90. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State 1

1391. Paris for Secretary and Amb. Luce. Secretary and Prime Minister Segni met October 23 with following present: FonMin Martino, FonOffice Secretary General Rossi-Longhi, Director General Political Affairs Magistrate, Special Assistant to Prime Minister Canali, Ambassador Luce, Merchant, MacArthur and Jernegan.

Subjects covered were:

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1. Italian Membership in United Nations 2

Segni, supported by Saragat, made strong and reiterated appeal for US support of Ital candidacy ahead of any other non-member nation and argued even more insistently that if Italy were vetoed by USSR US must at all costs prevent any other new member from being admitted. Hoped it would not come to this soon but urged that US use veto if necessary to prevent admission to UN of any other country ahead of Italy. Used familiar arguments re probable effect on Ital public opinion of failure Italy secure membership when others were admitted. Asserted results of such development would be especially disastrous in view of local administrative elections to be held next April or May. These elections afforded opportunity to accelerate decline Communist strength in Italy, but if Italy lost race for UN membership while others succeeded, Communists would be given powerful weapon to attack foreign policy of this and preceding center coalition governments.

Segni said he realized that responsibility Italy’s non-admission to date rested with Russians. However, Italian people had already discounted Russian action in vetoing Italian candidacy, whereas admission of Austria or any other state would be new factor which had not been discounted and would have disastrous repercussions on Italian public. Italian people would say Austria was being rewarded for neutralism while Italy was being punished for adherence to Western Alliance.

Secretary replied UN membership of Italy more ardently desired by US than any other non-member nation. US would make no agreements or deals with anyone which could have effect of bringing in any state ahead of Italy. It was, however, very difficult for US to undertake veto admission of other eligible states merely because Soviets vetoed Italy. We hoped bring about vote on present candidates on understanding that all permanent SC members would waive veto rights. We had proposed this to Soviets and were still awaiting their reply.

Soviets had indicated they willing make package deals which might include Italy but would also include states we did not think eligible under UN Charter. We did not want make such deals because we thought each state should be considered on its merits. We would find it very difficult to vote for states not fully sovereign or which had not shown necessary evidence of being peace-loving.

Secretary recalled Bandung Conference3 had proposed admission of seven Asian countries. There were indications Russians might vote [Page 302] for at least some of these countries. However, Secretary did not know of any European country which would have better chance for admission than Italy. US would certainly make every effort obtain Italian admission at this GA session. Secretary would probably have chance to talk to Molotov on this subject at Geneva.4

In response to Segni’s remarks re effect on internal Italian politics of failure US to prevent admission of other states than Italy, Secretary asked whether he was suggesting that if Russia violates UN Charter this causes Italian public opinion to favor Russia. If so, Secretary added, we might follow same policy in order strengthen our position with public opinion in Italy.

When Secretary reiterated hope Russians would forego use of veto in reply our proposals, Segni asserted he convinced USSR has too much interest in creating trouble in Italy to relinquish this weapon.

After intervention by Saragat stressing link between Ital Socialists and Communists and their joint efforts to convince Italian public that neutrality offers more advantages than Western Alliance, Segni closed this point. Secretary remarked we were glad to have Italian views and would take them seriously into account.

2. Disarmament

Segni opened by saying it would be most useful if Italy could take part in exchanges on this subject. US and Italian representatives had already discussed this Italian desire and it had been recognized as reasonable. He hoped there would be some early concrete action.

Secretary observed that so far disarmament discussions had been more procedural that substantive. US was not disposed to discuss such matters as types and quantities of armament until we knew provisions for inspection and control. We did not want to embark on disarmament program which would prove unilateral because other parties would violate agreements reached. First we must know how much control there could be.

As soon as serious discussions began on substantive arrangements, Secretary considered it essential that they be broadened to include other powers and he would hope and expect that Italy would be one of those. Meanwhile, we were arranging to keep Ital Govt fully informed of everything that went on in disarmament discussions.

Secretary emphasized strong desire of US to move into substantive part of discussions. Soviets try represent US as really uninterested in disarmament. This was entirely untrue. American people do not like maintain large armed forces in peacetime and have never done so in [Page 303] past history. However, after experience of World War I and II and Korean War, we wanted to be sure that if we reduced our armaments, others would do likewise.

Segni commented our position seemed correct and fair. He hoped we would soon pass into the substantive phase of disarmament discussions.

3. Italian Interests in Mediterranean and Near East

Characterizing Italy as “the Mediterranean power par excellence” Segni spoke of Italy’s special position “enclosed in the Mediterranean” which gave her both special interests and special capacities for service. In past Italy had been subjected to various events in the Mediterranean without advance warning. She desired to be helpful to her friends and allies and could be more so if she were taken more into consultations on these matters, especially since she had no enemies in the Mediterranean. He was not speaking about old concept of “mare nostrum” which was discredited and obsolete, but merely desire to further common interests.

In reply to Secretary’s question Segni said he was referring to events in North Africa, Cyprus, Israel and whole Middle East.

Secretary commented US itself was not directly involved in any of these situations. Our advice was not always heeded by those nations which were directly involved and we might not be best nation to broaden scope of consultations on this field. Nevertheless, we did recognize deep and proper concern of Italy in Mediterranean affairs. If Segni had any suggestions for solution Arab-Israel conflict, Secretary continued, he would be most happy to have them. In this connection he wanted to thank Segni, Saragat and Martino for support which Itals had give his speech of August 26.5 So far that speech had won more applause outside Near East than within that area.

