143. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State1

2983. Refs: Saigon’s 2446,2 28033 and 2979.4 Seriously concerned over absence any response to reftel s requesting action aimed at obtaining ACSI agreement for assignment to office ArmAtt about 10 personnel for anti-guerrilla training of Civil Guard.

Deterioration security situation SVN points up extremely urgent need for adequately trained forces to control Communist guerrilla elements. Increasing indication that VC terrorism is directed not only at village officials and rural cadres (which is resulting in growing malaise among GVN administrative apparatus) but also aimed at obtaining real control of rural areas which is same tactic Viet Minh employed against French. At same time VC carrying out attacks on installations [Page 407] and posts guarded by Civil Guard and on Civil Guard units and others to show their strength and boldness, and on plantations to disrupt favorable development Vietnamese economy.

Inability counter VC tactics because of lack of adequate training to include anti-guerrilla training poses serious morale problem within Civil Guard. Civil Guard should carry large share responsibility for meeting internal security threat. Civil Guard commando battalions totalling 1264 men recently formed for use in Kien Hoa province, but his effort may be impaired by exactly that kind of training which special forces personnel designed provide.

Again request Department take this matter up with DOD at earliest opportunity. Once decision reached on assignment special forces personnel to ARMATT, we are ready to move ahead on this project ot meet essential need of Civil Guard.5

Should be noted this training separate and distinct from special forces training for ARVN discussed Saigon’s 2979.

Durbrow
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/4–1960. Secret; Limited Distribution.
  2. Document 105.
  3. In telegram 2803, March 29, Durbrow reported that Thuan was pushing for assignment of U.S. Special Forces instructors to Vietnam to train the Civil Guard and subsequently ARVN in anti-guerrilla combat. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/3–2960)
  4. In telegram 2979, April 19, the Embassy summarized the MAAG outline plan for anti-guerrilla training of the ARVN. See enclosure to Document 139.
  5. In telegrams 1923 and 1925 to Saigon, both April 20, the Department responded as follows:

    “Department and DOD working on this problem.” Early solution anticipated.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/4–2060) “Ref: Preceding Deptel this subject [telegram 1923].

    “Further exploration problem furnishing ten US Special Forces personnel for Civil Guard counter-guerrilla training confirms continued strong ACSI resistance to ArmAtt cover proposal. Furthermore feeling here view relatively low level proficiency Civil Guard is that Special Forces group this size could be expected have small impact and that attainment effective counter-guerrilla capability by Civil Guard apt be slower than in ARVN and Marines.

    “View foregoing would appear Okinawa training recommended CINCPAC’s 152221Z March [February—see Document 103] may warrant further consideration as immediate and most effective alternative. Would welcome your comments,” (Ibid.)