Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

85. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State ¹

Rome, August 17, 1955— 2 p.m.

550. Personal for Secretary from Ambassador Luce. Reference Deptel 455 August 12.² I appreciate reasons why my suggestion concerning Gronchi visit cannot be carried out at this time (Deptel 455 August 12). In discussion today³ Rossi-Longhi suggested that it would be most helpful if you could visit Rome for two or three days prior to meeting in Geneva. The reasons underlying his suggestion are both fundamental and urgent and can be summarized as follows:

1. Since summit conference tempo of distensione in Italy has been stepped up. Rossi-Longhi and other responsible officials believe aftermath relaxation in world tensions will have profound effect on Ital politics and consequently on Ital diplomacy.

2. Italian Ambassador in Moscow has already been approached to ascertain reactions to stop-over visit in Rome by Bulganin en route to India.⁴ Rossi-Longhi has advised Di Stefano that formal request for such an invitation should be avoided if possible. He points out however that if Bulganin visits London next spring and in view of possible exchange of visits with US that Italians cannot long refuse such requests. Visit by Bulganin to Italy would inescapably increase power, prestige Communist Party. If it has to take place it should be preceded by high-level contacts between Italy and Western nations.

3. Eden plans to visit Rome in mid-winter after Ministerial meeting returning visit of Scelba and Martino to London last spring.⁵

4. I am concerned by left drift in Italian affairs following the Geneva Conference. Communists have capitalized at every turn on relaxation of tensions and as Rossi-Longhi points out election Sunday in San Martino may provide “small foretaste” of effect which distensione can be expected to have in administrative elections next spring. In foreign policy Foreign Office for example has initiated study concerning possible reorientation policy toward Red Chinese leading to recognition although pointing out that any move this kind would be done in agreement with US.

You will also recall De Gasperi’s repeated insistence to me expressed also to Churchill that Churchill’s distensione speech in May 1953 lost the election for him. De Gasperi to end insisted “relaxation of tensions” might be good news for world but would always favor internal progress Communism Italy. I believe internal political and Foreign Office officials need not only personal reassurance from highest US levels that conference with Soviets does not in any way mean any change in our policy of opposition to Communism but steadying of public opinion which your presence here would do. If you could manage to come to Rome for two or three days en route Geneva it would also reassure Italian officials and have great public effect by demonstrating further that our objectives are unchanged, that we still wish work closely with Italians in developing our general European policy. I hope you can arrange such a visit.⁶

Luce

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.6511/8–1755. Secret.
2. In telegram 455 to Rome, Dulles informed Luce that a visit by Gronchi in October was not possible because the President would be absent from the White House. (Ibid., 090.6511/8–1055)
3. The conversation took place on August 15. The memorandum of conversation was sent to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 359 from Rome, August 18. (Ibid., 765.00/8–1855)
4. Bulganin and Khrushchev visited India, November 18–30.
5. Scelba and Martino visited London, February 15–20, 1955.
6. In telegram 531 to Rome, August 19, Dulles replied that a visit to Italy en route to Geneva would not be possible, but that a short stopover en route to Washington after the conference might be feasible. He also stated that it was difficult to see what special measures could be taken to further allay Italian anxieties in light of the redeployment of troops to northeast Italy which had been geared as a special gesture of continued U.S. support against Communism. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/8–1955)