Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Western Europe and Canada, Volume XXVII

72. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, March 28, 1955, Noon¹

Washington, March 28, 1955, Noon

SUBJECT

• Call of Prime Minister Scelba of Italy on the President

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Secretary of State—Mr. Dulles
• Ambassador Luce
• Assistant Secretary of State—Mr. Merchant
• Prime Minister Scelba
• Foreign Minister Martino
• Ambassador Brosio
• Ambassador Magistrati
• Minister Canali
• Lt. Colonel Walters

The President welcomed the Prime Minister and said how happy he was to receive him. The Prime Minister thanked the President for his welcome and recalled that he had first met him on the occasion of his last visit to Rome as Supreme Commander in Europe when the Italian Government had given a luncheon for him at the Villa Madama. Mr. Scelba said he would try to give the President an exposé of the present situation in Italy. This exposé would be given in the fraternal terms of a younger brother addressing an older brother. The President jokingly said that he was the older anyway.

The Prime Minister said that when his government came to power after a period of governmental instability it had two main objectives, one was the consolidation of foreign policy and the other the question of internal restoration of the authority of the State. In the former field, the problem of Trieste had been solved and he wished to express his thanks to the President for the good offices of the Secretary of State and Ambassador Luce in this respect. The President said he was glad to hear this and was sure Mrs. Luce was also. Following the demise of EDC which had been killed by the negative vote of the French Parliament the Italians had ratified the Paris Accords, first of all nations in continental Europe, and second only to Great Britain. The Status of Forces Agreement had passed through the Lower House and they were hopeful of Senate action before the summer vacation.² (This last phrase was not translated into English by Minister Canali but was spoken by the Premier in Italian.) In accordance with a promise given Mrs. Luce, they had signed the Facilities Agreement following the Accord on Trieste.³ The Premier wished to point out in this connection that even parties opposed to the Atlantic Pact had voted for the Status of Forces Agreement (with the exception of communists and their socialist allies) showing that some progress had been achieved in this field. He said that the Italians had lived up to their promises and commitments. He wished to assure the President that he could count on Italy. The Agreement on Trieste had been inspired by the desire to remove this question which had remained in suspense since the end of World War II and in order to fill the gap which existed in the field of Western defense due to the divergences between the Yugoslav and the Italian Governments.

In the domestic field of the struggle against communism, the Premier said that as a result of the 1953 elections, the center parties were in a state of uncertainty and the communists were emboldened to resume their former overbearing behavior and it was imperative for the Government to establish order and restore governmental authority. Much had been done in these fields. The Government had established a program of measures to be taken all of which could not be made public immediately and in some cases it was wiser to wait for a more opportune time. He would not go into details of this matter but he was leaving a short memorandum with the Secretary of State covering the problem.⁴ He did, however, wish to make mention of two important measures which the Government had taken in the struggle against communism. In the first case the Government had drawn up a black list of firms dealing with the East. Some 46 firms who had previously monopolized trade eastward were now incapacitated from doing so and the State had practically monopolized this question, handling some 70 percent of East-West trade, thus depriving the communists of large sources of income. The Government had also put a stop to clandestine trade with East Germany and Russia itself. Secondly, the Government had undertaken an important program to screen out communists in public service. [5½ lines of source text not declassified] These anti-communist activities against the Government had commenced bearing fruit and for the first time since the liberation the communist vote had dropped during the recent regional elections in Val d’Aosta, near the French border. They had dropped 12% in relation to the vote of June 1953. In reply to a question by the Secretary of State, the Prime Minister indicated that these elections had taken place in November. Mr. Scelba went on to say that similarly in municipal elections it had dropped one percent. Similarly there had been a drop in the communist vote for shop stewards and other labor activities including farmers’ unions. As a result of all this there was evident in Italy a greater sense of security. The Government would continue to carry out the program it had set forth but it must be understood that there were limits to governmental action. The only further step that could be taken would be to outlaw the Communist Party. In order to explain this he wished to point out the political background against which the Government had taken its measures against the communists. In the elections of 1946, out of a total of 22 million votes, the communists had obtained nine million or 41 percent as a result of Fascism and the war. The Prime Minister said that in a country like the U.S. where there were only 500,000 communist sympathizers it was easy for the government to take strong measures against them but if instead of 500,000 there were 50 million it would be a great deal more difficult, yet that was the situation which they faced in Italy. One can outlaw a few thousand but outlawing a third of the population is not easy.

