Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

87. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State ¹

Rome, October 19, 1955— 8 p.m.

1326. For the Secretary. Since message received that you would visit Rome I and members of my staff have talked to the FonOff about the arrangements for your discussions.² The tentative schedule is arrive Rome 6 pm October 22, meeting with President Gronchi 7:30 pm.

Official–informal stag dinner at Villa Madama 9 pm given by Segni. Guest list will include high-ranking members of Ital Govt, MacArthur, Merchant, McCardle, Phleger and Bowie and Embassy officers.

Sunday October 23. Meeting with Segni and Martino at 10 am. Departure 1 pm, with lunch on plane with Martino in accordance with arrangements you have proposed.

You will note from foregoing that you will have little time for substantive discussions following a prepared agenda. Also it will be extremely difficult to brief you personally before your meeting with Gronchi and the dinner. Therefore, would like to transmit these detailed recommendations.

We recommend that you confine your discussions to international questions rather than going into matters of internal policy. As much as we would like for you to take up such questions as the Vanoni plan, oil legislation, private investment and other highly controversial issues, time is too short to do so for reasons outlined below.

A. General Situation.

All competent observers here are alarmed about the consequences of distensione, both in terms of Italian diplomacy and internal political orientation of present government. Leaders of the government and many responsible elements in the CD party are conscious of this problem and are trying to check the internal drift which will lead inevitably to the opening to the left. They need encouragement and advice. In field of diplomacy, there are many signs that Italian interpretation of so-called “spirit of Geneva” may be carrying nation to a position which will conflict with Italy’s obligations to West; for example the growing pressure for recognition of Red China,³ increased demand for cultural exchanges with East, various comments on plans for European security, and a general questioning of the value of Italy’s commitments to West. We note in press and talks with public leaders a tendency to inquire why Italy should continue appropriating money for defense and commitments to NATO. General Mancinellian, for example, in conversation with Embassy officer, praised results of Paris meeting of Defense Ministers but stated it would be increasingly difficult to hold NATO together in the face of distensione and particularly to justify in Parliament expenditures for military purposes.

In other words, we are faced with a trend in the interpretation of international events which has profound effect in this country where 35 percent of voters vote left. In our estimation, it is based on false interpretation of summit meeting at Geneva. If unchecked, it can only result in encouraging opening to left and creation of popular front government which will include Nenni or his reasonable facsimile. His recent trip to Moscow and Peking⁴ and espousal of popular causes, as expansion of trade with East and acceptance of Soviet conditions for entry into UN, can only increase both his personal stature and his pressure on a weak government to adopt leftist programs, particularly in Italy’s foreign policy.

B. Recommendations.

In view of this drift in popular opinion and the general confusion which prevails in government circles, recommend for your consideration following approach:

1. Meeting with Gronchi.

There will probably be little opportunity to present any detailed position as President likes to do all the talking. You might try to draw him out on his views concerning:

a. Future course of events in Europe and what effect he envisages the relaxation of tension will have on great plans for defense of Western civilization and integration of Western Europe in which Italy has played such prominent role, asking him precisely what he means by distensione and how it will alter the international scene.

b. You might then lead into the internal situation and inquire what effects distensione will have on theory of government which has been so highly successful in preserving democratic institutions in Italy against internal threat of Communism. You might inquire about Nenni’s prospects and plans and in the end state your own views and those of President Eisenhower on the real meaning and significance of Geneva with a very strong indication US will not support a Nenni-Socialist-neutralist type of government or, in fact, any government with which either Nenni or the Socialist Party is connected directly or indirectly.

These detailed suggestions are offered because, in Embassy view, the immediate threat in Italy does not arise completely from the Communist movement, but from the ambitions of Gronchi and from his long consistent effort to reconcile the Nenni left with CD forces, plus the weakness of the present cabinet and the consequent tremendous confusion and indecision in the CD party on how to deal with whole question of distensione. In other words, if you can draw Gronchi out on his plans, you will be in a much better position to discuss problem with government leaders following day.

In this connection, Gronchi’s one great desire is to visit US. If practical, I hope you can sustain his hope to do so without committing yourself to a formal invitation. If you could reasonably offer such a prospect to him, it might have a great effect and might forstall any future plan on his part to visit Moscow before Washington visit consummated.

