employees Overseas” (April 1958)² and

b. “Report on U.S. Personnel Overseas” (July 1959), including a Statement of National Policy and a Presidential Letter and also a reprint of the Conclusions and Recommendations of the 1958 report.³

Guidance.

33. Insure that U.S. official personnel and their dependents are aware of the importance to the United States of their role as personal ambassadors.

34. Develop and strengthen activities that promote good personal relations between foreign nationals and U.S. personnel.

35. Develop and strengthen activities aimed at maintaining respect for local laws and customs and a high standard of personal conduct by U.S. personnel.

36. Hold the number of U.S. official personnel in Viet-Nam to a strict minimum consistent with sound implementation of essential programs.

Note: NIE Applicable to Viet-Nam: NIE 63–59, Prospects for North and South Viet-Nam, May 26, 1959.⁴

[Here follows Annex A: “Arrangements or Agreements with the United States.”]

Annex B–1

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PROGRAM SUMMARY

Viet-Nam

53. The Military Assistance Program in Viet-Nam is designed to improve the effectiveness of Vietnamese forces eligible for MAP support by providing materiel, equipment, some spare parts and maintenance, training and ancillary costs. (Cumulative and current MAP financing, along with explanatory notes, are shown in the Financial Annex of this Plan.⁵)

54. Past programs have provided aircraft and related equipment; ships and harbor craft, tanks, vehicles and weapons; ammunition; electronics and communications equipment, military construction and training.

55. The combat effectiveness of the Vietnamese Armed Forces has improved materially during the past year. MAP arms and training have produced an armed force considered as effective as that of any free world power in Southeast Asia.

56. The FY 1960 program provides training to maintain the current effectiveness and improvement of the Army, one patrol craft and the overhaul of ten (10) small craft, twenty-five AD4’s as replacements for F8F aircraft and maintenance and training assistance.

57. For FY 1961, Defense has proposed to State a MAP totalling $49.3 million. The proposed ground forces program includes tactical communications equipment, vehicles and trailers, personnel equipment and war reserve ammunition. Other major items in the FY 1961 program include 3 small ships, 8 landing craft, shop and utilities equipment for the naval shipyard, and construction for air field faculties. In addition, the program includes training, spare parts, and other matériel.

58. In addition to the training conducted in Viet-Nam, 3,644 Vietnamese military personnel have received training in the U.S. up through FY 1959. An additional 726 were trained in third countries or at U.S. facilities overseas. The FY 1960 program provides for the training of 1,375 Vietnamese military personnel in the U.S. and 226 in third countries. The proposed FY 1961 program provides for the training of 888 Vietnamese military personnel in the U.S. and 308 at U.S. facilities overseas.

[Here follow Annex B–2, “ICA Program Summary”; Annex B–3, “State Department Program Summary”; and Annex B–4, “USIA Program Summary”.]

Annex C

February 9, 1960.

Central Intelligence Précis

SINO-SOVIET BLOC ACTIVITY IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

Political

79. Bloc countries refuse to recognize South Viet-Nam as a sovereign political entity, but neither Moscow nor Peiping has agitated vigorously against South Viet-Nam in the international arena during the reporting period. Peiping has concerned itself but little with South Viet-Nam except to support North Viet-Nam’s propaganda line of the moment; it usually attacks both Diem and the U.S. as preparing a new war in Indochina. Khrushchev, in his major foreign policy review in October, completely ignored Viet-Nam, which he apparently did not regard as important enough to discuss.

80. North Vietnamese spokesmen, however, have once again been re-emphasizing the reunification themes in recent weeks. Speaking for the government, Premier Pham Van Dong, in his December address to the National Assembly, reiterated his policy of pressing for peaceful reunification through negotiation, arguing that relaxation of international tensions has improved the atmosphere. This government line contrasted with the party line toward South Viet-Nam laid out by party leader Truong Chinh, who urged that the “people’s democratic revolution” be carried on “directly” in the South to eliminate American influence there and defend “socialist construction” in the North. The party’s political directive to the South is “to liberate the South and to defend the North.”

Diplomatic

81. None. The USSR vetoes South Viet-Nam’s attempts to gain admission to the United Nations, demanding concurrent admission of North Viet-Nam.