To sum up the situation geographically, the Prime Minister felt there was an improvement in the North. In the center of Italy, the situation was stationary and in the South and in the islands the situation was delicate. This was closely related to the economic situation which was improving in the North, constant in the center, and depressed in the South and the islands. The future of Italian democracy was directly related to the economic situation of that country. In the whole of Italy the average per capita income was only one seventh of that in the United States. The income per capita in southern Italy was one 1/21st of the U.S. average per capita income. The Premier pointed out that the depressed southern areas of which he was speaking contained 25 million people or almost half the population of Italy and in this area only half the active population was employed. Thanks to the efforts of De Gasperi’s governments, the per capita income had moved from $125 in 1946 to $350 in 1954 but there remained severe shortages in housing, schools, water supply and irrigation which none of the preceding Italian governments had been able to remedy. His Government had marked down last year 500 billion lira (25 percent of the Government’s revenue) to meet the problem of unemployment. They had set aside 700 billion lira for defense and police forces in order to be able to meet their NATO commitments. These different commitments make it difficult to devote a larger proportion of the Government’s income towards meeting the problem of unemployment. Through the Government’s activities some 400,000 men had been given employment. But it is doubtful if this effort can be long sustained.

Several courses had been considered in an attempt to permit the Government to increase its commitment in that field. Severe penalties had been voted for income tax dodgers including prison sentences but this would only spread the load more equitably and would not increase overall income. Another solution for this problem had been sought in emigration. This was a difficult matter as there were barriers against emigrants in many countries. Most of these emigrants had come from the depressed areas of southern Italy which he had mentioned. The difficulty in this field lay in the fact that as other nations would not accept communists they had to export democratic workers and keep the communists at home. When one considered that the 1953 elections had been lost for lack of a 100,000 votes and that in the preceding period 120,000 non-communist emigrants had gone to Canada, it become evident that this was a limited possibility. They did not feel that they could reduce their defense expenditures without reneging on their NATO commitments.

The Premier said that his experts had elaborated a plan to achieve full employment but that it would take ten years to fully implement this plan. Furthermore, it could not be undertaken before two years, thus twelve years would be required but the political and social posture in Italy is not one which will permit waiting that long. The Premier said that they had real prospects of starting to implement this plan at an early date if only the Government had the funds available. He said that speaking with “fraternal frankness” they did not feel that Italy’s economic situation was fully appreciated here. The question of loans and off-shore procurement was still under negotiation after more than a year. He said he would not venture to draw the attention of the President who was also General Eisenhower to the strategic position of Italy and the catastrophic effects communist control there would have. It would be a disaster for the whole free world and would impose on the American tax payers additional burdens to face in the light of this new situation in the Mediterranean. If Europe were to achieve a position of social peace, the U.S. would be able to turn its position [attention] subsequently to Asia, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He felt that Asiatic problems would require a great deal of money and a great deal of time and patience. A much smaller investment in Italy would be effective in a shorter time. If the problem of unemployment could be solved in Italy it would send a wave of hope throughout the free world. The communists have constantly hammered the point that only in a communist regime can such problems be solved. A happy result in Italy would prove that it was possible to achieve a similar result without sacrificing freedom. The West had been constantly on the defensive in the propaganda struggle. It would be a disaster for the entire civilized world if Italy and Rome should fall into the hands of the communists. They were conscious that in defending their country they were defending the seat of Western culture and one of the centers of Christendom. The Prime Minister said he wished to assure the President that they realized this was a problem they must solve for themselves. They were not asking for gifts or direct aid but if some other means could be found to help them it would greatly improve the situation in Italy and they might have two or three stable years if some of the lesser parties do not allow themselves to be carried away. He wished again to emphasize to the President that they would never permit Italy to be taken over by the communists but that they were determined to fight and they felt that they had a right to be helped by their allies and friends. There was a Latin saying which went “one should ask only honest things from one’s friends”, they wished only to ask honest things from the U.S. They did not wish to increase the already heavy burden on the U.S. tax payer on whom had fallen the responsibility of defending freedom and civilization throughout the world. The Premier went on to say he wished to conclude by reiterating that he was speaking with frankness as of a younger brother to an older one and that he hoped that the President would forgive the time he had taken to make this exposé of his country’s situation.

