92. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 30, 19551
PARTICIPANTS
- Signor Paolo Emilio Taviani, Italian Minister of Defense
- Signor Manlio Brosio, Ambassador of Italy
- Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
- Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State
- EUR—Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State
- WE—Mr. Richard B. Freund, Mr. James B. Engle
The Secretary opened by complimenting Taviani on the ratification of SOF2 and the establishment of SETAF.
1. Geneva and the Need for European Unity
At Taviani’s request, the Secretary then gave his impressions of the Geneva Conference. The Soviets were immovable on all points. The Secretary observed that the experience of the conference demonstrated that European unity was more important than ever. The best interest of Western European countries was to get on with the job of unity. Taviani, in expressing his agreement, said that it was his view that if Western Europe did not unify itself, individual Western European countries would steadily decline in importance and that, within 50 years, they would occupy secondary positions in the world. Taviani said that, in view of the Commonwealth orientation of the British, efforts should be directed toward the initial objective of integration based on the six continental countries which were members of the Coal and Steel Community. Perhaps after a greater degree of unity were achieved, British cooperation could be secured. He felt that U.S. interest and guidance was an indispensable element of progress toward unity. He did not see how the conflicts of economic interest between the Benelux countries on the one hand and France and Germany on the other, and of political interest between France and Germany could be resolved without U.S. leadership and encouragement. Taviani pointed to the sad spectacle of France, whose leaders (Monnet, Schuman, Bidault, et al.) had conceived the plans for European unity, creating the greatest difficulties for the realization of these plans. He hoped that political groups favoring European unity would gain ground in the coming French elections. The Secretary said that while the U.S. was very much in favor of European unity, the initiative, impetus and will to get together must come from the European countries themselves.
2. Middle Eastern Situation
Taviani said that he knew Nasser, who he thought was basically pro-Western. He was sure Nasser realized that Egypt’s security depended on the West. Taviani said that it was his own opinion that there was no alternative between Nasser’s military dictatorship and Communism. He hoped that the U.S. was aware of the special position Italy enjoyed with the Arab world. Italy had had a great deal of experience with the Arabs including assimilation of waves of Arabic [Page 310] migration in South Italy and Sicily. This experience, together with the fact that Italy is no longer a colonial power, gave Italy a unique position among the Western powers with respect to the Arabs, and Taviani thought the West could benefit by Italian cooperation in this area. In response to the Secretary’s inquiry regarding pressure to export Italian arms to the Middle East, Taviani said that twenty-eight fighters with English-manufactured motors were delivered to Syria about four months ago under a contract of some years ago, another contract for twenty-four planes has been negotiated with Saudi Arabia but still lacks Italian governmental approval, and a third similar contract was still in the preliminary discussion stage. Aside from minor small arms Italy is now refusing all export permits.
3. Defense of South Europe
Taviani said he thought it was important, in view of events that had occurred in the past year, to strengthen the southern flank of NATO defenses which rests on Italy. He had discussed this matter with General Gruenther who impressed him as having a magnificent grasp of the problem. Taviani reviewed unsuccessful efforts on both political and military levels to seek cooperation with Yugoslavia. He said that a political solution of this problem was not possible, but that advance military planning for the contingency of a Soviet attack through the Balkans and North Italy was essential. He referred to the Trieste settlement as a great triumph of Western diplomacy. He also felt that our policy toward Yugoslavia was the best course for the U.S. to follow in the present circumstances. [4 lines of source text not declassified]
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6511/11–3055. Secret. Drafted by Freund and Engle on December 9.
On November 16, the Department of Defense announced that Defense Minister Paolo Emilio Taviani, would visit the United States November 28–December 7. In telegram 1847 from Rome, November 23, Ambassador Luce informed the Department of State that Taviani was very anxious to see the Secretary of State during his visit to discuss the Middle East and conditions in Western Europe. Luce recommended that the Secretary agree to a meeting. (Ibid., 033.6511/11–2355)
↩- The Status of Forces Agreement was ratified on November 11. In telegram 1033 from Rome, September 27, Luce indicated that Taviani had specified that he would not visit the United States unless the Status of Forces Agreement had been ratified. This was in response to Luce’s statement that the visit would be more meaningful if ratification had already occurred. (Ibid., 033.6511/9–2755)↩