Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

99. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated.

SUBSTANTIVE BRIEF FOR THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GRONCHI AT 10:30 A.M. FEBRUARY 28

U.S. Objectives During the Visit

It is precisely because of the controversial character, personality and intentions of President Gronchi and also of his ignorance of the U.S. that we have, early in his term of office, invited him to this country. We cannot hope to convert him on all issues and in fact, his pretensions toward executive power make it undesirable to pursue with him official matters that should properly be the concern of his Premier and the latter’s cabinet. Thus, our objectives are to impress Gronchi with the spiritual and material power of the U.S., our friendly reasonableness, our enlightened motivations and the correctness of our vigorous policy in defense of the Free World.

A pertinent illustration of Gronchi’s efforts to obtain executive powers is the fact that throughout the planning of his visit he has sought to convert it from a State Visit to an official one normally enjoyed by chiefs of government. Not wishing to deny him the opportunity to air his views, which is very important to him, Secretary Humphrey and I have each agreed to meet with him informally before two of the scheduled dinners. Gronchi will also have an opportunity to see Admiral Radford and General Twining, and by direct Italian arrangements, Mr. Eugene Black, Governor Harriman and Governor Dewey. Administration officials will avoid being drawn into normal government-to-government matters he may raise.

Points President Gronchi May Raise

1. He has no intention of proposing specific agreements but merely of portraying Italian and international problems as he sees them, with the expectation that action will follow in normal government-to-government channels.

2. He fears that he is misunderstood in America through no fault of his own and wishes to reassure you that he is anti-Communist and pro-West, though he may have legitimate differences of view as to methods the West should adopt.

3. Since his election internal reform measures have been adopted in Italy that were stymied for years. Much more remains to be done, and if the Nenni Socialists will support further reforms, so much the better. The little people of Italy will feel that they are better served and are less likely to turn to the Communists (he will probably make no distinction between the pro-Communist Nenni Socialists and the anti-Communist Saragat Socialists who are Social Democrats of the Center and comparable to other European Socialist parties).

4. Legislation being passed is in the U.S. interest too, viz., the foreign investment law, which he favored. He realizes our interest in the pending petroleum legislation, but the Italians would not understand it if their oil resources were turned over to foreigners. Their understanding might be increased if the U.S. showed more interest in the serious need for Italian large-scale economic development.

5. Italian economic development cannot await European integration. Without such development the Italian people would feel their normal aspirations were being thwarted, governmental instability would worsen and Italian support for the Atlantic policy would weaken. Prompt U.S. action is required in its own interest under Article 2 of NATO, so that the Italian people feel the U.S. sees them not merely as front line soldiers but as fellow humans in need of help. Rather than aid of the Marshall Plan type, he will seek large-scale loans that he claims would be a sound business venture for the U.S. and the IBRD. Given an affirmative response, he might suggest that a more favorable petroleum bill than the one now in Parliament could be passed.

6. Italy’s problem of overpopulation and unemployment also requires for solution heavier emigration and he will express interest in the passage of the legislation you have recently proposed to Congress.

7. The West is losing out to the Soviet bloc because of concentration on military fields. Economic and social progress must be pressed forward by the West, led by the U.S. The U.S. must also appreciate that neutrals and neutralism are here to stay. Specifically, German unification is a vain hope without a neutral Germany and/or if the West would agree to proceed first with a European security pact and international control of armaments with, of course, a concurrent Soviet commitment that unification would follow within several months or years.

Italy’s ability to play a larger role should be more fully appreciated and exploited in the UN and the councils of the Big Three with respect to the Mediterranean, NATO and East-West problems.

Recommended Points to be made by the President

(Since Gronchi is anxious to be heard and naturally loquacious, you may prefer to take, and later, re-take the initiative.)

1. Your welcoming remarks could include references to: the fact that Gronchi’s is the first Italian state visit ever made to the U.S.; the remarkable economic and social progress in Italy since the war; the close interdependence of Italy and the U.S. in the post-war effort to preserve the freedom and dignity of the individual; and the importance of Italy’s international position. (Gronchi may use as a theme in his visit the ten years of progress of democratic, post-war Italy, which theme we wish to encourage in hopes of placing him in the framework of his party and of past leaders such as DeGasperi and Einaudi who represented the most dependable post-war Italian elements and policies);

2. Your views on the situation facing the allies since the second Geneva Conference, perhaps stressing points made in your reply to Bulganin’s first friendship treaty proposal and our assessment of the dangers and falsity of the Soviet-proposed European security pact without prior or concurrent German unification;

3. The importance we attach to self-initiated European integration and continued Italian leadership therein;

4. Our current assessment of Communist tactics in internal subversion in Western Europe, i.e., the growing efforts to restore “popular front” governments, the campaign to gain respectability through support of desirable internal legislation and our realization that Italy faces a particularly difficult problem in that its Nenni Socialist Party is committed to the Communists but attempts to portray itself as just another European Socialist Party. We see grave risk if European leaders permit the lines between the “Socialcommunists” and truly democratic parties to become blurred in the public mind.