4. German Unification and European Security

Segni said he would be grateful for information Secretary could give him on these closely related questions and on any understanding US might have reached with British and French in this regard.

Secretary summarized at some length US views on these points. He pointed out that German unification had been most acute point of difference since Geneva summit meeting, with Soviets trying to postpone discussion this subject and concentrate on what they called “European Security”. This apparently meant liquidation of NATO and Brussels Treaty and substitution of all-European “security” organization. Segni interjected that Russians, of course, wanted to bring about [Page 304] all-European system which would exclude America from Europe. Secretary continued that he expected that at Geneva Soviets would maintain former policy that two Germanies should be left to work out unification problem among themselves after establishment of European security system. We on other hand expected that both topics be discussed together, as provided by Geneva Summit directive. We planned to insist that European security treaty should come into force when Germany was united and not before and that such treaty would not require liquidation of NATO or Brussels Treaty.

We recognized, Secretary said, that Russia has suffered from German aggressiveness and is entitled to assurances against German remilitarization. We believe best assurances she can have is integration of Germany into Western Europe, NATO and Brussels Treaty. Since Bulganin said at Geneva that a great power does not like to have its security dependent on arrangement to which it is not a party and in which it has no voice, we would be prepared, once Germany were unified and had joined NATO and Brussels Pact, to give Russia guarantee regarding levels of force and inspection of forces within area which would include on one side all or most of Germany and on the other a comparable area of Poland and Czechoslovakia. We thought it possible through such arrangements to quiet and legitimate Soviet claims that Germany would menace Soviet security. Secretary was not sure, however, whether this would really satisfy Soviets since they were even more concerned with future of East German republic than with their own security. He felt Soviets feared (rightly) that unification would liquidate East German republic and have disastrous impact on other Soviet satellites. Fact that Russian leaders stopped for three days in East Berlin after Geneva conference was measure of their anxiety this score. (Segni nodded in agreement.)

Secretary went on to remark that he had learned himself and President Eisenhower had re-emphasized to him on basis of past military experience how easy it is to become so preoccupied with one’s own troubles that one fails to realize opposition also has troubles. We on our side realized more friendly attitude of Soviet leaders tended to reduce Western fears and loosen ties holding free world together, but we should also realize that once Soviets departed from past policy of rigid conformity, intolerance and iron discipline within their own sphere, they were destroying means by which they had held together area they controlled.

At Geneva, Secretary said, we must meet all fears Soviet dare avow publicly and leave them in position of having no possible reason to reject German unification. World public opinion would not stand for rejecting unification merely so that Russia could maintain its puppet regime in East Germany. In a year or two they would be forced to accept unification.

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Concluding exposition this point, Secretary assured Italians we had reached no final agreement with British and French. He expected to talk with them on this subject in Paris and also would talk further with Martino.

Segni thanked Secretary for his outline of US views. Said Ital Govt agreed fully with thoughts put forward. Considered unification of Germany and European security as inter-dependent. Believed that if free elections were held in Germany in near future, democratic parties would win. This was probably why Russia opposed unification. He suggested, however, that collective security threats might precede elections by a short period. (Implication seemed to be that Italians thought agreement on security pact would induce Russians to agree to free elections shortly thereafter.) Segni reiterated Italian desire to be helpful in these matters.

Secretary did not comment directly on Italian suggestion re elections but paid tribute to part Italy has already played in integration of Western Europe, especially in working out Paris Accords.

5. Possible Move of Italian Government to Left

Secretary observed there was some talk in US to effect effort might be made to form Italian Government in coalition with Nenni Socialists on theory that this would be means of applying “spirit of Geneva”. [1½ lines of source text not declassified] Spirit of Geneva did not eliminate differences between Communist and free world beliefs. We continued to believe firmly that state was designed to help man realize his God given rights and that man was not intended to serve the state. Differences between these two beliefs was as great now as before, even though we recognized they must not lead to war. Any experiments by Italy with a corporate authoritarian state would be contrary to spirit of Geneva. In our view, calmer atmosphere produced by Geneva should make it possible to spread more successfully our own concept of democracy and the rights of man. It was not designed to encourage compromises. [1½ lines of source text not declassified] In this connection Secretary expressed his appreciation for cooperation of Martino in helping prevent spread of Communism.

Segni commented he could assure Secretary there had never been any intention to extend Ital Govt coalition to left. In fact, aim of govt was to avoid any extensions. In his opinion, spirit of Geneva did not mean any abandonment of Italian democratic principles. Secretary expressed his pleasure in having this confirmation of what he had been sure was attitude of Ital Government.

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As meeting broke up, Secretary inquired about ratification of Status of Forces Agreement. Segni said he was sure it would be effected in November.

Jernegan
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/10–2355. Secret. Repeated to Paris.
  2. Documentation concerning the admission of Italy to the United Nations is in Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Italy 1952–1955.
  3. Reference is to the Conference of Asian and African States which met in Bandung, Indonesia, April 18–24.
  4. Reference is to the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting at Geneva, October 27–November 16.
  5. For text of the speech, delivered before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on August 26, see Department of State Bulletin, September 5, 1955, p. 378.