2. Meeting with Segni and Martino.

Suggest pitching talks with Segni and Martino on your reactions to what Gronchi tells you about distensione. If Gronchi says that distensione, both internally and externally, is the order of the day, would firmly inform government leaders that any opening to the left would have a disastrous effect on Italo-US relations. If Gronchi quibbles, which he will do in all probability, then you might discuss how Italy and US together can meet problem of Communist exploitation of spirit of Geneva and how we can work together to prevent Communists coming to power in Italy through medium of Nenni. Would, therefore, recommend following approach:

a. That you give appearance to Italians that you are consulting them about future decisions in Europe. This would fulfill a basic desire on their part, and if it could be exploited publicly would strengthen not only government but many democratic nationalist forces which feel that Italy is treated as a second-rate power.

b. Inform them prior to NAC meeting to extent possible how you plan to deal with basic problems at Geneva and ask their advice as to how they would solve problems of European security and German reunification.

c. Ask them how they plan to deal with Communist problem in Italy in face of distensione and what the outcome of future elections might be.

d. Tell them precisely what relaxation of tensions means in the American view and stress dangers faced by other European countries, for example, France.

e. Urge them to ratify SOF at earliest possible date as a visible sign of strengthening ties with West. In this respect, you should thank them for fine reception given to US forces moved here from Austria.

f. Urge them to maintain both as a political and military necessity the strong ties with NATO and stress that our mutual commitments must not be relaxed.

g. Inform them of latest developments on Italian entry into UN which is a basic problem here.

h. Go over with them once again the US policy on China.

Martino agrees with you that there should be no fixed agenda, but that each side should bring up questions of mutual interest. He wishes to raise two specific points:

1. Italy’s entrance into UN, particularly our position with regard to various package deals which he apparently suspects we oppose.

2. Association of Italy and other non-UN members in the work of the Disarmament Commission. He will repeat position taken by Casardi in New York which has been explained to you in detail by Brosio. He may assume that you are committed in Italy’s favor.

Martino agrees that major subject of discussion should be distensione and general situation in Europe.

Foregoing recommendations transmitted in detail your consideration, because I firmly believe that your visit will be of tremendous benefit in strengthening government and in arresting a trend highly dangerous for US objectives.

Luce

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/10–1955. Secret; Priority.
2. In telegram 1178 to Rome, October 13, Dulles informed Ambassador Luce that he could stop over in Rome for a few hours on October 23 on his way to a NATO meeting in Paris. (Ibid., 110.11–DU/10–1355) In telegram 1258 from Rome, October 14, Luce answered that a short visit would not be useful and asked if Dulles could alter his schedule to allow for a longer period for discussions with Italian leaders. (Ibid., 110.11–DU/10–1455) In telegram 1226 to Rome, October 15, Dulles agreed to arrive in Rome on the evening of October 22 and to depart for Paris the following day. (Ibid.) At his press conference on October 18, Dulles announced that he was visiting Rome to discuss common problems with the Italians and to keep them informed of developments concerning the Geneva Foreign Ministers meeting. (Ibid., EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Italy 1952–1955) In telegram 1257 to Rome, October 18, Dulles advised Luce that he did not wish to develop a fixed agenda and preferred informal talks. (Ibid., Central Files, 110.11–DU/10–1755) The itinerary for the visit indicates that Dulles was accompanied by Merchant, MacArthur, Phleger, McCardle, and Bowie. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 563)
3. Telegram 1172 to Rome, October 12, instructed Luce to convey to Martino U.S. concern over a recent Italian statement concerning the possibility of normalizing trade and diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. (Ibid., Central Files, 765.00/9–2855) In telegram 1270 from Rome, October 15, Luce reported on the demarche she had made to Martino. Martino stated that Italy had proposed the establishment of trade relations with the Chinese, and that the Chinese responded affirmatively but cautioned that because of Italy’s support of the U.S. exclusion of China from the United Nations, a more extensive relationship between the two nations was not possible. He stated that pressure on Italy to recognize China was growing but that Italy realized there was little to gain by such a move. (Ibid., 765.00/10–1555)
4. Nenni arrived in China on September 29, after visiting the Soviet Union on September 26.