Proposed Response to other Points made by Gronchi

If Gronchi raises such matters as the Italian need for large-scale economic development and U.S. loans to support it, it is suggested you reply in general terms and imply that these are questions that would appropriately be taken up between his Foreign Minister and your Secretary of State.

Assessment of Gronchi

Giovanni Gronchi was elected President of Italy on April 30, 1955 for a seven-year term by the two houses of Parliament sitting jointly. Under the Italian Constitution he, as Chief of State, is merely the titular executive. The real executive power resides in the Premier who is the head of the Cabinet which depends for its existence on the will of Parliament. The only substantive powers of the President are the decision to dissolve one or both houses of Parliament (but only upon the advice of the Premier and the speakers of the two houses), the choice of the Premier (but only after hearing the political leaders; it is constitutional custom that he must heed the wishes of the majority in Parliament), and titular Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

While President Gronchi’s predecessor limited himself to the foregoing role, the Italian Republic is so new (the constitution went into effect in 1948) that there is no clearly established tradition regarding the limits of the presidential powers. President Gronchi has made little attempt to conceal his intentions of expanding those powers by any available means, a subject that has been openly discussed in Parliament. His almost frank desire to encroach upon the sphere of the Government itself makes it particularly important to be aware that any views he may express are not necessarily those of the Italian Government. In fact it is known that many of his views on domestic and international politics are at complete variance with those of the present government of Italy.

Gronchi defies categorization, although he was one of the founders and remains identified with the largest party among the four center democratic parties in Italy, the Christian Democratic Party. Although he was President of the Chamber (“Speaker” of the lower house), he has never had a large personal following and his views frequently diverge from those generally held by his party. He is, however, believed responsive to Vatican attitudes. It is, therefore, particularly important to consider President Gronchi’s personal attributes and views so far as we know them. He combines charm, cleverness, and forceful-ness with a high degree of vanity, sensitivity to the personal regard in which he is held by others, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] inconsistency, inexperience in international affairs and great personal ambition. He enjoys expatiating on his thoughts of the moment, thus creating varying impressions of his beliefs and policies.

As implied above, President Gronchi appears to conceive of his role as a national leader of unrivaled power. On the one hand, he claims to be anti-Communist; he has private, substantial business interests; he expresses belief in the Atlantic Community and he has shown active desire to improve the economic and social lot of the Italian people. On the other hand, he prefers a Government based on the collaboration of the pro-Communist Nenni Socialists with the Christian Democrats to the present Center coalition of democratic parties. Gronchi, we believe, considers this the means of ridding the Center of the small but “free enterprise” Liberal Party and reorienting the Center to a socialist program more in line with his fundamental outlook. He appears under the illusion that it is possible to cooperate with Nenni on domestic economic and social legislation without running the risk of compromising Italy’s pro-Western foreign policy, even though Nenni has had a unity of action pact with the Communists for many years. When questioned, Gronchi replies that the Center coalition is rent by dissension and has only a small majority; a broader, more stable majority is necessary in order to guarantee Italy progressive government. He either fails to understand or refuses to admit that collaboration with Nenni would split the Center and thus prevent the stable majority toward which Gronchi says he is aiming.

Gronchi is also believed to be critical of the United States on the grounds that it is too rigid in its foreign policy, inclined to disregard its allies in policy-making decisions, preoccupied only with military defense as a means of resisting Communism and blind to the positive factors in the Communist world that could be exploited for evolutionary development in desirable directions.

Gronchi seems genuinely desirous of solving the basic economic weaknesses of Italy, but looks to the U.S. and NATO for substantial assistance in his proposed solutions. Finally, Gronchi shares with most of his countrymen a strong desire for much greater Italian international prestige and, on certain terms, may be expected to give some support to the idea of European integration.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The source text is undated but it was transmitted to the President by Secretary Dulles as an attachment to a February 25 memorandum dealing with arrangements for the State visit of President Gronchi.