The President said that he wished to thank the Prime Minister for the clear, energetic and vivid account of the action taken to defend the common cause and his exposé of the difficulties lying ahead. We had followed the progress which had been made and had been gratified by it. To take the actions which the Prime Minister had taken required courage, drive and forcefulness. He wished to reassure the Prime Minister regarding two subjects: 1. That we recognized the scope of his problem and 2. that we fully recognize the importance of Italy to the world and to NATO. He felt that generally the Premier’s impression that they were entitled to some aid was correct. He was happy to note the Premier’s recognition of our problems. Without going back to the past, he felt sure that Mr. Scelba was aware of our record in this field. [10 lines of source text not declassified] He assured the Prime Minister that we would look with sympathy on his problems but he did not wish the Premier to underestimate the scope of our problem. As a former military commander in the Mediterranean and as Supreme Commander he was well aware of the political and strategic importance of Italy. We had no intention of losing Italy. He wished to be a good partner to them but he trusted that the Premier would not make his plan so entirely dependent on American aid as to jeopardize our plans or make us fail in some other area, nor to cause us to ask Congress for something we could not justify. The President said that he would conclude by expressing his earnest hope that upon the Prime Minister’s return to Italy at the conclusion of his visit here he would find things looking brighter as a result of the further conversations he would have here in Washington. He felt sure his problems would receive friendly and sympathetic consideration in the conversations the Prime Minister would have in Washington. Mr. Scelba said that there were two things he wished to make clear. The Italians had no intention of unloading on the U.S. the problem of the internal defense of Italy. They would handle that themselves, and secondly that they were not looking for gifts or donations but other forms of aid. He would be grateful if the President would ask his colleagues to listen to the Prime Minister’s problems with the same sympathetic consideration which the President had given them.

The President said he felt that this was not necessary as it was already a foregone conclusion. That the Prime Minister could be sure that he would be given a sympathetic and understanding hearing but he would do it anyway if the Prime Minister so wished though it was not really necessary. The President then took the party in to lunch.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 765.00/3–2855. Top Secret. Drafted by Walters.
2. The “Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces,” June 19, 1951, was ratified by the U.S. Senate on July 15, 1953, approved by the President on July 24, 1953, and entered into force on August 23, 1953. For text, see TIAS 2846. The Italian ratification of the agreement was deposited on December 22, 1955.
3. The military facilities agreement was signed in Rome on October 20, 1954; the documents which comprised this agreement were attached to despatch 871 from Rome, November 2, 1954. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56365/11–254)
4. The text of the memorandum, entitled “A Year of Democratic Struggle in Italy: The Anti-Communist Initiative of the Scelba Cabinet,” bears a handwritten notation indicating that it was given to Merchant by Martino on March 30. According to the memorandum, the anti-Communist measures undertaken by the Scelba Cabinet included: the eviction of socialist-Communist organizations from government buildings; the barring of trade-union organizations from government-owned premises; and an end to the employment of state workers by trade-union organizations. To further defend democracy, the Italian Government intended to cooperate closely with the Atlantic Alliance and to impose strict controls on trade with Communist bloc countries. Additional internal measures such as increased surveillance of the Communist Party and press, legal inquiries into the activities of local Communist officials, and a loyalty program for civil servants were also being implemented. The memorandum concluded that this campaign would be successful provided “the Western democracies will furnish new proofs of their solidarity toward the nation which within the limits of free Europe now faces with success the strongest communist pressure.” (Ibid., 765.00/3–3055)