Economic

82. Trade is limited to a small amount of cross-border smuggling.

Information-Propaganda

83. Bloc broadcasting in Vietnamese increased to a total of over 46 hours weekly by mid-1959 from 38.5 hours weekly at the end of 1958. The South Vietnamese Communists (Viet Cong) carry on intensive local propaganda activity directed at civilians and members of the security forces, especially in rural areas.

Subversive

84. Communist subversion and dissident activity—South Viet-Nam’s major security problem—seems to be shifting from isolated acts of terrorism to larger scale guerrilla warfare. In late January several hundred Communists launched several attacks, the boldest being against a regimental headquarters near Tay Ninh, 50 miles northwest of Saigon. According to South Vietnamese security officials, recently captured agents and documents disclosed Communist plans to step up terrorist activity this year in the troubled southwestern provinces in an effort to disrupt communications and government economic efforts, thereby eliminating Saigon’s control over the area except for major towns. The Communists have also attempted, with some success, to infiltrate the army and government agencies. Their persistence in the face of extensive government anti-dissident campaigning results from the extreme isolation of their bases of operations, their use of the Cambodian border area as a safe haven, and continuing personnel and material support from North Viet-Nam. The Viet Cong do not present a major military threat to the Diem Government at this time.

South Vietnamese Reaction

85. The Diem Government is rigidly anti-Communist in its foreign policy orientation. It has avoided North Viet-Nam’s efforts to ‘regularize’ relations by interposing conditions it is sure will be unacceptable, but Diem has taken care to avoid the appearance of accepting Viet-Nam’s division as permanent. Diem has considerably improved the army’s unity and its effectiveness, but he feels that the recent Tay Ninh attack has seriously hurt the army’s prestige and he may make changes in the field command structure. The government reportedly is increasingly inclined to stress counter-guerrilla tactics in army training, which heretofore has been largely along conventional lines.

The Outlook

86. The North will probably continue to press South Viet-Nam for normalization of relations, hoping thereby to exploit any popular pressures for relaxation of tensions, to embarrass the Diem Government internationally, and to persuade Asian neutrals that North Vietnamese intentions are peaceful. Although South Viet-Nam may agree to very limited discussions with the North, it is not likely to enter into broader discussions—whether or not held under ICC auspices—or to agree to establish regular contacts with the North on any scale. President Diem will probably step up military action against the dissidents in the wake of the Tay Ninh attack, for erosion of public confidence in his government and dislocation of the economy by Communist activity would have serious implications for long-range internal stability.

[Here follows a financial annex.]

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Preliminary Notes IV. Secret. This plan was discussed at the OCB meeting of February 17, according to preliminary notes of the meeting by O’Connor, as follows:

   “Messrs. Daniel Anderson, Richard Usher and Chalmers Wood of the Office of Southwest Asian Affairs were present for Board consideration of the Plan. Mr. Anderson spoke of the problems facing U.S. operations in Viet-Nam as a consequence of the provisions of the Geneva Agreements. The termination, by the end of 1960, of the U.S. Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission and our endeavors to obtain the tacit acquiescence of the International Control Mission (ICC) to an increase in MAAG strength in a current problem. The Board discussed the differing State-Defense views relating to U.S. cooperation with the ICC. Mr. Dulles (CIA) and Mr. Irwin (Defense) suggested compromise language. The Chairman, Mr. Gray, with the consent of the members, agreed to a revision which would indicate that should U.S. cooperation with the ICC result in significant and adverse effect on U.S. operations in Viet-Nam, the U.S. would immediately review the extent of its cooperation with the ICC. Revised language is to be approved by the Board Assistants. The Treasury representative raised suggestions which were also referred to the Board Assistants. A split with Treasury relating to the application of area policy guidance to specific countries is also to be resolved at a later time. Aside from these pending issues the Board concurred in the Plan for implementation by the responsible agencies.” (Ibid.)

   According to a covering note by Smith attached to the Outline Plan, the Board concurred on February 17 with this paper subject to resolution of differences between the Departments of State and Defense on a draft version of paragraph 21 and between the Departments of State and the Treasury on a draft version of paragraph 16. Because both draft versions of this OCB Outline Plan, February 5 and April 14, were destroyed, it is impossible to ascertain the exact nature of these differences. These differences were resolved by the Board of Assistants representatives of the three Departments. This plan superseded the previous plan for Vietnam, January 7, 1959, of which extracts are printed in Document 47.

2. Not printed. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Overseas Personnel Vol. I-III)
3. Not printed. (Ibid.)
4. For an extract, see Document 76.
5. Attached, but not printed.